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ABSTRACT
SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR
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Under the Supervision of Professor Steven B. Redd

Bringing together foreign policy literature and INGO (international non-governmental
organization) scholarship, this dissertation seeks to explain geographic and temporal
variation in the US government’s use of hard, soft and smart power in the War on Terror.
Making an important theoretical contribution, I revise Nye’s concept of soft power, more
rigorously conceptualizing it as a consciously-utilized strategy employing methods other
than hard power (military or economic sanctions) to influence a target government or
population to enhance US interests. Soft power is a strategic means of achieving a foreign
policy goal. I conceptualize smart power as including both soft and hard power, whose
proportions will vary by context. I argue that the US executive begins its counter-terrorism
strategizing with an assessment of the terrorist threat from a particular country. The US
executive will use hard power to fight a short-term terrorist threat, soft power to fight a
long-term terrorist threat, and smart (i.e., combined) power to fight a combined threat. The
political, economic, and NGO regulatory context of a country also influence the kind and
degree of soft power the US executive uses in countries posing a long-term or combined
threat, ultimately influencing the smart power makeup of US counter-terrorism strategy in
such countries. I examine a particular form of US soft power: government funding of NGOs. I
explore the theoretical and empirical interest of NGOs, arguing that US soft or smart power
utilizing NGOs will be impacted by their goals, capabilities, and the government’s
ii

relationship with them. Employing qualitative methods, I provide a big-picture overview of
US strategy in the War on Terror, as well as country case studies of US strategy in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. This project presents and tests a relevant, innovative, integrated
theory of US foreign policy strategizing, making theoretical and empirical contributions to
foreign policy and INGO literatures.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR
Under what conditions is the US executive likely to use force, also known as hard
power, against a particular threat to the country? Alternatively, under what conditions is
the US executive likely to address specific threats through other methods, such as soft
power? And when will the US executive decide to use a combination of the two kinds of
power? These questions have been significant so long as the US has faced any sort of
security threat and the executive has had to deal with such threats—in other words, for as
long as the United States has existed as a sovereign nation. However, these questions as
they have been framed here, with respect to hard, soft, and combined power, have been
particularly significant since Joseph Nye (2004a) popularized the notion of “soft power.”
The uniqueness of “soft power” lies in the contrast Nye (2004a) draws between it
and the “hard power” used by various actors, usually states. He defines soft power as “the
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments [the latter
being “hard power”]” (x). This concept of soft power has since become quite popular among
academics and policymakers alike, but categorizing what we might call the non-use of force
against particular targets cannot account for the conditions under which the US executive
will decide to use soft power in a particular context. Even Nye’s (2008b) hybrid concept of
“smart power,” which puts forth the possibility that both hard and soft power might be used
concurrently, clarifies only that soft and hard power may be employed as complementary
methods. We are still left wondering when or why the US would use hard, soft, or combined
power and against whom. Nye’s notions of soft and smart power leave an enormous gap,
both theoretical and substantive, regarding the US’s use of various forms of power in
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innumerable contexts, and this dissertation is an important theoretical and empirical step
to fill that void.
Purpose
This dissertation attempts to do the following: 1) re-conceptualize Nye’s soft power
framework as a consciously-utilized strategy employing methods other than hard power,
aimed at target countries to enhance US interests, 2) theorize about the conditions under
which the US is likely to use hard, soft, and smart power in the specific context of the War
on Terror, and 3) test this revised theory through empirical examinations of the War on
Terror in general, but also through case studies of the US War on Terror in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Because Nye’s concept of soft power is rather vague and does not lend itself to
empirical testing, re-conceptualizing the concept was of paramount importance.
Furthermore, putting together a theory about when the US will use hard, soft, and/or smart
(or combined) power goes beyond Nye’s rather prescriptive suggestions that soft power is a
useful tool that should be used by the US more often. The theory I present in this
dissertation thus makes an important contribution to the literature, bringing Nye’s notions
of soft power into the realm of testable theory. I will argue that the US executive is more
likely to use soft, hard, or smart (or combined) power as a function of specific factors, in a
theory that explains both temporal and geographic variation of the US’s deployment of each
of these kinds of power in the War on Terror. And because theories are developed to be
tested, I test mine in both a big-picture overview and in more limited, specific contexts of
the War on Terror that the US has been waging for more than ten years. The application of
my theory to the domain of this war is in itself a substantive contribution to the literature
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on counter-terrorism and, as will be demonstrated shortly, to the literature on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well.
Conceptual Framework
As indicated above, Nye’s (2004a) notion of soft power is well-known and widely
used, but it remains conceptually vague. The concept has been referred to as “shallow,”
(Bohas 2006) and “lack[ing] rigour” (Zahran and Ramos 2010, 16). Furthermore, scholars
such as Fan (2008) have suggested that Nye inadequately articulates the differences
between hard and soft power or the relationship between the two (151), to the extent that
it may be understood from Nye’s work that “soft power is cultural power” and nothing more
(149). Bohas (2006) finds Nye’s discussion of the sources of soft power--US culture, political
values, and foreign policies--too vague (412). Similarly, Fan (2008) points out, “soft
power…is a rather confusing concept” because it does not adequately consider who
possesses soft power in a given country (148). Bohas (2006) and Zahran and Ramos (2010)
agree, pointing to the soft power wielded by non-state actors (19).
In addition, scholars have pointed to another important shortcoming of Nye’s
concept of soft power: the conditions for its use, and the use of the alternatives of hard and
smart or combined power, are unclear. As Eriksson and Norman (2011) write, soft power is
an “ambiguous notion” that can be interpreted and applied in myriad ways (433), implying
that Nye’s ideas do not tell us enough about when soft power is used. Layne (2010)
explicitly states that the causal mechanisms through which Nye claims that soft power
operates are “fuzzy”: for instance, is multilateralism the cause of legitimacy in the eyes of
others, or are shared values the cause (54)?
Against this backdrop of critiques of Nye’s notions of soft, hard, and smart power, I
start with a clearer and more precise definition of soft power. Aside from addressing

4
Hynek’s (2010) critique that soft power may also in some cases be used coercively, I have
not really strayed from Nye’s (2004b) definition of hard power: it refers to traditional
military power, as well as economic power when used to punish or threaten, e.g., through
sanctions. My concept of soft power, however, is much narrower than Nye’s (2004b): he
defines soft power as just “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments” (x). Building upon and revising his concept, however, I conceptualize
“soft power” as a consciously-utilized government strategy that uses non-hard power
methods, aimed at persuasion, to influence a target government or target population in a
way that will enhance US interests. In other words, soft power is a strategic means of
achieving an end or a goal, rather than a form of power that is by definition normatively
desirable, as Nye’s work seems to suggest.
After improving on the definition of soft power as a concept, I have developed in this
dissertation my own theory explaining the conditions under which the US will use hard,
soft, and smart or combined power in a particularly relevant context: the War on Terror. I
focus on the US executive as the primary actor in foreign policy decision-making, as any
discussion of foreign policy decisions must begin with the president (Wittkopf and
McCormick 1998; Banks and Straussman 1999; Rockman 2000). While the Constitution
affords a general separation of powers between the president and Congress, Congress
rarely exhibits strong opposition to presidential foreign policy decisions (Rockman 2000).
Therefore, any effort to explain American foreign policy decisions and strategies must
center around the president; the role of Congress appears to be less important, and is
beyond the scope of this paper. My theory of US strategy in the War on Terror, then, focuses
on the president and his foreign policy advisors, which include Cabinet heads and leaders of
relevant executive agencies, such as USAID.
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So what are the factors impacting the US executive’s decisions to use hard, soft, or
combined power in the War on Terror? I argue that the independent variables shaping US
strategy at a specific point in time and in a specific context are the threat level and/or type
of threat posed by the target country, the target country’s political and economic context,
and the preferences, goals, and work of the relevant NGOs. The president and his advisors
take into account the kind of terrorist threat (short-term, long-term, or various
combinations of the two) they determine to be coming from a particular country. When
facing what it determines to be a short-term terrorist threat, the US executive is more likely
to use hard power, while it is more likely to use soft power when tackling a longer-term
terrorist threat. In the many cases where a combined threat exists, the US executive will
utilize combined or smart power that includes both soft and hard power. The political and
economic context of that target country will also influence US strategy in the kind and
degree to which it uses soft power.
While it is tempting to theorize about the US executive’s use of soft power in
general, even my revised definition of the concept indicates that it covers a great deal of
territory, from government-funded television programs to foreign exchange programs to
government-funded development initiatives in foreign countries. Thus, I have focused in
this dissertation on a particular form of soft power that is both theoretically and
substantively interesting: US funding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Simply
put, NGOs are “private, self-governing, non-profit institutions” with goals ranging from
promoting economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict
resolution to providing humanitarian aid to helping foster civil society and democratic
institutions (Aall 2000, 124). Their activities vary and include relief and development
efforts, advocacy, agenda setting, public education campaigns, and mobilizing publics,
enabling NGOs to influence individuals, states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs),
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and even other non-state actors (Ahmed and Potter 2006,55). INGOs are international NGOs
or NGOs based in one (usually developed) country and operating in another; as Kerlin
(2006) describes, they operate in their various sub-fields but in international contexts.
In recent years, governments have viewed NGOs as offering competitive advantages
that make them desirable channels of dispensing foreign aid, including grass-roots access
and credibility, efficiency, and flexibility (Tvedt 1998; Evans-Kent and Bleiker 2003; Ahmed
and Potter 2006). Despite these perceived advantages, NGOs themselves may be at a
disadvantage when accepting funding from donor governments such as the US (Edwards
and Hulme 1998), and the relationships between NGOs and the governments who fund
them may vary by organization and over time (Najam 2000). Thus, my theory also takes
into account NGOs as an important actor. The US executive’s strategy, in this case whether
to use soft or combined power that involves government funding of NGOs, is also influenced
by the NGOs themselves: their experience, preferences, and goals are the conditions that the
US government uses to decide which NGOs and which of their projects to fund.
All these factors--threat level and/or type of threat posed by the target country, its
political and economic context, and the preferences, goals, and work of the relevant NGOs-can vary over time, and they interact with one another to ultimately shape US strategy in
the War on Terror. As an important note, a smart power strategy can take different forms
based on time and place, and its proportions of soft and hard power will vary based on
these independent variables. Thus I have deemed the term “combined power” more useful
than the term “smart power,” as it does not denote any sort of superiority or normative
advantage of one blending of soft and hard power over another the way Nye’s original
hybrid term does. Finally, this dissertation does not seek to assess the effectiveness or
success of the United State’s strategies in the War on Terror and their respective hard, soft,
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and combined power components. Instead, this dissertation merely seeks to explain the
variation in the breakdown of such a strategy over time and place, contributing to the
theoretical and substantive literature on foreign policy decision-making, counterterrorism,
and soft power.
Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter I has introduced the issues under examination in this dissertation. In
Chapter II, I examine Nye’s concepts of soft, hard, and smart power, as well as applications
and critiques by other scholars. As will be discussed extensively, Nye’s concepts of soft and
smart power are quite interesting but suffer from a lack of conceptual clarity, an inadequate
explanation and differentiation regarding the sources and actors who might wield soft or
smart power, and very little discussion of causal mechanisms through which soft power
operates. I also review the assessments by some scholars that soft power is an ineffective
strategic tool, claims that are relevant and interesting but whose accuracy this project does
not seek to assess. I conclude by suggesting that despite the conceptual and theoretical
inadequacies of Nye’s concepts and arguments catalogued in this chapter, soft power and
smart power remain concepts worth studying, refining, and testing. They represent the
theoretical starting point of this research project.
Chapter III presents my own theory of the conditions under which the US executive
is likely to use soft, hard, and/or combined power, explaining variation in the US
government's use of these different kinds of power in the War on Terror, i.e. the dependent
variable. I argue that the US executive examines threat levels from various contexts, using
hard power against short-term threats, soft power against long-term threats, and smart
(combined) power against combined threats. Examining US government funding of NGOs as
a specific form of soft power, I further suggest that the target country context also impacts
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US strategizing. I also claim that the mission and activities of the relevant NGOs, as well as
their relationship with the US government, further shape US strategy. In other words, threat
levels, the target country context, and the mission and activities of relevant NGOs are the
independent variables that explain variations in the outcome of the hard, soft, and
combined power components of US counter-terrorism strategy in the course of the War on
Terror.
Chapter IV is the first of the three empirical chapters of this dissertation, providing a
big-picture overview of the US War on Terror and applying my theory to explain variation
in the US executive’s decisions to use soft, hard, and combined power over time and place.
This chapter draws on official government documents, memoirs of the president and his
advisors, as well as financial data from Congressional Research Reports and the OECD. I
demonstrate that US hard, soft, and combined strategy has evolved over time and place, in
variation that can be at least partially explained by variation in threat levels (short-term,
long-term, or combined) acknowledged to be emanating from different geographic contexts
over time. The US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the surges there, suggest that
the US is more likely to use hard power when facing a short-term terrorist or security
threat. Alternatively, the executive is more likely to use soft power when facing a long-term
terrorist or security threat, as evidenced by US foreign aid (including support to various
international and local NGOs) to conflict-ridden or unstable countries, as well as the
emphasis on democracy-building in the Middle East and South Asia. More often, however,
the US faces a combined, short-term and long-term threat, implementing a combined
strategy in such cases. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as US hard and soft power
targeting countries such as Pakistan, stand as evidence of this combined strategy.
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In Chapter V, the second empirical chapter of the dissertation, I present a country
case study of Afghanistan as a target of US counter-terrorism strategy in the US War on
Terror. After a brief background discussion of US policy towards the country pre-9/11, most
of the chapter catalogues the evolution of the War on Terror itself in Afghanistan, from its
beginnings in October 2001 until as near the present day as possible. The Afghanistan case
demonstrates the US executive’s decision to use hard power against what is deemed to be
an immediate short-term terrorist or security threat and combined power in what is
deemed to be a combined short-and long-term terrorist or security threat. Furthermore,
Chapter V delves into the specifics of the Afghan country context and the regulatory
environment to test the impact of those variables on the US government’s use of a specific
kind of soft power, funding the work of NGOs. I conclude the chapter by providing an
overview of US-funded NGO work in Afghanistan, along with a more detailed examination of
the work of two specific US-funded INGOs in the country, using original interview data in
the case of the latter.
Chapter VI, the final empirical chapter, is a country case study of Pakistan as a target
of US counter-terrorism strategy in the US War on Terror. As in Chapter V, I begin with a
background on US strategy or policy towards Pakistan before 9/11. After this brief
introduction, I demonstrate that the US has indeed used hard power in Pakistan when
facing what it deemed was a short-term, immediate terrorist or security threat, and that as
the threat level has escalated in recent years, US hard power strategy has also intensified. I
also show that the US has used soft power in Pakistan from the early days of the War on
Terror, in what appear to be efforts to stave off a potential long-term terrorist threat; such
efforts have intensified with the passage of time, at some point becoming part of US
combined power efforts in the country. I also examine the socio-economic and political
country context in Pakistan, which have indeed dictated the kinds of US soft power
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programs and NGO projects implemented in the country. As in Chapter V, I provide both an
overview of US-funded NGO work in the country since the beginning of the War on Terror,
as well as a mini-case study of a US-based INGO, relying on original interview data.
Chapter VIII offers a conclusion to the dissertation by reviewing the most important
findings of this research project. I also discuss the implications of these findings, as well as
potential avenues for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW: SOFT, HARD, AND SMART POWER
Introduction
The empirical goals of this project are to assess how and to explain why the US
government’s use of soft power and hard power, and the relationship between the two, has
changed over time and across countries. Accomplishing these empirical aims would be
impossible, or not very useful from an academic perspective, without a strong theory about
what soft power and smart power actually are. Jospeh Nye is the “father” of the concepts of
“soft” and “smart” power, and this chapter examines his concepts, as well as applications
and critiques by other scholars. As will be discussed extensively in the pages below, Nye’s
concepts of soft and smart power are quite interesting but suffer from a lack of conceptual
clarity, an inadequate explanation and differentiation regarding the sources and actors who
might wield soft or smart power, and very little discussion of causal mechanisms by which
soft power can be said to operate. Some scholars even suggest that soft power is an
ineffective strategic tool, claims that are relevant and interesting but whose accuracy this
project does not seek to assess. Despite the conceptual and theoretical inadequacies of
Nye’s concepts and arguments, however, soft power and smart power remain concepts
worth studying , refining, and testing, and represent the theoretical starting point of this
research project. The next chapter will present my revised, fleshed-out theory of soft, hard,
and smart power and why the US government adopts them and when, as well as why the
strategies vary over time and place. Before revising Nye, however, we must first understand
his arguments and the critiques they have generated.
Soft Power
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Joseph Nye (2004 which one?) popularized the concept of “soft power,” which is
always contrasted with traditional “hard power” used by various actors (usually states). He
defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments [the latter being “hard power”]” (x). Elsewhere, Nye (2004b) writes
that soft power “occurs when one country gets another country to want what it wants,” as
opposed to hard power, used when “a country order[s] others to do what it wants” (76).
Soft power relies on images and messages, which can admittedly be interpreted in different
ways, depending on the audience (Nye 2004 which one?, 44). Nye (2008 ?which one) writes
that because soft power depends on a state’s ability “to shape the preferences of others”
(95), public diplomacy can be seen as an instrument governments use to mobilize soft
power resources to attract not only the governments of other nations, but also the publics of
those foreign countries (100). Because soft power targets an audience, whether it be the
government of another country, or a foreign public (through public diplomacy), Nye
(2008a) writes that “…soft power depends more on the subject’s role […]than does hard
power. Attraction [upon which soft power is based] depends on what is happening inside
the mind of the subject” (xiii). It appears, then, that the success of soft power is partially
dependent on the actions or interpretations of the subject of that power, an issue which has
given rise to much critique by other scholars, as will be examined later.
Given that soft power, or the successful implementation of soft power, depends on
both the actor utilizing it (such as the US government) and the target (the government
and/or people of Pakistan, for instance), what exactly are the sources of soft power? Nye
(2004b) writes that a country’s “culture, its values and domestic practices, and the
perceived legitimacy of its foreign policies” constitute its soft power (5). Thus, a country’s
pop culture, despite containing “an element of triviality and fad,” is an important element of
its soft power, providing that country with “more opportunities to get its messages across
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and to affect the preferences of others” (78). So while Nye (2004b) appears to resent the
critics who have “misused and trivialized [soft power] as merely the influence of Coca-Cola
and blue jeans” (5), he has consistently considered popular culture as a cornerstone of any
country’s soft power. Aside from popular culture and values, though (and more concretely,
perhaps), Nye (2008a) also considers economic resources to be a source of soft power, at
least sometimes, but since they can also be used for hard power, it can be “difficult to
distinguish” the role of each kind of power when it comes to using economic resources (xi).
While it is theoretically plausible and potentially convincing that a country’s economic
resources can be used as tools of both soft and hard power, Nye (2008a) does not take the
time to explain or differentiate or define what kind of economic resources can be deemed
either “soft” or “hard,” which adds to the fuzziness and lack of clarity of some of his concepts
and definitions. This lack of clarity, however, does make economic resources flexible or
open to interpretation, and for the purposes of this research project, the US government’s
support for NGOs (which is to a great extent economic) is considered a use of soft power.
As mentioned above, Nye (2004b) considers the resources of soft power to be a
country’s values and culture, its domestic practices, and its foreign policies (when seen by
others as legitimate). In fact, Nye (2004b) places a country’s foreign policies in the “it
depends” category, even more clearly than he does its economic resources. Essentially,
foreign policies can either enhance or take away from US soft power (since Nye is mostly
considered with American power) in the eyes of others. For example, while President
Carter’s pro-human rights policies, as well as President Reagan and President Clinton’s
democracy promotion policies, have added to American soft power, Nye (2004b) argues
that apparent or perceived arrogant or multilateral foreign policy decisions or actions can
hurt and take away from American soft power (93). In fact, Nye (2010a) states outright that
over the tenure of President George W. Bush, US soft power declined a great deal, as
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evidenced by dramatically lower approval in opinion polls from around the world (4). It
may be empirically questionable to depend only on public opinion polls to measure the soft
power of the United States—after all, is there a real connection between public opinion and
government policy, for instance? Nye defends his reliance on public opinion polls to indicate
the level of American soft power by arguing that “where opinion is strong and consistent
over time, it can have an effect [on policy],” adding that to best measure the connection
between public opinion and “other variables,” one must engage in “careful process tracing
of the sort that historians [and political scientists!] do” (218). So at the very least, Nye
(2010b ) considers public opinion polls as a starting point for measuring soft power, and
such polls have indicated that many foreign policy actions under Pres. G.W. Bush have led to
a decline in American soft power. The point here is not to assess the success or failure of the
War on Terror (although Nye and other scholars certainly do that, and Nye suggests specific
ways to improve the ongoing fight), but to demonstrate how specific foreign policy
decisions and actions, as well as more general attitudes, can, according to Nye, either add to
or take away from the US’s soft power. Determining which of these effects “foreign policy”
in general has is a difficult and interpretive task, highly dependent on the target population
and/or government, inevitably adding to the difficulty of measuring soft power or even
determining whether or not it exists and/or to what relative degree—all points that will be
discussed later in the chapter, and areas upon which my revised theory of soft power,
presented in the next chapter, tries to improve.
That being said, due to the complexities and the relatively subtle nature of soft
power (for Nye, practical more than theoretical), Nye (2008a) points to the challenges it
poses when utilized in government strategies: first, soft power escapes the full control of
the government using it, since it draws upon cultures and values (xiii). Also, credibility is
necessary for soft power to work, which can be a challenge for the US government operating
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in other countries, for example. Furthermore, soft power is not useful in dealing with such
problems such as nuclear weapons in North Korea. However, when the government is
trying to achieve goals like promoting democracy, human rights, and freedom, Nye (2008a)
suggests that we may find that “soft power turns out to be superior to hard power” (xiv).
So why exactly can hard power be more useful or “superior” to soft power, and why
do governments try to implement it? For one thing, Nye (2004b) argues that when a
country’s power is seen by others as legitimate, they are less likely to resist soft power
(expressed through cultural or ideological attraction and the implementation of
international norms, etc.) (77). Furthermore, he suggests that in a changing world, the cost
of military force has risen, so soft power represents a less costly alternative (71); rising
nationalism in poor and weak states means that military occupation and intervention are
less viable alternatives than they were in previous eras (74). Furthermore, because of
modernization, urbanization, and better communication technologies around the world, in
developing countries have seen power less concentrated in governments; it has “diffused”
to other private actors (74), who can, he implies, be influenced more effectively through soft
power. Particularly when dealing with relatively new global issues and threats like
terrorism and drugs, it is more difficult for great powers (such as the US) to get what they
want when using economic and military force—hard power. Instead, they can wield more
influence by utilizing multilateral institutions, good communication, and using information
as a tool—all examples of soft power (75). Thus, Nye (2004b) argues that the US can be
successful in facing the new context of globalization and combating specific problems such
as terrorism not just through coercive military and economic power, but also through soft
power, as expressed through its culture, values, and implementing policies “that make
others feel that they have been consulted and their interests taken into account” (8). It
appears, then, that US unilateral military action, for instance, would be for Nye an example

16
of using hard power, not at all suitable (at least on its own) as a strategy in confronting
terrorism.
Thus, Nye (2010a) writes, “…in the struggle against terrorism, we need to use hard
power against the hard core terrorists, but we cannot hope to win unless we gain the hearts
and minds of the moderates” (7). To accomplish both these objectives, of defeating the
“hard core terrorists” as well as winning over the “moderates,” Nye (2004b) writes, a
successful counter-terrorism strategy by the US should consist of five elements, bringing
together both hard and soft power: military action (preferably not unilateral); intelligencesharing between countries (211); diplomacy, including public diplomacy that targets the
publics of foreign countries and not just their governments; homeland security; and aid and
assistance to increase the capacity of poor countries to deal with their respective challenges
(212). While this five-pronged strategy might be useful to policymakers, it is theoretically
(and perhaps even empirically) unclear, as Nye (2004b) fails to specify which of these
strategies or approaches to use under what conditions. This is a common critique of much
of Nye’s work, and will be more extensively addressed later on in this chapter.
Smart Power
Given the difficulties and challenges of using soft power, and the inevitable futility of
using soft power to deal with serious military threats, for instance (North Korean nuclear
weapons being one example), it would appear that a combination of hard and soft power
would present the most well-rounded and successful foreign policy approach. Enter the
hybrid concept of “smart power”: Nye (2008) writes that “the ability to combine hard and
soft power effectively is ‘smart power’” and wholeheartedly advocates its use, although
admittedly, this concept integrating the two forms of power emerges years after his original
claims on behalf of soft power. Wilson (2008) does a better job defining smart power more
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clearly, explaining it as a situation when actors combine hard and soft power in “mutually
reinforcing “ ways that are efficient and effective (115). For Wilson (2008), it is important to
go back to the definition of power itself, which is the ability to make others act in a way that
they would not have done otherwise. Hard power is when this is done through coercion,
while soft power relies on persuasion (114). Unfortunately, advocacy for smart power is
met with both institutional and political challenges in the US, because of the bias towards
hard power; Wilson (2008) argues that this bias should change so that US officials feel more
comfortable using smart power.
Like Wilson (2008), Nye (2010a) writes not just in defense of smart power as a
concept, but as a practical strategy that should be used, particularly in the War on Terror.
Thus, he argues that the US needs “an integrated strategy for combining hard and soft
power,” that brings together public diplomacy, development assistance, broadcasting, and
other soft power tools into the national security strategy (whose default tools are based in
hard power) (7). Interestingly, Nye (2010a) himself questions what the “right proportion” is
between military spending and soft power spending (7), presumably implying that
governments should be responsible for coming up with the answer to such a question. The
suitable proportion of hard to soft power (even a rough, relative proportion, without
specific details of dollars spent) is also an interesting theoretical question, which Nye fails to
really address, so this is another issue dealt with in my revised theory of soft power.
Despite the lack of theoretical and/or practical clarity of how to decide when to use
soft or hard power, Nye has certainly been working in more practical avenues to promote
the incorporation of soft power—leading to strategies of smart power—in US foreign policy.
For instance, he co-chaired a Smart Power Commission with former Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage, who served under President George W. Bush. Some of the findings
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of this Commission have been that the US had a good smart power strategy during the Cold
War, but has more recently been leaning too much on the military in its foreign policy. This
is a problem, writes Nye (2010a), because “promoting democracy, human rights and
development of civil society are nto best handled with the barrel of a gun” (9). Thus,
according to this Smart Power Commission, the five areas of priority for US foreign policy
are strengthening alliances, global development, public diplomacy based on face-to-face
interactions, economic integration in the global economy, and taking a leadership role in
efforts towards energy security and against climate change (Nye 2010a, 10). Aside from the
fact that these are monumental and rather daunting (and very general) “priorities,” the
interesting point here is that these issues appear to be mostly ones that will utilize soft
power, perhaps to the exclusion of strengthening alliances, which would presumably
involve both hard power and soft power methods. Perhaps this great emphasis on soft
power in the Smart Power Commission stems from the assumption that military efforts
(and economic “hard power” efforts, such as sanctions) are very much a part of US foreign
policy, and do not need to be much improved. In any case, it is striking that even in these
policy or “priority” recommendations by the Smart Power Commission, it remains unclear
what exactly smart power is, or rather what, even generally speaking, the smart vs. hard
power decision should be based on. Most recently, Nye (2011) put forth a few specific
issues that any smart power strategy must address: the preferred goals or outcomes,
available resources based on context, preferences of targets of influence, the type of power
most likely to be successful, and the probability of success (209). This breakdown is the first
step to explaining any sort of hard, soft, or smart power strategy, but certainly further
clarification is needed. Thus, revising Nye’s theories or concepts of soft and smart power
remains necessary, and is part of my theoretical and empirical contributions to this
discussion, as will be laid out in the next chapter.
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Despite the difficulty of measuring the concept of “smart power” or prescribing how
to use it specifically, several scholars call on the US to employ exactly this kind of strategy
and cite its importance. Ferguson (2003), for instance, writes that the US should be
disabused of the notion that it is a superpower, because military (i.e., hard) power is not the
only way to measure its influence. In fact, the US’s military actions since 9/11 have cut into
its soft power. The only way to respond to this shortcoming is to view the world as made up
of global, interdependent networks (32). Blinken (2003) calls for a new strategy of
“engagement” whereby the US goes beyond the Bush doctrine of preemption in order to
deal with problems that cannot be solved by hard power alone (38). The threats facing the
US today (rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism, as Patrick (2006), also
lists them) cannot be destroyed only by hard power. To meet this challenge, the US should
employ four strategies through a “comprehensive engagement” paradigm: threat reduction,
nuclear deterrence, counter-terrorism, and a use of soft power (46). While Blinken’s (2003)
categories are conceptually muddled and may overlap, the direction of his argument
represents an advocacy of the “smart power” approach in a specific context, namely, the
War on Terror.

Application and Expansion of Nye’s Concepts
Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy is one of the subsets of “soft power” most frequently discussed in
the literature, all based on or at least citing to Nye’s concepts. According to Nye (2008 which
one?) public diplomacy can be seen as an instrument governments use to mobilize soft
power resources to attract not only the governments of other nations, but also the publics of
those foreign countries (100). Melissen (2005) defines public diplomacy as an interaction
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characterized by “direct relations with people in a country to extend the values of those
being represented” (8). Williams (2009) points out that public diplomacy has become
especially relevant post-9/11, with the emphasis on winning a “war on ideas” as an
essential part of fighting terrorism (219). Van Ham (2003) also discusses public diplomacy,
although his definition is the broadest of the three. It includes three possible modes:
engaging foreign peoples directly (like Nye 2008; Melissen 2005), influencing citizens to
bring about change in a foreign government, and/or presenting or creating a positive image
of one’s country and its policies. Unlike classical diplomacy, public diplomacy is valueoriented, rather than issue-oriented (429). Public diplomacy seeks to address or shape the
image of a country’s general values in a specific target country, rather than diplomatically
address specific contentious issues between the two countries. As Williams (2009) points
out, public diplomacy has become especially relevant post-9/11, with an emphasis on
winning a “war on ideas” as an essential part of fighting terrorism (219).
Like Nye (2008), Van Ham (2003) points to the importance of public diplomacy in
the post-9/11 world, since, after all, the US is fighting “to win the moral and political
support of the Muslim world” (427). This focus on trying to attract support is clearly in line
with Nye’s (2004 which one?) concept of soft power. Van Ham (2003) even references soft
power when he describes public diplomacy as being a part of “Noopolitik” (as opposed to
realpolitik), which emphasizes a strategy of soft power expressed through the media and
focusing on values, norms, and ideas (440). Thus, public diplomacy, while certainly not a
new phenomenon—Nye (2008 which one?) points to its origins, at least in the US, as long
ago as World War I—can certainly be considered part of the newer concept of soft power.
The question, both theoretically and empirically, is what distinguishes public diplomacy
from soft power? Nye’s (2008) description of public diplomacy as an “instrument” of soft
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power is far from satisfying; this ambiguity becomes most problematic when one sets out to
measure either of the two concepts.
Conceptualization and measurement are not the only problems facing public
diplomacy. As a strategy, it is less predictable than classical diplomacy whose audience was
foreign governments, rather than foreign populations (Melissen 2005). Furthermore, in
order for public diplomacy efforts to be successful, the “brand” or image being created
needs to match the “product” or actual policies of the country being represented (Van Ham
2003). This brings us to the question of the relationship between public diplomacy, or more
broadly, soft power, and more traditional “hard power” actions, such as military operations
or economic sanctions, that governments take, issues that will be taken up both in the
theoretical section of this project (presented in the next chapter) as well as the empirical
testing and application of my revised soft/smart power theory.
Support and Expansion of the Soft Power Concept
While some theoretical problems with Nye’s work have already been presented, and
critique of his concepts will be discussed at much greater length ahead, it is important to
point to scholars who have supported and expanded his concept of soft power without
essentially tearing it apart. Yasushi and McConnell (2008), for instance, argue that while
many people critique Nye’s work for being too state-centered, such criticism is unwarranted
because Nye does in fact acknowledge the role of non-state actors in wielding soft power,
although the two kinds of actors may have different goals or preferences (xx). Seiichi (2008)
goes even further, not just defending Nye’s concept of power but also expanding it, dividing
what he calls the “operation of power,” both soft and hard, into four stages: resources,
transmission, reception, and outcomes. By breaking down the implementation of power
into these stages, Seiichi (2008) suggests that the role of subjectivity in soft power becomes
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important and apparent, so that it is “virtually impossible” to predict the impact of soft
power (193). Interestingly, while Nye argues again and again that the government should
use more soft power, Seiichi (2008) advocates instead for a more limited government role
in wielding soft power, particularly its subset of public diplomacy. Instead of being the
primary wielder or force of soft power, the government should rely on the market to do so
and instead act as a “facilitator and network hub” among the other actors who might better
implement soft power (202). While Seiichi’s (2008) recommendation is unique in the
literature on soft and smart power, his work is noteworthy because it embraces Nye’s
concepts and expands upon them, without the extensive and biting critique (most of it
admittedly valid) that Nye’s work usually provokes by scholars.
In what might count as another defense of Nye’s work, Eriksson and Norman (2011)
analyze Nye’s work and concept of soft power in terms of its political utilization, or how
“particular concepts coined by academics are used in the formulation of policy, whether
those concepts reflect dominant beliefs in society or not” (420). Because Nye’s work on soft
power is easily accessible to policymakers and fits in (to some extent) with earlier policy
paradigms, it has become politically utilized (423). Summarizing Nye’s concept of soft
power as giving rise to policies that rely more on diplomacy than force, trade and cultural
reciprocity instead of threats and military campaigns, and engagement instead of isolation
(427), Eriksson and Norman (2011) suggest that over the course of the Bush
administration, soft power was increasingly politically utilized. In President G.W. Bush’s
first term, the term “soft power” was not used explicitly, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
(in)famously said he did not know what was meant by the term. However, by Bush’s second
term in office, “more emphasis was put on public diplomacy and its budget [were]
somewhat strengthened,” accompanied by increased use of the term by Secretaries Rice,
Powell, and Gates (430-1).Eriksson and Norman (2011) also point out that as a concept (but
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not as an explicit term), soft power was part of the 2002 National Security Strategy (the
basis for what became known as the Bush Doctrine), as well as the 2003 National Security
Strategy, which both referenced the War on Terror as being some sort of war or struggle for
ideas (428). Furthermore, these Strategies suggested the War on Terror to be both a
military and ideological fight against terrorism, implying that soft and hard power would be
complementary tools to wage this war (i.e. smart power) (429). This sort of analysis by
Eriksson and Norman (2011) is useful insofar as it concretely demonstrates the progressive
adoption of the concept and terminology of “soft power” in the US War on Terror, indicating
and reminding us that soft power and smart power are not just concepts debated
theoretically among scholars, but concepts and terms used and implemented, to varying
degrees, in US counter-terrorism strategies—the starting point for this research project.
Implementing Soft Power
Several writers begin with Nye’s concept of soft power and apply it to different
contexts or trace its implementation in various countries. Fraser (2003), for instance, traces
the historical use of soft power in American foreign policy; Hynek (2010) analyzes Canada’s
reliance on soft power in its foreign policy; while Heng (2010) compares the soft power
policies of Japan and China. Fraser’s (2003) application of the soft power concept may be
seen as most directly linked to Nye, who in his development of the concept of soft power has
again and again used the example of the United States (Nye 2004, Nye 2008, etc.). Unlike
Nye, however, Fraser (2003) confines himself to a more narrow definition of soft power,
which he considers to be, in essence, American popular culture: movies, music, television,
fast food, and the like. Contrasting the two types of power, Fraser (2003) writes, “if hard
power, by definition, is based on facts, soft power is based on values” (10), although it is
unclear what exactly he means by “facts,” especially as a distinctive feature of hard power.
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Viewing American soft power through the (rather too) narrow lens of popular culture, he
applies a new name: “weapons of mass distraction” (13), presumably implying that
American popular culture, when spreading to foreign countries, may distract their
respective target populations or governments from what else the US government might be
doing, perhaps from its “fact-based” hard power. This new label for soft power is far from
useful, however, not just because Fraser (2003) does not adequately explain what he means
by it, but also because it implies an opposition between hard and (his restrictive definition
of) soft power, which may very well work in tandem, as Nye explains in his discussions
about smart power.
Heng’s (2010) concept of soft power, on the other hand, is much more satisfying
than Fraser’s (2003), and not just because the former not only points out that both states
and non-state actors, such as NGOs or private sector organizations, can wield soft power (a
point that Nye (2004b) also makes). In addition, Heng (2010) points to Nye’s use of the US
Marshall Plan, which was a mix of military and economic aid, as an example of soft power,
and so soft power, which can involve diplomacy, economic aid, and cultural promotion,
involves an “imperfect correlative relationship between inducements, coercion, and
attractiveness” (280). Thus Heng (2010) does not confine his discussion of soft power to
popular culture, but he does not exclude culture from his application of soft power to the
Chinese and Japanese cases, either. Finally, Hynek’s (2010) discussion of soft power in the
Canadian context is also more sophisticated and less narrow than Fraser’s (2003), as he
analyzes Canada’s use of soft power in the field of “human security,” focusing on NGOgovernment interactions that have been a part of Canada’s foreign and security policies in
recent years. It is interesting to note, then, that while Fraser (2003), Heng (2010), and
Hynek (2010) all seek to apply Nye’s concept of soft power in different contexts, they (and
in all likelihood, countless other scholars) do not all seem to be using the same base concept
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of soft power, and some of these base concepts, like Fraser’s (2003), are by no means
improvements on Nye’s original concept but are in fact too restrictive and narrow.
Despite Fraser’s (2003) narrow definition of soft power, which he confines to (in his
case, American) popular culture, his historical application of the concept is interesting
insofar as it demonstrates ways in which the US government deploys various forms of
American pop culture to promote its strategic interests. This American soft power, suggests
Fraser (2003), “promotes values and beliefs [such as democracy, free enterprise, and
individual freedom] that, while contentious, are ultimately good for the world,” causing
many people across many countries to view the United States as “a model society that has
championed these values” (260). He argues that US soft power has been utilized for a long
time; Cold War projects like the Voice of America radio, activities of the US Information
Agency, and CIA-supported covert projects like the Congress for Cultural Freedom all
represent targeted use of American soft power in the fight against the Soviet Union (28).
Currently, however, American use of soft power surpasses any of its previous
implementations, though, spurred on by globalization (32), although American soft power is
also facing more resistance from non-Western countries, such as Saudi Arabia (33)—this
final statement may or not may be true, since certainly American television, movies, music,
and fast food (which constitute Fraser’s (2003) definition of soft power) are widely popular
even in countries like Saudi Arabia. Despite the possible presence of this animosity toward
American popular culture (soft power) around the world, Fraser (2003) suggests that these
tools of American soft power are “important cultural antidotes” that can help prevent
grievances that may lead to hatred or violence against Americans (265)—here we see
echoes of Nye’s calls for using soft power to help win the War on Terror, although the latter
certainly has more in mind than just pop culture promotion.
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Like Fraser (2003), Hynek (2010) is interested in soft power in foreign policy, but in
his case he analyzes the use of soft power in the Canadian context of “human security,”
whereby “issues traditionally viewed as military problems could be successfully framed as
humanitarian problems” (66). Thus, Hynek (2010) is interested in the collaboration or
interaction between the Canadian government and the NGO sector as an example of the
expanded utilization of soft power in that country’s foreign policies—it would appear, based
on Hynek’s (2010) discussion, that merely involving humanitarian- or developmentoriented NGOs in Canadian foreign policy can in itself be considered an exercise of soft
power on the part of any government; certainly my own project starts with this same basic
notion. Heng’s (2010) comparison of Chinese and Japanese soft power features a seemingly
more expansive concept of soft power than either Fraser’s (2003) or Hynek’s (2010), in the
most Nye-esque application of the concept. Both China’s promotion of its culture and its
attempts to demonstrate adherence to international norms constitute for Heng (2010)
examples of wielding soft power, as does Japan’s liberal democratic system. Interestingly,
though, Heng (2010) suggests that China’s promotion of its culture is a form of soft power
directed not only at external (world) audiences and governments, but also internally at the
Chinese people, “to instill cultural pride, consolidate internal coherence against economic
inequality, [and] promote regime legitimacy through moral example” (286)—here is a slight
expansion of Nye’s concept of soft power.
The most important point Heng (2010) makes comes from the inherent assumption
that countries will exercise different forms of soft power based on their economic system,
regime type, history, and position in the world—so China under authoritarian rule uses soft
power in the form of promoting its culture, signing a non-aggression treaty with ASEAN,
and advocating for its economic development approach as an alternative to Western models
(287). Japan, on the other hand, simply by being a democratically-ruled country, exerts a
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great deal of soft power, but like China, it also promotes its traditional culture as a soft
power tool (286). Heng’s (2010) logic here is not only theoretically satisfying, but it can also
be applied in the other direction; a country will exert its soft power in different ways, or use
a particular mix of hard and soft power (soft power), partly based on the context of its
target country or population, as my own revised theory of soft power will posit—certainly,
Nye’s (2008a) reference to the extensive role of the subject in soft power is relevant here.
Critiquing Nye
Soft Power as a Concept
Nye’s concepts of soft and smart power have generated widespread critique among
scholars, although most of the criticism has been directed against soft, and not smart,
power. Bohas (2006), for instance, Nye’s treatment of soft power is “shallow” because he
considers hard power as “opposed” to soft power, since implicit in his definition is that
“real” power is exercised through force, resulting in a “dichotomy [that] prevents us from
taking soft power seriously” (410). While Bohas (2006) is certainly going too far by
suggesting that that Nye downplays the importance of soft power—after all, Nye coined the
term and developed the concept with the clear goal of demonstrating the utility and
effectiveness of soft power, particularly in US foreign policy!—he does not stand alone in
pointing out the problematic “dichotomy” inherent in Nye’s explanation of soft power.
Hynek (2010), for instance, also critiques the soft and hard power dichotomy, writing that a
“full conceptual appreciation of the notion of soft power is only possible after the original
emphasis on its contrast with hard power is replaced by an examination of the practical
means of achieving soft power” (62). In other words, Hynek (2010) is suggesting that it is
more useful to understand soft power through the ways it is utilized, and Nye’s assertion
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that soft power is always based on attraction, while hard power is always based on
coercion, represents a false starting point for both concepts.
Zahran and Ramos (2010) agree, decrying Nye’s definition of soft power because it
“lacks rigour” (16), as evidenced by Nye’s categorization of hard power as involving tangible
resources command power, whereas soft power involves intangible resources and co-optive
power, where this distinction does not always hold. As counterexamples, Zahran and Ramos
(2010) suggest that a state can use soft power through multilateral institutions a way to
coerce other countries, exercising command behavior, or it could co-optive behavior to
create hard power resources such as military alliances (18). In other words, soft power can
be used to manipulate (and not just “attract” or “co-opt,” as Nye asserts), and co-option or
attraction can be used to generate hard power, a possibility that seems to escape Nye.
Certainly my own project, which examines the US government’s use of soft power in its
funding of and partnerships with NGOs to help fight the War on Terror, not just to prevent
terrorism but also to influence other countries and ensure their cooperation in fighting
terrorism, is an example of soft power being used, at least partially, as an instrument of
coercion, a possibility which Zahran and Ramos (2010) astutely point out.
Fan (2008), too, points to Nye’s problematic definition of soft power, arguing that he
does not clearly articulate the difference between hard and soft power or the relationship
between the two, and that one can understand from Nye’s work that “soft power is nothing
more than the ‘soft’ face of hard power” (151). Certainly Fan’s (2008) critique goes too far
and is much less nuanced than Zahran and Ramos’s (2010) analysis of the problematic
distinctions (or lack thereof) between Nye’s “hard” and “soft” power. After all, while it
seems possible that in some cases soft and hard power may overlap or stem from the same
source (i.e. the US military, mostly viewed as a source and tool of hard power, has
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increasingly been engaging in activities and methods that can be classified as soft power), it
is a misreading of Nye to suggest that soft power is merely an approach or “nice” face of
military or threatening economic resources. Nevertheless, Fan’s (2008) point that Nye’s
explanations of the interaction between the two types of power and the exact differences
between them leave much to be desired is a valid one.
Sources and Actors
Another point of criticism of Nye’s concept of soft power relates to its sources and
the actors who utilize it. As Fan (2008) points out, “soft power…is a rather confusing
concept” not just because Nye describes it in several different ways (i.e. shaping the
preferences of others, or persuasion through attractiveness, etc.) but also because it is
important to consider who possesses soft power in a given country (148). Fan (2008)
demonstrates this last point more specifically, showing that in his early work, Nye (1990)
writes that soft power comes from three sources: culture, international laws and
institutions, and American multinational corporations (MNCs), but by 2004, Nye modifies
the sources of soft power to include culture, political values, and foreign policies, without
explaining the purpose of this conceptual change. Bohas (2006) also finds Nye’s discussion
of the sources of soft power (US culture, political values, and foreign policies) problematic,
because these “sources” are very vague (412). Similarly, Layne (2010) points to the
expansion of the concept of soft power over time: first it referred to ideas and culture, not
carrots and sticks, but most recently, Nye and policymakers and experts influenced by his
work use the term to refer to such varied tools or strategies as multilateral diplomacy,
foreign aid, developmental assistance, exporting democracy, and nation-building (58).
Certainly the revision or expansion of a concept over time is not in itself problematic; the
issue arises when the concept appears to have changed without the necessary theory-
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building or accompanying explanations. Some scholars react to this theoretical or
conceptual expansion by eliminating a large part of the concept: for Fan (2008), “a
country’s soft power itself is not a separate form of soft power but the mere manifestation
of its hard power,” such as political power exercised through military efforts, or economic
power expressed through aid or sanctions (148). Thus, the style of a country’s foreign policy
may be attractive, but it is tied to substance, actually making it a part of hard power;
actually, then, “soft power is cultural power,” and Nye does not make this distinction clear
enough (149). Fan’s (2008) critique does go too far—it is altogether too simplistic to do
away with all of foreign policy as involving soft power, and regard only culture, in the
manner of Fraser (2003), as a source of a country’s soft power—but he does pick up on an
important ambiguity and lack of conceptual clarity in Nye’s delineation of the sources of soft
power.
Similarly, Zahran and Ramos (2010) argue that Nye does not clarify which actors
hold soft power; he assumes that the state does, but many non-state actors have both kinds
of power (19); furthermore, Nye does not account for the relationship between the state
and civil society, two important sources of soft power (20). Bohas (2006) shares this
sentiment, arguing that when examining power in general, we need to look at non-state
actors, who can influence government decisions (400); he implies that Nye does not
consider non-state actors in his discussions of power. This critique is certainly exaggerated,
as Nye (2004b) does point out that non-state actors can wield soft power. However, Zahran
and Ramos’s (2010) critique that the relationship between governments and other actors,
the soft power of each, and the relationships between, is under-theorized in Nye’s work is
well-taken. My work, for instance, considers non-state actors (specifically, NGOs) as sources
of soft power that are utilized by the US government, but certainly the two actors have
different agendas, and the ultimate form that the US expression of soft power takes in a
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given context partially on the relationship between the government and the NGOs—in other
words, NGO preferences and goals can constrain US soft power (and smart power)
strategies.
Causal Mechanisms
Yet another critique aimed at Nye’s concept of soft power involves its causal
mechanisms, or how exactly soft power works. Although Nye (2010) answers many of his
critics by claiming that “soft power is an analytical concept, not a theory,” implying that
scholars should stop treating it as a theory (219), his discussions of why the US should use
more soft power and how soft power can help in the war against terrorism, for example,
depart from the realm of simple “concepts” and enter into realm of actual theory, ultimately
precluding this rather weak response. As Eriksson and Norman (2011) write, soft power is
an “ambiguous notion” that can be interpreted and applied in myriad ways (433), implying
that Nye does not adequately how soft power works. Layne (2010) explicitly states that “the
causal mechanisms through which soft power is supposed to operate are fuzzy […]is
legitimacy [in the eyes of others] the consequence of multilateralism, of shared values, or
both?” (54). This point is well-taken; not only does Nye include different (and vague)
potential sources of soft power in his definition of the concept, as well as fail to explain the
relationships among the various actors involved in soft power, but he also does not explain
how exactly soft power operates in a clear and theoretically logical way. How exactly does
promoting human rights, or projecting a positive image of the United States through its
movies, add to the United States’ soft power? And what are the consequences of that?
Furthermore, Layne (2010) adds that “although Nye does not cast soft power as a theory,”
the concept must be empirically tested to assess the validity and causal logic of Nye’s claims
(53); this research project is certainly an answer to this call, aiming not only to revise and
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refine Nye’s theory of soft, hard, and smart power, but to empirically test it in the context of
the US War on Terror.
Some scholars put forth new perspectives on soft power that can map out clearer
causal mechanisms through which it operates. Bohas (2006), for example, argues that to in
order to understand soft power, we need to think in terms of domination and hegemony;
thus soft power interacts with force and economic capital and “constrains by shaping
upstream rather than coercing later,” targeting individuals and utilizing non-state actors
such as MNCs and NGOs who are closely allied with US territory (411). Thus, for Bohas
(2006), American hegemony in the world is mostly made up of a “soft power which
constrains foreign people through the diffusion of the American way of life” (397), to the
extent that people are so influenced by American soft power that they cannot live without
American cultural products. In an illustrative example, Bohas (2006) points to the paradox
of the anti-Americanism that exploded around the world as a result of opposition to the
2003 invasion of Iraq: despite the widespread outrage against US foreign policy, people in
most countries did NOT, as might have been expected, boycott American goods, because
they are so “constrained” by American cultural soft power that they simply cannot live
without American products. While Bohas’s (2006) theory takes Nye’s concept in a very
different direction from what Nye presumably intends, it is an example of taking the
concept of soft power (and restricting it to its cultural elements, albeit “supported by socioeconomic structures” (397)) and explaining how it operates and what effects it has,
something Nye fails to clearly and explicitly do.
More specific than Bohas’s (2006) critique is Hynek’s (2010) analysis of the
interaction between governments and NGOs in the Canadian “human security” context. His
argument is interesting because it does not present a causal mechanism of how soft power
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operates in general, but rather how a widely-held notion of the relationship between NGOs,
who have been utilized by the Canadian government (and others) as a way to increase soft
power, and the government is simply wrong. Thus, Hynek (2010) describes his argument as
a “rebuttal of the usually stressed causal arrow flowing from the NGOs toward the
government (i.e. the idea that the pressure of NGOs leads to changes of governmental
preferences)”; instead, NGOs impact government preferences and thus policies, but the
government also impacts what NGOs can or cannot do (69). Here is an argument about how
soft power can work in a bi-directional way, influencing preferences and thus actions or
policies, flowing either from NGOs to government or from government to NGOs (or both,
presumably). Not only does Hynek (2010) bring specific actors and how they interact into
the picture, but also demonstrates that the relationship does not take only one form, instead
varying by context and over time—Canada’s national security goals in the War on Terror
impacted how it dealt with NGOs and the kinds of NGO projects the government funded, for
instance. Certainly NGOs and governments are not the only actors involved in smart power
(even Nye would agree with that), but Hynek’s (2010) argument is useful insofar as it
demonstrates how the concept of soft power can be fleshed out into a causal argument
about how different actors can exercise soft power and impact one another in various ways.
In a more general and thus more widely applicable alternative, Lukes (2005) also
outlines what might be considered categories of causal pathways, something not addressed
in Nye’s work, although the former’s explanations are not as radical as Bohas’s (2006) or as
actor-specific as Hynek’s (2010). For Lukes (2005), it is important to understand how
exactly the “attraction” or “co-option” or “persuasion” of soft power takes place, and thus it
is important to “distinguish between different ways of securing compliance through
persuasion” (490). Mattern (2005) agrees, critiquing Nye for not clearly explaining the
concept of attraction and how it works; Lukes (2005) tries to flesh out this concept and
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presents a causal argument of how one actor can “attract” another. An actor wielding soft
power can either employ different strategies to induce compliance based on the fixed or
assumed preferences of the target, or the actor wielding soft power can actually change the
target’s preferences. Furthermore, Lukes (2005) emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing
between when soft power is used (under what conditions?) and the mechanisms or
strategies by which it is employed (how is soft power used?) (491).
So while unlike Bohas (2006), Lukes (2005) does not present a clear theory of how,
for example, American hegemony persists because US soft power—culture—constrains
how target populations choose to live, thereby cementing American world domination, the
latter does present a categorization of how we can analyze and understand soft power and
the different pathways through which it can operate. We can apply Lukes’s (2005) theory
and say, for instance, that the US uses soft power to change the preferences of the Afghans
under conditions of a military invasion and through funding NGOs that support democratic
governance. We can also apply Luke’s (2005) theory and say alternatively that the US works
with the preferences of the Pakistani government (staying in power) in conditions of
extreme poverty by funding NGOs working toward economic development, thus preventing
some potential challenges against Musharraf’s regime. This is a far cry from Nye’s work,
which posits, in article after article and book after book, that soft power, stemming from
American values, culture, and foreign policy, can attract other countries to do what the US
wants, without really explaining how.
The Ineffectiveness of Soft and Smart Power
Not all scholars agree with Nye, or even with other scholars who critique Nye’s
concept but consider it an important one (Lukes 2005; Bohas 2006; Fen 2008, and others)
on the importance of soft power or its subset of public diplomacy. Sondhaus (2007)
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disputes Nye’s advocacy of the importance of soft power, pointing to NATO’s intervention in
Kosovo and US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 as evidence that
despite Nye’s assertions, “hard power” remains relevant and important (203). Thus,
Sondhaus (2007) argues that while hard power supported by soft power is a good strategy,
“soft power not supported by hard power is no power at all” (214); for him, this is an
insurmountable problem in Nye’s (2004) theory. It is inaccurate to say, however, that Nye
(2004) actually proposes that the US exert soft power to the exclusion of hard power, since
his concept of smart power calls on using a combination of the two.
While Sondaus (2007) suggests that soft power is not useful when it is not
supported or backed by hard power, Layne (2010) goes even further in his critique of Nye’s
concept, arguing that soft power, even with the existence of hard power, is not an effective
as a strategy. He cites the example of Pres. Bush in his second term, where his
administration tried to incorporate more soft power approaches, such as when Secretary of
State Rice met with European leaders to “mend relations” that had been hurt by the
controversy over the 2003 Iraq invasion, and “yet, this soft power diplomacy yielded scant
results” (63). Furthermore, Layne (2010) declares that President Obama, “whom the
Europeans regard as the embodiment of the virtues of hard power,” was unsuccessful in
convincing NATO members to add to their Afghanistan commitments in a 2009 meeting
(63). He points to yet another example: President Obama’s speech in Cairo in 2009, aimed at
improving US relations with the Muslim world, a goal that was not achieved, according to
Layne (2010), and will not be achieved until the US puts in place policies that align with the
national interests of Muslim countries (71). It appears here that Layne (2010) is missing the
point, reducing the entire concept of soft power into speeches and rhetoric, which are
certainly a part of soft power (public diplomacy), but not to the exclusion of actual
“policies.” Perhaps Layne’s (2010) point about the strategic futility of soft or smart power is
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a valid one—and the purposes of this research project are NOT to assess the success or lack
thereof of smart power strategies in the War on Terror, but rather to trace and explain their
development and variation over time and across countries. Even so, Layne (2010) appears
to be trivializing Nye’s concept, however flawed, into “nice” rhetoric or a president’s
reputation for cooperation and diplomatic demeanor, rather than actual strategies and
actions based on soft power.
Layne (2010) has even more to say about smart power, arguing that it is just
another label for the liberal foreign policy strategies of democracy and good governance
promotion and economic development, used in the War on Terror to stave off the collapse
and failure of weak states in order to reduce the threat of terrorism (68). Thus, smart power
is just another name for modernization theory and nation-building, two strategies that the
US has applied and failed at since the Vietnam War (70). Nye (2010) responds directly to
this critique, arguing that smart power is not just another name for democracy promotion,
good governance, and economic development, but it “can be applied to many different
policies in different contexts, and its descriptive content can also fit different situations”
(225). This is not a very strong or rigorous response to such a scathing and fundamental
critique, but Nye’s (2010) implied point, that even if smart power uses the specific
strategies of promoting democracy and economic development, it can be applied in contexts
as diverse as the War on Terror or the Arab Spring, is a valid one. In other words, smart
power has as its goal attracting others, whether they be populations or governments of
target countries, in ways that align with American interests, and not just modernization
theory or democracy promotion because development and democracy are in themselves
normatively desirable.
Conclusion

37
Although Layne’s (2010) critiques may be unwarrantedly harsh, it is also clear that
Nye’s work is far from theoretically satisfying. While the theoretical discussion of using “soft
power,” or combining soft power and hard power into “smart power,” is an interesting and
attractive one, the concepts of soft and smart power are vague and unclear—any type of
non-military action might fit under Nye’s (2004) definition of soft power, or any nonmilitary action combined with military action might fit into Nye’s (2008) and Wilson’s
(2008) definitions of soft power. It is therefore not very useful to describe a strategy—here,
the US strategy in its War on Terror—as being one of merely “soft” or “smart” power
without refining Nye’s concepts and presenting a revised theory, since applying these
concept does not tell us much about what exactly the strategy entails, the motivation behind
it, etc. There is evidence to suggest that US policymakers have espoused the use of “soft” or
“smart” power in the context of the War on Terror—former US Homeland Security
Secretary Chertoff (2008), for instance, wrote that the US should use “soft power” in order
to “win nations and peoples to its side…[and]reduce the appeal of terrorist organizations
and deter individuals from joining them” (14). After all, what politician or policymaker
would not want to advocate the use of such an attractive strategy?
However, the expectation in this research project is that while US policymakers
may frequently all cite the necessity of using soft power—and calls for the use of “soft” or
“smart” power seem to have increased as the War on Terror has evolved—applications of
what is called “soft” power (relevant here is the use of NGOs), and its combination with
“hard power,” resulting in “smart power,” will take on different forms in various contexts.
Thus the next chapter will present my theory of US strategies in the War on Terror, which
rely on both hard and soft power, often combining them into smart power, and why it varies
over time and across geographical contexts, based on several factors—so soft power, often
combined with hard power, will look different based on the situation. In order to make
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Nye’s work more useful theoretically and convincing empirically, a more comprehensive
and specific theory of hard, soft, and smart power must be explained.
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CHAPTER 3
A MORE RIGOROUS THEORY OF SOFT, HARD, AND COMBINED POWER
Introduction
The United States War on Terror has proven to be a unique kind of war, with
military as well as non-military offensives. In fact, the United States has been using not only
traditional “hard power” approaches to this ten year-old war, but has also arguably been
using non-traditional, “soft power” methods. This research project seeks to explain the
variation in the US government’s use of hard, soft and smart (i.e., combined) power in the
War on Terror, examining soft and smart power specifically through the US government’s
partnering with or funding international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). In
order to explain the variation in US soft /hard power strategy, both over time and across
countries, it is necessary to examine three sets of factors: the US government’s goals and
leadership preferences; the threat level and political and economic context of the target
country; and the goals and preferences of the INGOs involved. By examining these three
factors, we can explain the variation in the kind and extent of US-INGO interaction in the
different countries where the US is waging its War on Terror.
This theory seeks to explain both temporal and geographic variation in the US
government’s strategy, accounting for its hard and soft power elements and a variety of
possible combinations of the two. In other words, under what conditions is the US
government more likely to use soft, hard, or various degrees of smart power in fighting the
War on Terror? I argue that the independent variables that shape US strategy at a specific
point in time and in a specific context are the threat level and/or type of threat posed by the
target country, the target country’s political and economic context, and the preferences,
goals, and work of the relevant NGOs. The primary actor here is the US executive, namely
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the President and his advisors, who take the first step in making strategy based on their
ideological preferences, in favor of using either more or less force to combat threats. The
next step of the strategy-making process is the assessment and determination of the threat
level coming from a specific country: short-term vs. long-term potential for terrorism. When
facing what it determines to be a short-term terrorist threat, the US executive is more likely
to use hard power, while it is more likely to decide to use soft power when tackling a
longer-term terrorist threat. In the many cases where a combined threat exists, the US
executive will utilize combined or smart power that includes both soft and hard power. The
exact makeup of the smart power used, i.e., its proportions of hard and soft power, will
depend on the other variables: the makeup of the combined threat, the political and
economic needs of the host country, and the preferences and capabilities of the NGOs. I also
include a few control variables that figure into strategizing in the War on Terror: executive
leadership preferences and ideology, the United State’s relative power in the world, and
military capabilities or power of the target country.
Once the US executive has determined the threat level coming from a particular
country, other variables may impact the executive’s counter-terrorism strategy. A threat
level that is determined to be immediate and short-term is enough to explain the US
executive’s use of hard power, but the threat level alone cannot account for the type and
extent of soft power tools the US government uses to fight long-term or combined (short
and long-term, together) terrorist threats. In such situations, the political and economic
context of the target country also comes into play. Specifically, the political and economic
needs of a target country determined to pose a long-term or combined terrorist threat will
impact the kind of soft power tools the US will use. Since this project examines a specific
type of soft power used by the US government in the War on Terror, the target
governments’ treatment of NGOs will also influence US strategy. The US will use less of this
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soft power when the target country’s government places more limitations on NGO activity,
and vice versa. In this way, the target country’s political context will impact the extent to
which US counter-terrorism strategy uses soft power. In situations where the US faces a
combined threat and thus uses smart power, the target country’s policies will help
determine the makeup of the combination of hard and soft power. I am examining a specific
example of US soft power in this project, funding and partnering with NGOs, whose work, in
cases of a US smart power strategy, will interact with hard power efforts. Thus, the US
executive interacts with this final actor in developing and then implementing US counterterrorism strategy. The experience, goals, and capabilities of these NGOs, as well as their
relationship with the US government, are the conditions that determine whether or not the
US decides to partner with them in fighting terrorism, and then whether to continue that
partnership over time.
My theory, then, illustrated in Figure 1, explains the conditions under which the US
executive decides to use either hard or soft power, or various degrees of smart power, in
fighting the War on Terror. The President and his advisors, who have their ideological
preferences, take into account the kind of terrorist threat (short-term, long-term, or various
combinations of the two) they determine to be coming from a particular country. The
political and economic context of that target country will also influence US strategy in the
kind and degree to which it uses soft power. Finally, the US executive’s strategy is also
influenced by the NGOs themselves: their experience, preferences, and goals are the
conditions that the US government uses to decide which NGOs and which of their projects to
fund. All of these independent variables vary over time, and they interact with one another
to ultimately shape US strategy in the War on Terror, specifically its soft, hard, and smart
power components. As a final note, a smart power strategy can take different forms based
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on time and place, and its proportions of soft and hard power will vary based on the
independent variables examined here.
Figure 1
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Soft Power: A Revised Definition
This chapter presents my theory of hard, soft, and smart power strategies in the US
War on Terror; the specific form of soft power examined here is US partnerships with NGOs.
Any theory incorporating the concept of soft power must start with Joseph Nye’s work, as
he coined the widely-used phrase. However, Nye’s concept of soft power is problematic in
several ways, the most important of which are a general lack of conceptual clarity and rigor
(Bohas 2006; Hynek 2010; Zahran and Ramos 2010; Fan 2008); no clear delineation
regarding the sources and actors involved in soft power (Fan 2008; Bohas 2006; Zahran and
Ramos 2010); and no explicit outlining of the causal mechanisms involved in the use or
implementation of soft power (Eriksson and Norman 2011; Layne 2010; Bohas 2006;
Hynek 2010; Lukes 2005; Mattern 2005). It is worth noting once again that one of Nye’s
(2010b) responses to his critics has been that his concept of soft power is “an analytic
concept, not a theory” (219). However, his numerous publications on the subject and his
various suggestions about how and why soft power can be an effective tool of US foreign
policy (2004b, 2010a) have pushed soft power into the realm of actual theory, even if Nye
fails to acknowledge that.
In order for the concept of soft power—and by extension, the concept of smart
power—to be useful, it is necessary to use a clearer and more precise concept of soft power,
one that points to the sources and actors involved. It is equally necessary to present a
theory of how and why soft power is used, which is the purpose of this chapter. In this
project, hard power is used to mean the use of coercive power. Aside from addressing
Hynek’s (2010) critique that soft power may also in some cases be used coercively, I have
not really strayed from Nye’s (2004b) definition. Hard power, then, refers to traditional
military power, as well as economic power when used to punish or threaten, i.e., through
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sanctions. My concept of soft power, however, is much more narrow than Nye’s (2004a): he
defines soft power as just “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than
coercion or payments” (x). Nye also points to three general sources of soft power, which in
their current theoretical incarnation are a country’s “culture, its values and domestic
practices, and the perceived legitimacy of its foreign policies” (Nye 2004b, 5). In order to
make the concept of soft power more theoretically useful and open to operationalization,
we must narrow its definition or go down the “ladder of abstraction,” in the words of Sartori
(1970), Building upon and revising Nye’s concept, however, I conceptualize “soft power” as
a consciously-utilized strategy that uses non-hard power methods, aimed at persuasion, to
influence a target government or target population in a way that will enhance US interests;
soft power is a strategic means of achieving an end or a goal.
In my revised concept, then, soft power does NOT just spontaneously or
unconsciously “happen,” the way Nye (2004b) suggests it can when he writes that it can
emerge from society rather than from conscious government action (92). My concept of soft
power does not preclude American popular culture as a possible source of soft power, but it
is soft power only when it is consciously utilized by the US government in order to enhance
American interests or goals. Why this specificity? One problem with Nye’s concept of soft
power is a lack of operationalization; it is empirically hard to measure or recognize, since it
mostly refers to outcomes, as indicated by his discussion of a decline in American soft
power as evidenced by opinion poll data (Nye 2010a, 4). But we cannot take soft power
seriously as a legitimate theoretical concept if we measure it based on outcomes; instead,
my concept of soft power measures consciously-adopted and implemented strategy, making
for a theoretically clearer concept. Finally, while as Nye (2004b) himself and other scholars
(Heng 2010; Zahran and Ramos 2010; Bohas 2006) have pointed out, non-state actors can
certainly exhibit or use or generate soft power, in this project, the actor generating soft
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power is the US government. However, the United States government can and does rely on
and utilize other actors, such as NGOs, in implementing soft power strategies.
So in my revised concept, what are the sources of soft power, and what forms can it
take? The sources of soft power may lie, as Nye (2004b) suggests in the culture, values and
actions, and positively-viewed foreign policy, if and when these sources are utilized in US
government strategy. For instance, in my concept of soft power, popular American
television shows viewed by foreign publics can be considered soft power only if they are
actively promoted by the US government. Soft power, then, can take a myriad number of
forms: funding NGOs to do development work in target countries, US government-funded
promotion of American culture or business in pursuit of specific policy goals or objectives;
diplomatic efforts highlighting the superiority and success of the American values of human
rights and democratic governance to help reach specific US goals, etc. Thus my conceptual
definition is a narrower one than Nye’s, but it retains some flexibility, as soft power will
vary based on context.
Clearly soft power, even according to my more narrow definition of the concept, has
been widely used and implemented as a strategy by the US government, but it is also clear
that soft and hard power are often pursued as complementary strategies. So while Nye’s
(2008b) label of “smart power” may appear trite, his definition of the term, “the ability to
combine hard and soft power effectively,” is still a useful baseline in my theory, with one
caveat. The adverb “effectively” is not theoretically useful, as determining what combination
of hard and soft power is effective requires an assessment of policy outcomes, which is not
the goal of this project. Thus, in this project, smart power refers to an integrated strategy of
both hard and soft power, in which the US government consciously and purposefully
combines hard power with other more persuasive, non-threatening exercises of power, i.e.,
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soft power, in pursuing US interests. Just as soft power can take various forms, so can smart
power—we can imagine an infinite possibility of soft power/hard power combinations. It
is impossible to define the exact proportion of hard to soft power inherent in smart power:
doing so would almost be measuring part of the dependent variable of this project, i.e. the
various levels of soft and hard power, or their combination (smart power) the US uses in its
War on Terror. Smart power by definition varies across time and place in its proportions of
hard and soft power,
The US Executive and Foreign Policy
This theory explaining US strategies based on hard, soft, or various degrees of smart
power, starts with the US executive: the President and his advisors. Any discussion of
foreign policy decisions must begin with the president, who is the central actor and
decision-maker in this area (Wittkopf and McCormick 1998; Banks and Straussman 1999;
Rockman 2000). As Wittkopf and McCormick (1998) demonstrate, even a watershed
moment like the end of the Cold War did not disrupt this relationship between Congress
and the President (442). Thus, foreign policy remains dominated by the President, with
members of Congress supporting or opposing his positions based on their ideological
preferences (457). Rockman (2000) agrees, suggesting that while the Constitution affords a
general separation of powers between the President and Congress, Congress rarely exhibits
strong opposition to Presidential foreign policy decisions. The President is more focused on
world affairs, but Congress is generally preoccupied with domestic issues, so its foreign
policy role has been “reactive rather than proactive” (143). Banks and Straussman (1999)
echo this same idea but see it as a problem that may lead to an “imperial” presidency, as the
title of their article suggests. For them, the US military campaign in Bosnia, which President
Clinton funded without Congressional authorization, violated the Constitution (1999). A
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more recent example of the same kind of issue arose regarding US involvement in the
current NATO campaign in Libya, where despite a great deal of Congressional opposition,
the American offensive continued for months.
An assessment of the normative implications of the President’s power in American
foreign policy is beyond the scope of this project. The point is that any effort to explain
American foreign policy decisions and strategies must start with the President, and the role
of Congress appears to be less important, and is thus beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Dobbins et al. (2008) even call the President the “prime mover” of American foreign policy
(3). This theory of US strategy in the War on Terror, then, will not take into account
Congressional actions or positions, but will instead focus on the President, his foreign policy
advisors, which include Cabinet heads and leaders of relevant executive agencies, such as
USAID. Some scholars, such as Sicherman (2011), argue that US foreign policy is
constrained to some extent by public opinion. Thus foreign policy that is very widely
unpopular cannot endure, making US foreign policy options limited by the pragmatic
culture of American society (362). The impact of public opinion on US foreign policy
decisions, however, is far from uncontested. Scholars including Holsti (1992; 1998) and
Jentleson and Britton (1998) defend the importance, lack of volatility and, in the case of the
latter, the relative “prudence” of American public opinion in foreign policy issues. Other
scholars disagree. Burk (1999), for instance, finds evidence challenging the “casualties
hypothesis,” arguing that the level of casualties in a US military intervention cannot explain
the level of public support for or against US military intervention. Thus, public opinion
cannot account for US executive decisions to continue or pull out of military offensives in
Lebanon or Somalia. Since the possible impact of public opinion on executive foreign policy
decisions is unclear, my theory does not take it into account in explaining US foreign policy
strategy.
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The Terrorist Threat
The above section discussed the importance of executive preferences, particularly
as they relate to the usefulness of soft, hard, and smart power to deal with threats against
the US. My theory posits that the next step in the formulation of foreign policy strategy in
the War on Terror is the US executive’s assessment of the threat level posed by a particular
geographic location. The important distinction here is between short-term, immediate
terrorist threats and long-term, potential terrorist threats. In other words, the US fights
against both actual, existing terrorists who pose an immediate threat against the US, but the
US also works to prevent actual threats from developing and becoming immediate threats
in the present and future. I suggest that the threat level determined by the US executive to
be coming from a particular country will determine what kind of power—hard, soft, or
smart—the US decides to use to fight the terrorist threat.
Short-Term, Immediate Terrorist Threats
Hypothesis 1: The US executive is more likely to rely on hard power tools, i.e. military power,
rather than soft power tools, in addressing short-term, immediate, existing terrorist threats.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (2009), who served under Presidents
Bush and Obama, implied a relationship between the kind of terrorist threat posed in a
specific context and the tools best suited to address that threat. The use of military force is
necessary to fight and capture existing terrorists but, Gates (2009) suggests, in the long run,
a different strategy must be adopted to prevent future threats from emerging and
threatening US security. These include measures such as development programs and prodemocracy efforts (12), in other words, soft power. Ayub and Kouvo (2008) point to this
same distinction, arguing that in Afghanistan, there has been a “mismatch” between shortterm security and counter-terrorism operations and long-term, state-building concerns
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(641). In the language of my theory, both Gates (2009) and Ayub and Kouvo (2008) point to
a complex situation whereby military efforts are needed to address short-term, immediate
terrorist threats, but soft power tools are needed to address the long-term terrorist threat
and prevent it from growing into an immediate one.
Longer-Term, Potential Terrorist Threats
Hypothesis 2: The US executive is more likely to rely on soft power tools, rather than hard
power tools, in addressing long-term, potential terrorist threats in an effort to prevent them
from escalating into immediate, short-term terrorist threats. In contexts where both a shortterm and long-term terrorist threat is determined to exist, the US executive is more likely to
rely on a combination of hard and soft power tools, rather than choosing just one of these. The
kind of smart power combination that emerges, or its proportion of hard to soft power, will
depend in part on the combination of the threat; i.e., if the short-term threat is minimal and
the long-term threat is extensive, US strategy will rely on more soft power than hard power,
and vice versa.

Soft power strategies have increasingly come into play in addressing the longerterm terrorist threats that exist against the United States. This project deals with variation
over time and place in the War on Terror, and as Dobbins et al. (2008) astutely suggest,
when examining foreign policies of specific Presidents, one must consider the learning that
takes place over time within administrations (1). If we see an increased emphasis on
addressing long-term terrorist threats within the Bush or Obama administrations over time,
it is not necessarily the case that the long-term threats just arose and increased over time. It
may also or instead be the case that there was a new determination by the administration
that this long-term threat existed. In this theory, any terrorist threat must be determined by
the President and his advisors to exist in order for any counter-terrorism strategy to be
forged.
Given that the President and his advisors must determine the existence of a longterm, potential terrorist threat in order to combat it, what is the logic of using soft power

50
tools to do so? Essentially, a soft power strategy stems from the belief among policymakers
and some academics that instability and a lack of development are important causes of
terrorism. As Tujan et al. (2004) write, the connection between the lack of development and
instability and terrorism exists because terrorism takes advantage of the difficult conditions
resulting from poverty, war, occupation, and repression as a means of mobilizing
dissatisfied members of such countries, justifying to them the use of terrorism (54).
Wunderle and Brier (2007) suggest that the US must realize that military operations alone
will not put an end to terrorism and instead, fighting poverty, promoting education, free
markets, and economic relations with the US should be used as ways to fight terrorism
(2008). My argument is that the latter strategies, all utilizing soft power tools, are seen by
policymakers as a tool to address the long-term, potential threats of terrorism.
One way that tools of soft power—consciously-utilized, non-threatening methods
aimed at persuading populations or governments, influencing them in a way that aligns
with US interests—in target countries are seen as useful is by addressing grievances of the
population that might, if left unchecked, explode into actual and immediate terrorist threats.
In other words, this kind of soft power involves public diplomacy (Nye 2008a). Wunderle
and Briere (2007) describe the grievances among the publics of foreign countries that
present a long-term terrorist threat to the US. They discuss the “inner conflict” that exists in
the minds of the youth in poor, underdeveloped countries. These young people
simultaneously admire Western civilization and are taught to revile it on moral grounds,
particularly in Muslim countries. This “inner conflict” can grow and be exploited by terrorist
leaders, who capitalize on people’s humiliation and religious fervor to incite violence
against Western countries (206). Moghadam’s (2006) discussion of the “globalization of
martyrdom” is in line with this kind of logic. Even Michael Chertoff (2008) himself, Bush’s
second Homeland Security secretary, wrote that the growth of terrorism is due to failed
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political and economic systems in the developing world, whereby “violent Islamic
extremism” was adopted as an ideology by those frustrated with the state of affairs in their
country (15). The debate about motivations for terrorism is an ongoing one—Pape (2003),
for instance, argues that extremist Islamist ideology is not a cause or motivation of
terrorism, while Moghadam (2006) insists that Islamic fundamentalism is an important
motivation for terrorism. It is clear that the roots of terrorism are complex and probably
involve not just poverty and underdevelopment but also ideological and political goals. The
point here is that tools of soft power, using such methods as funding and partnering with
NGOs, appear to be most suited to address grievances such as poverty and
underdevelopment that may morph into actual and immediate terrorist threats.
Addressing mass grievances and long-term terrorist threats through tools of soft
power can in this way be used to prevent their growth into more pressing and immediate
short-term threats of terrorism. Wunderle and Briere (2007) indicate that the US should
“align” the resources of its foreign assistance programs with its foreign policy objectives
(211), suggesting that development aid should be included in the overall foreign policy
strategies of combating terrorism. Former Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff (2008)
even refers explicitly to Nye’s concept of soft power as an important part of US antiterrorism strategy. He argues that the US needs to take concrete steps such as providing
humanitarian aid to developing countries not just to fight poverty, but also to make
extremist terrorist ideology less appealing—i.e., addressing the long-term threat of
potential terrorism. Potential recruits are not driven to desperate measures or ideas if they
have more economic opportunities or if they see the US as a helpful power instead of as an
enemy (Chertoff 2008).
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This second benefit of US provision of humanitarian aid to developing countries
who pose threats to the US is evident when Chertoff (2008) cites US relief efforts after the
2004 tsunami which, he writes, helped improve Indonesian public opinion towards the US
and decrease Indonesian public approval of terrorist groups (15). As De Wijk (2003) writes,
the War on Terror is unusual because the US needs to use not just traditional military and
diplomatic power, but also other soft power tools such as humanitarian aid and
propaganda, to win over the populations of the Muslim world (19). Of course, traditional
diplomacy is one form of soft power, but De Wijk (2003) is calling for additional uses of soft
power: attracting Muslim populations through public diplomacy, along with foreign aid.
Lord (2006) agrees with De Wijk (2003), writing that any long-term efforts to combat
terrorism in the Arab and Muslim world need to include “winning the hearts and minds” of
potential terrorists in order to dissuade them from resorting to terrorism. This involves
targeting both mass audience , or public diplomacy, as well winning over political and
cultural elites in the region who may be allowing terrorism to persist there unchecked (38).
The existence of “failed states” is also cited in the literature as an explanation for the
growth of terrorism, particularly against the US and the West. Tayekh and Gvosdev (2003)
argue that terrorists seek out weak states that cannot stop their activities but still display
some degree of sovereignty that deters other countries from taking action against them
(95). Failed states allow terrorists to acquire more territory than if they were scattered
across other states--assuming acquiring territory is an objective of terrorists, as Pape
(2003) suggests it is. Furthermore, failed states usually do not have strong law enforcement
in place, allowing terrorists to raise money through illicit activities such as drug smuggling.
There is also a lack of state power generally and of civil society in failed states, and this
vacuum allows terrorist groups to more effectively recruit members (Tayekh and Gvosdev
2003, 105). It may be imprecise to conflate “weak states” and “failed states” together, but a
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similar logic underlies Patrick’s (2006) assessment of the threats, including terrorism,
emerging against the US from weak states who lack the will and/or capacity to provide
development and security for their populations. Ken Deji’s (2005) link between poverty and
potential instability nicely rounds off Patrick’s (2006) argument. The former suggests that
sustainable development, aimed at solving the problems of poverty in a long-term fashion,
is now an important part of US strategic interests since extreme poverty can turn countries
into a threat by ruining their institutions, leading to instability (7). In the worst case, a weak
or failed state, to use Tayekh and Gvosdev’s (2003) terminology, may result, possibly
presenting a long-term terrorist threat to the US. Chenoweth (2004) somewhat disputes
this claim, arguing that a lack of state strength, i.e., political and economic stability and
development, rather than the existence of “failed states,” is an important cause of terrorism.
When considering the soft power tools that can help address failed states or ones that are
unstable, in Chenoweth’s (2004) terminology, the distinction may be irrelevant, since the
same set of tools can be used to address both situations in an attempt to mitigate what the
US executive determines to be a long-term terrorist threat.
The existence of weak, unstable, or failed states is seen as one potential opportunity
for terrorism to take root or spread; some scholars suggest that one way to combat such a
threat is by promoting democracy. It is certainly possible for an authoritarian state to be
stable; Huntington (1968) suggests, for example, that political stability is more important
than the kind of regime in power. However, some scholars suggest, and many policymakers
seem to accept, that democracy itself can help combat terrorism. As Windson (2003)
explains, there is no direct link between a lack of democracy and terrorism, just as there is
no direct link between poverty and terrorism, but an absence of democracy has helped
generate the circumstances favorable to the rise of extremist movements (363). Thus, she
argues, the existence of democracy can by its very nature help remove these conditions.
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This is because democracy entails peaceful change in government, outlets for dissent and
discussion, the rule of law, the existence of civil society, a free flow of information, a
stronger state, social and economic development, and liberal values and ideals, all of which
can counteract the conditions that help foster terrorism (366-7). Lord (2006) agrees that
pushing for democratization should be part of the strategy to combat terrorism because of
these characteristics of democracy (51).
What options are available to the US if it seeks to promote democracy in places that
may pose a long-term terrorist threat? Windson (2003) calls for more “robust” US foreign
aid as a way to promote democracy. To that end, government agencies such as USAID
should rely on the expertise of the NGO sector in general because of the institutional
knowledge of NGOs, as well as the creative efforts on the part of specific NGOs working on
democracy promotion, in a region where change is difficult (377). By its very nature, such a
strategy relies on tools of soft, and not hard, power. Roy (2005) suggests that in the context
of failed or authoritarian states, one way that outside powers can pursue democratization is
through promoting the development of a civil society that includes political parties and
NGOs as a first step in democracy-building (1004). Hobson (2005) agrees, pointing out that
democracy promotion has become an important part of Bush’s War on Terror and a
“strategic necessity” in fighting terrorism (40). US efforts in that direction have included the
establishment of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which funds civil society and
education programs (42).
Fandl (2006) makes a similar point about fostering civil society in an effort to bring
about democratization, astutely bringing together the issues of economic development and
democracy. He suggests that the US can fight what I categorize as the long-term terrorist
threat by promoting development, which will decrease inequalities, help lead to democracy,
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and provide potential terrorists with alternative outlets to express their grievances (308).
Fandl’s (2006) argument thus builds on the strong correlation, widely addressed in political
science literature, between economic development and democracy. He suggests that to
combat the long-term terrorist threats, the US should promote economic growth, which in
turn will make democratic reform possible and more likely to be successful (320). Both of
these elements, fighting poverty and promoting democratization, utilize tools of soft, rather
than hard, power.
Combined Short-Term and Long-Term Terrorist Threats
The above sections outlined the distinction between immediate short-term and
long-term terrorist threats. As I argue, the existence of the level or kind of terrorist threat,
short vs. long-term, will lead policymakers to consider different kinds of strategies, utilizing
hard or soft power, as appropriate tools to address each. Ten years into the War on Terror,
however, it seems that most often, the US is waging a war against both short-term and longterm terrorism. My theory posits that with the existence of both kinds of threats, US
policymakers will pursue strategies based on both hard and soft power—smart power—
whose proportional makeup will vary depending on the independent variables examined
here. One thing to note is that while the term “smart power,” coined by Nye and frequently
used by policymakers and academics alike, may sound like an attractive term, the makeup
of smart power is both a conceptual and an empirical issue that Nye failed to address. In
other words, how much soft power must be combined with hard power in order for a
strategy to be considered a “smart” one? I have used continue the term “smart power,”
simply because it is so widely used, but from this point onward, it is more useful to consider
it in terms of “combined power,” denoting the use of both hard and smart power in varying
proportions.
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Williams (2008), presumably referring to both short-term and long-term threats,
argues that to ensure the national security of the US, a combined military and development
strategy must be put in place (1111). While the President can send more troops to
Afghanistan, those troops cannot implement longer term development strategies that can
ensure future peace (1119). In other words, Williams (2008) is suggesting that both hard
and soft power strategies must be used to deal with combined short-term and long-term
terrorist threats. Lake’s (2010) analysis of US state-building efforts over the last century
also points to an integration of both hard and soft power to combat both immediate and
potential terrorist threats. He explores a new counterinsurgency strategy in 2007,
suggesting that fighting the insurgency is synonymous with winning over the hearts and
minds of the locals, in an effort to decrease support for those whom the US is fighting (273);
clearly such a strategy involves both hard and soft power.
Like Williams (2008) and Lake (2010), Azam and Thelen (2010) discuss the use of
development promotion, in this case the dispensing of US bilateral foreign aid, to target
countries, which has been a strategy in the War on Terror since at least 2002, with the
establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account (237-8). Their attempts to assess the
effectiveness of foreign aid, as opposed to military action, in terrorist prevention is beyond
the scope of this project, but the point about both kinds of policies being used is an
important premise of this theory. Collins’s (2004) description of American military efforts
in Afghanistan as a “three-block war” is also relevant. Such an operation has multiple but
sometimes simultaneous stages whereby Block 1 is combat, Block 2 is peacekeeping and
stabilization, and Block 3 is humanitarian reconstruction. In a similar vein, Waisova (2010)
discusses Canada’s development policy, whereby the Canadian government has used
development aid to combat poverty and state failure, which after 9/11 were deemed
security threats (83). Indeed, the Canadian government often entangled development aid
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with military operations in places like Afghanistan (84). Lucas (210) also points to the
civilian-military interface in the Afghan war, in this case the deployment of academic
specialists with expertise in the local culture, in a phenomenon known as “military
anthropology” (23-24). The important point in all of these arguments is that countries
waging the War on Terror have used both hard power and soft power tactics; I argue that
the former is used to address immediate, short-term terrorist threats, whereas the latter is
used to address long-term, potential terrorist threats, and a combination of the two is used
to address combined threats.
The Target Country’s Context
Up to this point, my theory has taken into account the preferences and assessments
of one set of actors: the President and his advisors. Of course, the War on Terror itself is
fought against a terrorist threat determined to be coming from other countries, as discussed
in the above section. I have argued in the above section that the US executive will decide to
use hard power against immediate, short-term terrorist threats. In cases where either a
long-term or a combined terrorist threat exists, however, the US executive’s strategizing
and implementation of counter-terrorist measures will be affected by an additional set of
factors: the domestic political and economic context of the target country.
Hypothesis 3: Where a long-term or combined terrorist threat is determined by the US
executive to exist, the socio-economic and political needs of that country’s population will
shape the kind of soft power tools the US uses, including the types of NGOs it funds. For
example, the US government is likely to fund economic development programs in a country
with high levels of poverty, and likely to fund literacy programs in a country with low literacy
rates, etc.
Hypothesis 4: Where a long-term or combined terrorist threat is determined by the US
executive to exist, the US is likely to use more soft power, in the form of funding NGOs, where
the government of the target country places fewer limitations on NGO activity, and vice versa.
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The US President and his advisors formulate policy based on their preferences and
the threat level they determine to be coming from a particular country. However, the
making and implementation of strategy is a dynamic process, and the host country context
will also impact the kinds of soft power policies the US decides to implement when dealing
with what it determines to be a long-term or combined terrorist threat. This political and
economic context will influence the kinds of soft power tools the US uses, as well as their
extent. Ultimately, in these situations where a combined terrorist threat is determined to
exist, the socio-political context of the target country will impact the proportional makeup
of the US’s smart power strategy. This project examines a specific kind of soft power tool
used by the US government, funding and partnering with NGOs, to be discussed in greater
detail in the next section. Here I argue that in situations where the target country’s
government places fewer limitations on NGO activity, the US is likely to use more of that soft
power. This will increase the ratio of soft-to-hard power; the reverse is also expected to be
true. Of course, the political and economic context of the target country, and thus the
makeup of US soft or smart power strategies, will vary over time.
This cross-country variation will be examined in the case study sections of this
project, which will focus on US strategies in fighting terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
A cursory look at these two countries reveals some important differences. For instance, the
most powerful political force in Pakistan is the military, and it is a poor nation with a per
capita GDP of $2,400 as of 2010 (CIA World Factbook 2011). Afghanistan, on the other hand,
has been besieged by war since the Soviet invasion in 1979, with a much smaller population
of 29 million people and a GDP per capita of only about $1000 as of 2010; its economy is
heavily dependent on foreign aid, and the country is besieged with problems ranging from
crimes such as drug trafficking, as well as corruption and weak governance (CIA World
Factbook 2011). Thus if we compare the two cases, Afghanistan is much poorer than
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Pakistan, with a much lower rate of female literacy, and so perhaps the US is funding NGOs
who work in combating poverty more extensively in Afghanistan than in Pakistan. In
contrast, while Pakistan is certainly not a full-fledged, legitimate democracy since the
military has so much political power, its government is comparatively more stable than
Afghanistan. Perhaps in Pakistan, then, a more prominent part of the US strategy in fighting
terrorism is utilizing INGOs who work in democracy promotion or strengthening civil
society, since they might be more effective than in Afghanistan, which is even less politically
stable.
The target country’s treatment of the NGO sector will impact the extent to which the
US will use the specific kind of soft power examined in this project, the US government’s
funding of NGOs to combat what it determines to be long-term or combined terrorist
threats. Thomas (2007) points out that the biggest challenge of NGOs in developing
countries comes from the existing political or economic system, often because NGOs are
viewed as politically threatening (56). Similarly, Bratton (1989) views the relationship
between NGOs and governments in developing countries as a power struggle, whereby
authoritarian regimes often view the NGOs as a threat to their authority, and thus take a
variety of approaches to curb or limit NGO influence. Such restrictions can include
monitoring the organizations’ activities, trying to involve themselves in NGO work, and
sometimes even absorbing NGOs into state apparatuses (577-79). More specifically,
Salamon (2006) suggests that NGOs operating in countries with authoritarian regimes can
play a supplemental role to the government but cannot challenge state power or cooperate
with the state on equal footing, limiting the development of the nonprofit sector (414).
In the same vein, Rita (2008) expounds on the powerful role of the state in which
NGOs operate in shaping and influencing their work, even in developing democratic states
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such as India (164). One way states impact the work of NGOs is by granting or denying
territorial access to NGOs; authoritarian states are more likely to place limits on activists
and their ties to the outside world, but even democratic governments can place limits on
NGO activities by citing, for instance, security concerns (166). In India, the state regulates
NGOs through eligibility requirements, a strict registration process, inspection and seizure
proceedings, and sometimes revoking registration and an NGO’s ability to receive foreign
funding (175). While Rita appears to be discussing state limits on Southern NGOs (NGOs
based in the developing world), the same kinds of restrictions might hamper the activities
of INGOs coming from countries such as the US. This might particularly be the case since
these Northern NGOs or NNGOs, as they are called, often form partnerships with Southern
NGOs (SNGOs), located in the global South or developing countries(Ahmed and Potter 2006,
142).
Stevens’ (2010) work offers another example of an authoritarian government’s
extreme restrictions of NGO activities, particularly those receiving Western funding, this
time in Uzbekistan. As part of its partnership with the US in the War on Terror, the Uzbek
government allowed a great deal of US aid into the country, much of it funneled through
NGOs (357). Once it started to view the US and its support of NGO operations as politically
threatening in 2003, the government largely cracked down on the NGO sector, closing down
269 NGOs between 2005 and 2007. It also instituted much stricter registration and
operating requirements for those that remained (357-8), until the NGO sector has
increasingly become a part of the government (361). The important point here is not just
that the governments of target or host countries can influence and restrict NGO activity, but
that governments’ treatment of NGOs can vary over time. The relationship between the
target government and its NGO sector will impact US strategy, with increasing limitations
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on NGO activity by target country’s governments leading to a decrease in US partnerships
with NGOs and thus less soft power in its counter-terrorism strategies, or vice versa.
NGOs
My theory explains US foreign policy strategizing in the War on Terror, specifically
the conditions under which it will use soft, hard, and various degrees of smart power. I have
argued that the US executive forges a counter-terrorism strategy based on its assessment of
the threat level coming from a particular country. In cases where a long-term or combined
terrorist threat is determined to exist, the US executive’s strategizing is also impacted by the
political and economic context, which will affect the kind and amount of soft power it uses.
One more actor is involved when the US is forging its soft or smart-power strategy to fight
long-term or combined terrorist threats: the non-governmental associations (NGOs)
themselves, with whom the US forms partnerships in the specific kind of soft power tool
examined in this project. In this section I will explain not only why the US government
views NGOs as important partners in exercising soft power in various contexts of the War
on Terror, i.e. why they are theoretically interesting, but also how US policymakers are
constrained by the capabilities and preferences of these NGOs. Once formed, the NGOgovernment interaction must also be explored to help account for variation over time, since
it will help explain the US government’s continued or terminated funding of specific NGOs in
exerting this particular type of soft power.
Background on NGOs
It is important to provide some theoretical background on non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). NGOs are non-state actors, although they are often funded at least in
part by governments, through agencies like USAID in the United States. Aall (2000) defines
NGOs as “private, self-governing, non-profit institutions” with goals ranging from promoting
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economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution to
providing humanitarian aid to helping foster civil society and democratic institutions (124).
Ahmed and Potter (2006) add that the ultimate importance of NGO activities stems from the
influence they have on individuals, states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and
even other non-state actors (55). As such, their activities in relief, development, advocacy,
agenda setting, public education campaigns, and mobilizing publics are all ways to influence
various actors in different political arenas. INGOs are international NGOs, which, as Kerlin
(2006) describes them, operate in their various sub-fields but in international contexts.
INGOs are contrasted with Southern NGOs (SNGOs) who are formed and operate solely in
developing countries. Over the last two or three decades, partnerships between NNGOs and
SNGOs have become increasingly common, whereby NNGOs utilize SNGOs as implementers
of various programs (Ashman 2001; Agg 2006). Because this project attempts to explain US
strategizing in the War on Terror, I will limit my examination to INGOs based in the United
States; these INGOs often partner with SNGOs, something that will be explored in the
empirical sections of this project.
Salamon (2006), often considered the father of the literature on NGOs, suggests that
the past few decades have been characterized by a “global associational revolution,” or a
huge increase in the presence of NGOs all around the world. Indeed, Boli (2006) points out
that the number of international NGOs has grown from 374 in 1909, to just under 10,000 in
1981, to over 25,000 in the year 2000 (334). NGOs have been influential in such important
historical occurrences such as the break-up of the Soviet Union, ending apartheid in South
Africa, and helping along democratic transitions in the Philippines, Argentina, and Chile
(416). Simmons (2010), describes four areas where NGOs have been influential: agenda
setting (e.g., bringing human rights as an issue to be addressed by the UN charter);
negotiating outcomes (e.g., helping negotiate the treaty in the Chemical Weapons
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Convention in 1997); conferring legitimacy (because of the less overtly political nature of
NGOs and their closeness to the grass roots levels of society); and implementing difficult
solutions to problems (e.g., the Red Cross providing healthcare to political prisoners,
something states often neglect to do) (241). Aall (2000) adds, in more general terms, that
NGOs can help build long-term relationships in places, provide early warnings about
impending conflicts, act as mediators when conflicts occur, seek international intervention,
and raise funds or participate in reconstruction in the aftermath of conflicts (133).
Why NGOs?
NGOs have rapidly proliferated around the world in the past few decades. Why,
though, would states want to fund or utilize NGOs? What makes NGOs theoretically
interesting as a form of soft power? These are important questions to answer, since this
project will explore the US’s soft power in the War on Terror, as expressed through funding
and partnering with NGOs. Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) work on transnational advocacy
networks is an interesting place to start: they argue that such networks, made up of activists
motivated by “principled ideas or values,” seek to influence states and international
organizations in both domestic and international politics(1-2). NGOs are an important part
of these networks, which emerge in issue areas where the access between domestic groups
and governments is blocked. This leads to a boomerang pattern or effect, whereby domestic
NGOs seek out international allies to exert external pressure on their state, with the goal of
changing the state’s behavior or policies in some issue area. These transnational advocacy
networks may also emerge with the presence of political entrepreneurs and conferences
that provide links and contacts among networks (12).
Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) constructivist focus on values and norms is echoed by
Nye (2004b), who argues that NGOs help to develop new norms in their quests to impact
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the policies of governments and business leaders (87). Keck and Sikkink’s theory (1998) is
a useful starting place, but in this project, I am reversing the direction of one relationship:
NGOs do not have to seek out international allies, but instead states such as the US use NGOs
to bring about change in a target country, in this case to help fight long-term or potential
threats of terrorism in an expression of soft power. These external actors use their own
INGOs, who may in turn fund and/or partner with SNGOs operating in the target country,
such as Afghanistan, in order to bring about certain changes such as promoting democratic
governance in an effort to fight the terrorist threat.
Risse-Kappen (1995) explores a similar concept of what he calls “transnational
relations,” or interactions between national governments or international organizations
with non-state actors (3). This fits in with Nye’s (2003) metaphor of world politics as a
three-dimensional chess game, where the US leads in the top layer of “classical interstate
military issues,” several powers lead the middle level of “interstate economic issues,” and a
variety of players, including state and non-state actors such as NGOs, all wield power in the
bottom layer of “transnational issues.” Surpassing Nye (2003), though, Risse-Kappen
(1995) suggests that the impact of transnational actors on states will depend on variation in
domestic structures and the presence or absence of international agreements and
organizations, which he calls “international institutionalization” (6). Thus, a more statedominated domestic structure will be harder for transnational actors to “penetrate,” while a
more fragmented, less cohesive domestic structure with a more organized civil society will
be more susceptible to influence by transnational actors (7). These theories about when and
how non-state actors such as NGOs can influence state policies or behavior are useful from a
different lens in this project: not the effectiveness of NGOs, but the circumstances under
which the US is more likely to utilize them. The US government is more likely to use soft
power, specifically by partnering with or funding NGOs, in circumstances where these
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organizations can be more effective. Thus Risse-Kappen’s (1995) argument fits in with my
earlier prediction that the US government is more likely to partner with NGOs in contexts
where these organizations are allowed to flourish and the target country’s government
places few restrictions over their activities.
States may choose to utilize NGOs for other reasons, and not just because they are
given room to operate in certain countries. A great deal of scholarship has been done on the
comparative advantages of NGOs, suggesting more specific reasons why states might wish
to use NGOs. State funding of INGOs is distinct from bilateral foreign aid studied by other
scholars (Meernik et al. 1998; Wang 1999). Furthermore, the comparative advantages of
NGOs or INGOs make government funding of INGOs theoretically interesting as a kind of
soft power. Evans-Kent and Bleiker (2003) write that in recent years, NGOs are increasingly
popular organizations, seen as providing services that states cannot or do not wish to
provide (103). They add that NGOs often have more credibility than states or IGOs among
local populations and more contacts at the grassroots level, making them more effective in
delivering their respective services. Tvedt (1998) and Ahmed and Potter (2006) add the
flexibility of NGOs to the list: NGOs are private organizations not required to use the
planning, evaluation, and reporting procedures as extensively as are government agencies.
Furthermore, they suggest that NGOs can be more efficient than aid bureaucracies, and can
quickly change the direction of projects that are deemed ineffective or face serious
obstacles (105). Ahmed and Potter (2006) trace the trend of donor governments relying on
NGOs to dispense official aid back to the 1990s, when the perceived comparative
advantages of NGOs made them the “preferred vehicle for the provision of official
development assistance” (55). Maragia (2002) makes the same point, calling NGOs
“conduits” used by states to dispense development aid (331), and Tvedt (1998) points to
their increasing utilization by states in foreign policy (112).
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Another comparative advantage of NGOs is the trust they have among publics
around the world; Nye (2008c) himself argues that NGOs should be utilized by governments
in public diplomacy efforts to influence foreign governments and publics, since they are
often trusted more than governments (105). In fact, the Edelman Trust Barometer
conducted surveys in Brazil, India, Italy, China Japan, Germany, France, the UK, and Russia
and found that in 2011, 61% of those surveyed said they trusted NGOs to “do what is right,”
whereas only 52% of them trusted government (Edelman Trust Barometer 2011). Perhaps
foreign publics in developing countries are wise in trusting NGOs more than their own
governments. Kerlin (2006) writes that one reason US government agencies like USAID
funnel assistance through INGOs is that these organizations are more dependable,
especially when it comes to finances, than the foreign governments that are seen as
financially corrupt (382). NGOs can also be more efficient and cost effective than
governments when working with war-torn populations, and they have technical expertise in
things like infrastructure projects, distributing goods and services, and helping to build
emerging economies though programs such as micro-credit loans (Ward 2007, 49).
Adding to the list of the comparative advantages of NGOs, Mercer (2002) argues that
NGOs are considered to play an important role in the democratization process. They are
assumed to increase the strength and plurality of political institutions by working with
grassroots organizations and representing poor, marginalized groups (8), as well as
challenging state power (9). Mercer (2002) suggests that these assumptions can often be
false, and that too much of the time, NGOs just reproduce and aggravate existing social
cleavages (13), and thus their role in democratization will vary by context (19). Still, her
discussion of the assumptions about the role that NGOs can play in creating civil society,
and thus promoting democracy, is quite important. It fits in with policymakers’ common
understandings about the role that democratization plays in fighting terrorism, a role also

67
explored in the literature (Windson 2005; Hobson 2005; Fandl 2006). It becomes clear from
Mercer’s (2002) suggestions, then, why US policymakers would choose to utilize NGOs as a
specific form of expressing their soft power to fight against a long-term or combined
terrorist threat.
NGOs and Governments
Hypothesis 5: The US government (through various agencies, such as USAID) is likely to utilize
a specific NGO as part of its soft power approach to fighting a long-term terrorist threat when
the preferences of the NGO align with those of the government, i.e., when the NGO does not find
a conflict between its own mission and the projects for which the US funds it.
Hypothesis 6: The US government (specifically the funding agency, such as USAID) is more
likely to continue to utilize a specific NGO in the fight against a long-term terrorist threat if
the relationship between them has been more cooperative and less confrontational. The US
government is less likely to continue to utilize a specific NGO in its fight against a long-term
terrorist threat (i.e. “non-engagement”) if the relationship between them has been more
confrontational and less cooperative.

The comparative advantages of NGOs illustrate why governments might want to
fund NGOs or utilize them as part of the War on Terror. The obvious caveat, though, is that
we cannot assume that the NGOs will always want to be “used” by governments. In fact, I
argue that the relationship between NGOs and governments, explored extensively in the
NGO literature, will impact the US government’s strategizing in its ongoing War on Terror.
Cooper and Hawking (2000) discuss the interaction between governments and NGOs in the
context of diplomacy. NGOs can “kick-start” specific issues and bring them to the agenda
(370), sub-contract for governments (372), or work with them as partners in projects like
humanitarian relief efforts (374). Reinmann (2006) clearly points out that the interaction
between states, IGOs, and NGOs does not just work in one direction where IGOs and states
may finance and dictate the actions of NGOs; the relationship is instead complex and
symbiotic (46). Thus, countries such as the United States and IGOs such as the UN partnered
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with NGOs and began to rely on them to promote not only civil society, but neoliberal
economics and democracy in the 1990s (Reinmann 2006, 60). On the other hand, many of
these NGOs rely on states and IGOs for financing in order to carry out programs that
promote policies related to neoliberal economics and democracy (Reinmann 2006, 51).
Despite a potentially symbiotic relationship between NGOs and states, some
scholars consider NGOs to be at a disadvantage when they accept funding from
governments. Edwards and Hulme (1995), for instance, suggest that Western donor
governments effectively force NGOs to operate in social and economic services on a very
large scale, in contexts for which the NGOs do not have enough capacity or comparative
advantage in the long run. Putting NGOs in such a position takes away from their potential
efforts in things like institutional development and advocacy, threatens the independence of
NGOs, and poses problems for their accountability to local populations by emphasizing
short-term outputs and quickly visible results (Edwards and Hulme 1995, 962). As Roy
(2005) puts it, for NGOs, “supply defines demand—or more exactly, the donors decide what
is desirable” (1008), thus shaping what NGOs may or may or may not do. Boris (2006)
suggests that INGOs do not always have the same perspective of their funding government,
and they actually work towards independence from their funders (27). Siddiquee and
Faroqi (2009) describe a tension between NGOs having to implement the policy agenda of
the donors, including governments, from whom they receive funding rather than their own
social missions (245). Because of their financial dependency and their need for funding,
NGOs may spend a great deal of energy trying to meet the accountability demands of these
donors (Archi 2008). Countless works catalogue the challenges, expenses, and constraints
upon NGO autonomy that such accountability demands from donors present (Tandon 1996;
Wils 1996; Townsend and Townsend 2004; Bornstein 2006; Makuwira 2006; Abrahams
2008; Mutua 2009; Peter 2009; Szporluk 2009; Harsh et al. 2010, etc.)
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More specifically, Smith (2006) points out potential conflicts that can take place
between funding governments and NGOs: there can be disagreements over policies,
services, clients, staff, internal organization, and procedures (235). The potential for conflict
is particularly high in situations where NGOs are working with militaries, which, as Spearin
(2008) points out, can include the US military or private security contractors hired by the
US government. In such situations, NGOs often struggle to maintain their humanitarian ethic
or mission, and more broadly, the NGO principles of impartiality, neutrality and
independence (371). All of this possible tension between the two actors implies that NGOs
must decide the extent to which they can submit to donor governments’ demands, and
whether or not those demands are in line with the NGOs’ own mission and preferences,
before deciding to accept funding from governments. Of course these preferences on the
part of the NGOs in turn impact the viability of implementing a US soft or smart power
strategy that relies on NGOs.
Not all INGOs that receive funding from governments have the same kind of
relationship with those governments, and scholars have categorized these relationships in
various ways. Coston (1998) comes up with a typology of government-NGO relationships:
repression, rivalry, competition, contracting, third-party government, cooperation,
complementarity, and collaboration. These categories are based on who has the power
advantage, the formality or informality of government-NGO ties, the level of NGO input in
policy planning, and which side benefits more. While Coston’s (1998) typology is a bit
tedious and difficult to apply, Najam’s (2000) 4-category typology of government-NGO
relationships is simpler and more relevant here. His categories are based on the different
strategies and goals of each actor (NGOs and government): when both the goals and
strategies of both the government and NGOs are similar, a “cooperative” relationship
emerges. Similar strategies but different goals will yield “co-optation” of NGOs by the
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government, while similar goals but different strategies lead to a “complementary”
relationship between the two. The worst-case scenario, so-to-speak, exists when both
strategies and goals of NGOs are dissimilar, leading to a “confrontational” relationship.
Interestingly, a fifth possibility exists for Najam (2000), “non-engagement” between the two
actors; I argue that a confrontational relationship between NGOs and the US government is
likely to lead to this outcome.
Najam’s (2000) typology is useful in explaining variation over time, i.e., the
persistence or termination of a US partnership with a specific NGO in the War on Terror.
Obviously, this categorization is subjective, and determining the nature of the relationship
will be an important part of the case studies in this project. The extreme case would be
when an INGO might decide to stop receiving funding and working with the US government.
For example, some NGOs, already receiving funding from a US government agency, may pull
out of military operations if they do not see eye-to-eye with US policy objectives (Spearin
2008, 372), or perhaps as they discover the before-unknown specifics of US objectives and
strategy.
Another important classification relating to NGOs relates to the kind of work that
they do. The National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), which gathers and publishes
data on all NGOs registered in the US, lists 29 different categories for International NGOs
(nccs.urban.org). This categorization is very specific, but Kerlin (2006) breaks it down into
ten more manageable types of INGOs: general; international relief; health; education;
environment, population, and sustainability; economic; human rights, migration, and
refugees; democracy and civil society; agriculture; and science and technology. Kerlin
(2006) points out the categories of INGOs who received the biggest increase in government
funding between 2002 and 2003: in order, they are international relief, health, education,
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democracy and civil society, and environment/population/sustainability INGOs (380).
Furthermore, Kerlin (2006) points out that the US government tends to fund larger INGOs
(381), perhaps because they are more established and more able to meet the demands and
costs of grant-writing requirements (381). Gubser (2002) categorizes INGOs by their
agendas, which include humanitarian aid, democratization, religion, and “people to people”
activism (147). The kind of work that an INGO does is particularly relevant in this project
that seeks to explain the formulation and implementation of US hard, soft, and smart power
strategy in the War on Terror. As I posited earlier, it is expected that the US government
through its agencies that fund NGOs, primarily USAID but also possibly the Department of
Defense, State Department, etc. will fund NGOs who can carry out projects seen by the US
government as combating the threat of long-term terrorism, based on the needs and
political and economic situation in each respective country.
Control Variables
Executive Ideology and Preferences
In this theory, we must control for the foreign policy ideology of the President and
his advisors, since this will impact the kinds of foreign policy strategies advocated by the
executive. Since this project is concerned with policy decisions about what kind of power to
utilize in fighting the War on Terror, the relevant characteristic here is the president and his
advisors’ attitudes and ideological preferences towards military force. Do they favor a more
hard power approach in fighting terrorism, or one based more on soft power that relies on
the targeted powers of American persuasion, or a combination of the two? If they favor a
combination, does that combination consist of more or less hard or soft power? By
accounting for the ideological and leadership preferences of the President and his foreign
policy circle, we can reach a starting point for this theory that begins with the US executive.
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To this point, Sicherman (2005) makes a relevant argument. He distinguishes between
presidents who are “hawks” and those who are “doves,” both of whom are “cheap,” everconstrained by a lack of funds and preferring quick, inexpensive solutions to crises (361). So
while “Cheap Hawks” such as President George W. Bush, as Sicherman (2005) calls them,
recognize external threats but due to a lack of available resources, hoping that strong
rhetoric alone can intimidate the enemy, “Cheap Doves” do not recognize a threat and thus
take no military action against the enemy (364). Although Sicherman’s (2005) discussion of
the “cheap” nature of hawks and doves is not particularly illuminating, his delineation
between hawkish and dovish presidents is a useful one. Important to note is that hawkish
and dovish ideologies are typically considered to correspond to party identification:
Republicans tend to be seen as hawks, while Democrats tend to be seen as doves. Thus, I
will control for executive ideology in this project, specifically preferences of using hard or
soft power when dealing with security threats. More extensive tests of the relative
significance of ideology in explaining US strategy are beyond the scope of this project,
although they may be an important variable to test further in future research.
In taking ideology into account, we may encounter problems of endogeneity, i.e., a
president might be labeled a “hawk” simply because he used force during his
administration, thus discounting the explanatory power of ideology as a factor influencing
his decision to use or not to use force. To avoid the endogeneity issue, I will be examining
presidential preferences or ideology of each President before he assumed the role of
Commander in Chief in the War on Terror. A president's preferences before he actually
became president or had to lead the War on Terror cannot be caused by his later actions in
the War on Terror; thus, this control variable of presidential ideology cannot be
endogenously affecting the outcome of variation in US hard, soft, and smart power strategy.
Again, I treat this examination of ideology as a control variable: of course, these leadership
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preferences are important as a starting point, but they will not alone determine the actual
strategy that will be crafted. Instead, these preferences will interact with specific threat
levels and with other actors; all of these variables together will shape what will become the
actual counter-terrorism strategy. Another important point to make is that it is not
necessary to explicitly use the “hawk” and “dove” terminology, but this terminology is
discussed here because it is widely used and familiar to most people. Unlike what
Sicherman (2005) suggests, however, a president who is more of a “dove” does not choose
to “do nothing” in my theory, but may instead prefer to rely more on soft power tools, such
as development aid, extensive diplomacy, and the like.
US Power in the World
It may seem obvious that a US executive (the President and his advisors) with more
hawkish ideological preferences will favor hard power as a starting point for forging US
counter-terrorism strategy and vice versa. Even so, it is important to control for this
variable, as discussed above. Another factor influencing US strategy in the War on Terror,
seen by some as “obvious,” relates to American power and hegemony in the world.
Some scholars suggest that the United States must rely more on soft power tools in
dealing with other countries, particularly those that pose threats, because the US is not as
powerful as it once was. Oglesby (2009), for instance, argues that particularly since the
onset of the global economic crisis in 2008, the US has grown economically weaker. This
economic decline, as well as the US’s decreasing military might around the world as a result
of the considerable resources spent in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has led to a
situation in which the US “is no longer the dominant hub around which the world is
centered” (94). Thus, suggests Oglesby (2009), the US must develop a new kind of
diplomacy that takes seriously the plurality of voices, opinions, and interests of other
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countries around the world in order for the US to maintain or reassume any global
leadership it once had (97). This argument suggests that US policymakers’ choices to use
tools of soft power is a kind of last resort, since a decline in hard power makes military
options less and less viable ways to deal with emerging threats. Indeed, Nye (1990) himself,
in his first work on soft power, countered the prevailing notion of American global decline
by suggesting that the US could maintain its status of global dominance through soft power,
even if its hard power was in decline.
The verdict on a decline in US power in the world is far from unanimous, however.
In a book review, Layne (2011) compares Calleo’s (2009) suggestion that 2007 was the
starting point of a decline in US hegemony with Norrlof’s (2010) more optimistic argument
that in fact the US is still, and will continue to be, the world’s strongest power. Layne (2011)
ultimately sides with Calleo (2009); for him, the Great Recession, the US’s inability to hold
on to its role as the world’s strongest economic power, particularly vis-à-vis China, and the
dwindling status of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency attest to the US’s global
decline. Unlike Oglesby (2009), however, Layne (2011) does not indicate that a decline in
US economic and military power makes it necessary for the US to rely more on soft power in
its international relations. Instead, Layne (2011) suggests that American soft power, too,
has suffered a major blow since the Great Recession, although he does not explain how or
why.
Other scholars disagree with both Layne’s (2011) and Oglesby’s (2009) conclusions.
Russett (2011), for example, proclaims that US military power is still unrivaled, and even
American setbacks from the Great Recession have not taken away from its relative
economic strength, even if its absolute strength has somewhat diminished (2). He also
considers American soft power to be a factor that cemented American global hegemony in
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the post-World War II era, but since his conception of the concept is limited to cultural
power and influence (64), his discussion of American soft power is not relevant in assessing
the extent to which US soft power strategies can be attributed to its relative strength in the
world. In line with Russett’s (2011) assessment of American relative power, Davidson and
Menotti (2009) argue that despite the Great Recession, the US maintains its “global
primacy” and remains the world’s only “pole,” with more than twice the economic and
military strength as the next country (14).
Alternatively, Kitchen (2010) suggests that soft power can be used to enhance the
US’s hard power, clearly pointing to the importance of a combined smart power strategy to
maintain US global dominance. He points to the example of US leadership under President
Clinton, whereby the US embraced and promoted globalization as the new state of affairs.
By turning more and more towards international institutions, particularly in the economic
arena, the US was able to enhance its own economic hard power while using its soft power
to influence other states’ preferences in alignment with its own. This resulted in
unprecedented American global power in the 1990s, and Kitchen (2010) suggests that
President Obama should focus more on increasing American structural power, including its
economic dominance, in conjunction with his predilection for increasing American soft
power, in order to avoid US global decline.
The issue of a decline in US structural, i.e., economic and military, power appears
unresolved and must be further tested empirically, but is beyond the scope conditions of
this project. In this dissertation, my argument here is that a consideration of using soft
power tools in US counter-terrorism strategy, and the actual implementation of soft power,
is not because of a decline in US hard power vis-à-vis other countries. Instead, I choose to
focus on the variables outlined earlier in the chapter: that US executives consider, and in
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some cases actually use, tools of soft power in the War on Terror because of what they
consider to be its merits, and not because they are short on hard power resources.
Controlling for US relative power is thus important for this theory.
Power of Target Countries
I have argued above that the US is more likely to use hard power against a state that
poses an immediate, short-term terrorist threat. While threat level is the primary variable
of interest in explaining the US use of hard power, it is also important to consider something
else: the capability balance between the US and the target country. As Geller and Singer
(1998) summarize, most theories that explain international conflict assume rationality in
state behavior, where states weigh the costs and benefits of military offensives. Scholars
point to the correlation between a state’s initiation of a war and its later victory as evidence
of this rational strategizing: a state is more likely to initiate a war if it expects to win (70). In
other words, the US is more likely to use hard power against a state it deems to pose an
immediate terrorist threat if the target state is weaker than the US. For instance, while the
US went to war in Iraq and Afghanistan (relatively weak states) as part of its War on Terror,
it would be unlikely for the US to wage a military offensive against a more powerful country
like China, even if the US determined that China posed a short-term terrorist threat. It is not
a coincidence that the US tends to use hard power against relatively weak states with
relatively limited military capabilities.
Alternative Explanations
In this project, I do not claim to present a universal theory of US counter-terrorism
strategizing. First, I am examining a very specific form of soft power, US government
funding of NGOs, given the limited time and resources I had in carrying out this project. A
variety of other forms of soft power could have been alternatively examined, including
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American pop culture or the rhetoric of policymakers, among other things. In studying only
NGOs as a particular form of soft power, I have no doubt constrained my theoretical
explanation to variables relevant to NGOs. I have chosen to focus on the US executive’s
assessment of threats, the socio-economic and political context of a target country, and the
preferences of specific NGOs in this more rigorous theory explaining variation in US
strategy in the War on Terror. However, a number of alternative or additional explanations
are perfectly viable, but were simply beyond the scope conditions of this project.
For instance, the state capacity of target governments may impact US soft power
strategy, even if we continue to examine NGOs as a form of soft power. Perhaps as the state
capacity of the Afghan government increases or the corruption of the Afghan government
decreases, the US government will prefer to fund the Afghan government itself, rather than
NGOs, to carry out development projects. Such a shift would not necessarily mean a change
in US soft power strategy, but instead a change in the way the US government
operationalizes this strategy of funding development in a target country.
Alternatively, public opinion may influence the strategizing of the US executive, and
this is a variable that I have chosen to leave out, as it is beyond the scope of this project. It
may be worth testing in the future, however, whether US public opinion after the 9/11
attacks influenced President Bush’s quick decision to go to war in Afghanistan, or the extent
to which public opinion impacted President Obama’s emphasis on Afghanistan, rather than
Iraq, as the primary front in the War on Terror. Other factors, including the state of the US
economy and the budget situation, may have also constrained the executive’s strategizing;
these variables are not included in my theory, but may be important alternative
explanations worth testing in future research.
Research Design
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The research questions explored in this project have not been systematically
addressed by scholars, perhaps because my theory brings together various literatures, on
US foreign policy, terrorism, and NGOs. Partly because this project involves theory-building,
this research cannot easily be carried out through a large-N, statistical regression analysis,
as the data necessary to answer the research questions at hand is not all quantitative and is
certainly not all available in one dataset. The first part of this research project will provide a
general overview of the evolving US strategy in the War on Terror, beginning to test
Hypotheses 1 and 2 and the effects of the control variables. Thus, Part I will examine the
independent variables addressed above: the preferences or ideology of the President and
his advisors, the relative power of the US, and the assessment and determination of the
terrorist threat level (short vs. long-term) coming from specific countries. This “big picture”
chapter seeking to explain War on Terror strategy over time will require obtaining data on
actual hard power and soft power activities the US has carried out since the start of the War
on Terror. In this part of the research project, I sought to trace the decision-making process
by US policymakers in the various agencies involved in the War on Terror (DOD, USAID,
State Department, Department of Homeland Security). The data for this part of the research
project came from any documents or records from these agencies, speeches by
policymakers, annual National Security Strategies, any published writings by advisors of
President G.W. Bush and President Obama on the topic, the memoirs of policymakers, and, if
necessary, journalistic accounts that helped illuminate the trajectory of the decision-making
process. I also explored whether or not US relative power in the world has declined over
time, and thus whether any soft or smart power strategy can be attributed to such a decline.
In order to measure the dependent variable of variation in US hard, soft, and smart
power strategy over time and place, I traced US military expenditures related to the War on
Terror over time and by country or geographic region, in Part I. This data was taken from
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publications by the Department of Defense, such as its website and other public documents,
as well as publicly available Congressional reports. Next, I gathered data on US financial
support of NGOs in its War on Terror. Some of this data was available through the
publications of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which
catalogues its members’ spending on various forms of foreign aid. To get a closer look at the
various NGOs funded by the US government, I drew on USAID publications, such as their
annual reports documenting their partnerships with Private Voluntary Organizations, or
PVOs (another name for NGOs). These annual reports document USAID grants to the NGOs,
the country or countries in which they operate, and the kind of work that they do
(http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/ 2010). I gathered similar data from the
State Department and the Department of Defense, who also partner with NGOs or PVOs. Of
course, not all NGOs financed by or partnering with these government agencies do work
related to the War on Terror, so I narrowed down the list to NGOs or PVOs operating in
contexts and regions related to the War on Terror: i.e., NGOs funded by the US government
in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) as well as South Asia.
Merely measuring the money that the US government has spent on NGOs as the War
on Terror has progressed will not be enough to explain the relationships between the
variables cited above. The real test of hypotheses 3-6 comes in the form of more detailed
case studies about particular countries. Thus, the rest of the research project involves
country-level case studies on two countries where the US is fighting the War on Terror to
determine how country-specific efforts in the War on Terror fit in with the larger strategy
explored in Part I. Case selection is an important step in this research, and I followed what
Gerring (2007) calls “diverse case” selection, where the goal is to achieve maximum
variance and which requires at least two cases “that are intended to represent the full range
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of values” of the variables under study (98). For categorical variables (such as different
hard, soft, or smart power strategies), Gerring (2007) suggests that the researcher choose
one case from each category (98). Afghanistan and Pakistan exhibit variation in US antiterrorism strategy in its hard, soft, and combined forms. In Afghanistan, the United States is
carrying out a full-fledged traditional war, but in Pakistan, the US is carrying out military
operations are on a much smaller scale, depending more on drones and special forces. US
soft power strategy, i.e., funding and partnering with NGOs, also varies across these two
cases.
For each case of these two cases, I began with an overview of US policy toward the
country before Sept. 11, 2001, to provide some background and document policy changes
post-9/11. Then to study variation in US War on Terror strategy in each country, I
conducted an in-depth qualitative study to examine the independent variables of threat
level, NGO preferences, capabilities, and experience, and the political, economic, and NGO
context of the respective countries. This required drawing upon any US government
documents assessing the threat levels of each country over time, as well as any government
publications of US anti-terrorism strategy in each case, from such agencies as the
Department of Defense, USAID, and the State Department. Explaining and mapping out the
political, economic, and NGO context of each country required using secondary source
material explaining those respective factors. It would be particularly useful to interview any
USAID officials who can help illuminate US soft power strategy, expressed through funding
and partnering with NGOs, for each country, if possible.
Another important component of these country studies will be examining the work
of particular NGOs that receive US government funding or serve as partners with the US
government. I selected between one and two NGOs from each of the two countries, based
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on the amount of money the NGO received from the US government. If the largest NGO
recipient of US government funding in Afghanistan is the same as the largest recipient of US
government funding in Pakistan, for example, I choose the second-largest recipient so as to
increase my case selection. I gathered data for this part of the case studies from USAID,
State Department, or DOD records of funding and collaboration between the two. I also
drew on financial data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) NCCS
database, interviews with NGO administrators, and data from documents published by the
NGO itself. For each case study, I gathered this data to answer questions such as the
following: At what point did this NGO become involved in US anti-terrorism efforts in this
country, if at all? Does it see itself as a partner of the US government in the War on Terror,
or have its operations since 2001 simply been a continuation of programs in place before
this US-led war? How much money does it receive from the government? What kinds of
projects does it carry out in the country? To what extent is it involved with US military
operations in the country? Does the NGO see itself as involved in any kind of “public
diplomacy” with the people of each country? How have the answers to any of these
questions changed over time? Has the NGO had to change some of its policies to meet the
goals of its US government funders in the context of the War on Terror? How was such a
change communicated to, and then implemented by, the NGO? Finding answers to such
questions will help me explain the relationship between NGOs and the US government,
testing hypothesis 5.
The Data-Gathering Experience
One of the difficulties of qualitative research designs is operationalizing and coming
up with clear measurements for the variables under study. Unlike in quantitative research, I
could not merely use available datasets measuring the relationship between the US
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government and the NGOs it funds, for instance, or a dataset measuring how the president
and his advisers decided to go to war in Iraq. Another difficulty that arises in this kind of
research is access to certain kinds of data, most notably for interviews. Even when
quantitative measures did exist for some of the things I sought to measure, such as the level
of US government funding for civil society or NGOs in South Asia or the Middle East, I was
still constrained by the availability of this kind of data. For instance, the OECD only had data
on US funding of civil society or NGOs around the world from 2005-2010, while the War on
Terror began in 2001 and continues to this day.
To measure the variable of the president and his advisers’ assessments of threat
levels from various countries, I relied on some public speeches, and a great deal on the
memoirs of President Bush and his foreign policy advisers. The ideal measurement here
would be interviews with these officials, but access to them is very difficult at best, if not
impossible. In some cases, as will become in Chapter 4, the accounts of President Bush’s
advisers collided, adding to the difficulty of measuring this variable and analyzing the data. I
also relied on government documents, such as the National Security Strategies and National
Strategies for Combating Terrorism, to measure what the executive saw as the threat level
and relevant strategy was for particular countries and regions.
In order to measure the second independent variable, the socio-economic and
political contexts of particular countries, I had to rely on second-hand accounts, including
data from the CIA World Factbook and historical accounts by other scholars about US
strategy in particular countries. Even to measure a subset of this independent variable, the
NGO regulatory environment, I had to rely on second-hand accounts by organizations
monitoring NGO activity in various countries. I was able to get some additional information
from the interviews I conducted on the regulatory environment within Pakistan and
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Afghanistan. Perhaps ideally, I would have conducted field research in Pakistan and
Afghanistan to really be able to measure the regulatory environment there, or even to add
nuance to the measurements of the socio-economic and political needs of those countries,
but the obvious security risks, as well as the expense and time limitations, prevented me
from doing that.
I measured the final independent variable, the preferences and capabilities of
particular NGOs funded by the US government and the subsequent relationships between
these two actors, through documents published by the NGOs themselves, as well as some
documents published by NGO umbrella organizations, such as InterAction. Most of the data
for this variable, though, came from the interviews with NGO workers themselves in
Pakistan and Afghanistan, and this data-gathering component of the project was
particularly challenging. The biggest problem was gaining access to people in these
organizations who were willing to talk to me; many organizations declined to answer my
questions, saying they were too busy or that the issues I wanted to discuss were rather
sensitive. It appears that the biggest concern of these NGOs was the security risk posed to
their employees in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and thus many were unwilling to answer any
questions about their relationships with the governments of the country in which they
worked. Even the NGO workers that I did speak to were very careful in how they discussed
the environment in the country in which they worked, and about their relationship with
USAID. Perhaps they were concerned about risking future funding opportunities from
USAID if they were overly critical or open in their accounts, even though I promised them
anonymity. The apparent sensitivity of the data I was trying to gather made measuring this
variable particularly challenging.
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Finally, I measured the dependent variable, the actual soft, hard, and combined
power makeup of US strategy in the War on Terror, using a variety of sources. This data
included Congressional Research Service reports on military spending, OECD data on US
funding of civil society and NGOs in South Asia and the Middle East, and USAID and State
Department documents and even blogs documenting their respective activities and funding
of various development and humanitarian assistance projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Gathering this data was easier than collecting the interview data outlined above.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented not only my revised concept of what soft and smart
power are, but also my theory of US strategy-making as it draws on hard, soft, and smart
power in the War on Terror. I have argued that the US executive begins its counterterrorism strategizing based on its ideological preferences and that any considerations of
soft power strategies cannot be attributed to a relative decline in US power. The next step of
the strategy-making process is the US executive’s assessment and determination of the
threat level coming from a specific context: short-term vs. long-term potential for terrorism.
When facing a short-term terrorist threat, the executive is more likely to use hard power,
while it is more likely to decide to use soft power when facing a longer-term terrorist threat.
Wherever a combined threat exists, the US executive will use combined or smart power,
whose relative makeup of hard and soft power depends on the proportion of short-term or
long-term terrorist threat.
The kind and degree of soft power that the US executive decides to use in countries
where it has determined that a long-term or combined terrorist threat exists will be
influenced by the political, economic, and the NGO regulatory environment of those
countries. I argue that the specific economic and political problems of a country will shape
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what kinds of NGO projects the US will fund in that country. Furthermore, the US
government will likely use more soft power in the form of NGOs in countries that place
fewer restrictions on those organizations. In this way, the political and economic needs of a
country with a combined terrorist threat, as well as its government’s friendliness to NGOs,
will influence the makeup of smart power the US uses in that country. In this project, I
examine US soft power as expressed through funding and partnering with NGOs. To this
end, my theory has explained the importance of NGOs as an actor—US soft or smart power
that utilizes NGOs will be impacted by the goals and capabilities of these NGOs.
Furthermore, the relationship between the NGOs and the US government after their initial
partnership will impact future US strategy. This qualitative research project seeks to
explain the big picture US strategy in the War on Terror and its evolution over time, also
looking to specific country cases to further understand and untangle the relationships
between the respective variables. Such a dual approach will allow me to test this theory
explaining the use of US hard, soft, and smart power in the War on Terror.
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CHAPTER 4
OVERVIEW OF US STRATEGY IN THE WAR ON TERROR
Introduction
No matter how often this has been said, and however much of a cliché it has become,
it remains true that the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon dramatically changed the course of US history, its foreign policy in particular.
Soon after the attacks, President George W. Bush announced the start of what became
known as the War on Terror, a name that was later modified by President Obama to the
“War on Al-Qaeda.” The US launched wars in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, and pursued
counter-terrorism operations across the globe. Military power was not the only tool used;
the US has also persistently used soft power over the course of the War on Terror, at some
times more than others, and often soft power has been combined with military or hard
power. This chapter provides a big-picture examination of the overview of the United
States’ War on Terror strategy over the last ten or so years, specifically its hard, soft, and
combined components.
I will demonstrate that US hard, soft, and combined strategy has evolved over time
and place, in variation that can be at least partially explained by variation in threat levels
(short-term, long-term, or combined) acknowledged to be emanating from different
geographic contexts over time. More specifically, I find support for Hypotheses 1 and 2
discussed in the theory chapter: the US executive is more likely to use hard power when
facing a short-term terrorist or security threat, as demonstrated by the invasions of Iraq
and Afghanistan, as well as the surges there. Alternatively, the executive is more likely to
use soft power when facing a long-term terrorist or security threat, as evidenced by US
foreign aid to conflict-ridden or unstable countries, as well as the emphasis on democracy-
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building in the Middle East and South Asia. More often, however, the US faces a combined,
short-term and long-term threat, and in such cases a combined hard and soft power
strategy is implemented, as evidenced not only by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also
US hard and soft power targeting countries such as Pakistan.
The 9/11 Attacks and Immediate Response
Although George W. Bush’s two-term presidency has been defined by his role in
leading the War on Terror, and he is considered a war President, that was certainly not
clear when he was first campaigning for office in 2000. In fact, in a presidential debate on
October 12, he refused to make a blanket statement about the direction of US foreign policy,
arguing only that as President, he would do what was in the “best interest of the country,”
dealing with important issues like peace in the Middle East (Bush 2000a). Furthermore,
Bush (2000a) argued, the US needed to be “humble,” in the world, and at the same time
“project strength in a way that promotes freedom.” So while he said in the debate that he
supported the NATO operations in Kosovo to remove Slobodan Milosevic, he wanted the US
to withdraw its troops and trade them for European boots on the ground instead. Bush the
presidential candidate declared (2000a) that he was “worried about over-committing our
military around the world,” and that as President, he would be “judicious” in deploying the
US military. Thus sending US troops to Haiti was not a good idea, he claimed, since it was
just an example of “nation-building” that was not really effective in transitioning the
country into democracy. The US should not try to impose its way of life on other countries
around the world, Bush (2000a) concluded.
A couple of months earlier, during a campaign speech in Miami, Bush the
presidential candidate had pledged his commitment to focusing on Latin America, because
“those who ignore our hemisphere do not fully understand American interests” (Bush

88
2000b). Thus, he promised that under his leadership, the US would further commit to
democracy and freedom in Latin America, as well as dealing with issues like clean water,
illegal immigration, criminal justice, poverty, debt reduction, and expanding free trade
between the US and other countries in the hemisphere (Bush 2000b). In her memoirs of her
time serving under President George W. Bush, Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
wrote (2011) that throughout the 2000 campaign, and in the early days of the Bush
Presidency before the 9/11 attacks, the executive was concerned with foreign policy issues
such as missile defense, reducing offensive nuclear spending, relationships with emerging
democracies such as India, and US-Latin American relations, an issue on which the
President was particularly well-versed (7). Rice (2011) suggested that upon taking office,
the US executive’s foreign policy goal was “simply to calm the [Middle East] region,” but
nothing more than that (54). Miller (2010) describes the initial foreign policy of George W.
Bush as a mixture of defensive (multilateral) and offensive (unilateral) realism, concerned
with the global balance of power. For instance, the President was concerned with increasing
the power of the US military so as to compete with Russia and China and he was generally
opposed to humanitarian intervention (Miller 2010, 50-51). Vice President Cheney and
Secretary Rumsfeld, were, Miller (2010) claims, hawkish offensive realists even before 9/11
(52). More generally, Lindsay (2011) suggests that before 9/11, President Bush was more
focused on domestic, rather than foreign policy, issues (766).
So while many may consider Bush a warmonger President, one who led the US into
war and used hard power all too easily, it is clear that he did not come into office with a
clear plan of going to war or with a strong disposition to wielding US hard power around
the globe. It would be difficult to classify Bush, then, as a “hawk,” in line with Sicherman’s
(2011) categorization, before the 9/11 attacks. An explicit contrast can be drawn between
the President and Donald Rumsfeld, a close advisor to President Bush, and his first
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Secretary of Defense. In his memoir, Rumsfeld (2011), who had worked for decades in the
White House prior to serving under President G. W. Bush, wrote that President Carter
should have increased the defense budget after the Soviet Afghan invasion, and that the
1979 American hostage situation in Iran “prov[ed] again that weakness is provocative”
(260). This was a favorite quote of his, and a statement that he repeated to Pres. George W.
Bush when asked to serve as his Secretary of Defense: “Weakness is provocative. But so is
the perception of weakness,” he told the then President-elect, and went on to explain that
US national security had been “undermined” for years by a lack of decisive foreign policy
leadership and action (283), such as the US retreat from Lebanon under President Reagan
and the US retreat from Somalia under President Clinton (268). In his first months as
Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld (2011) dealt mostly with Russia and China (305), rather
than the Middle East or countries harboring terrorists. Still, it is clear from his
preoccupation with the projection of US strength around the world to preempt any
perceptions of weakness, that Rumsfeld was predisposed to using US hard power in various
contexts, probably much more extensively than the President himself, even before 9/11. We
might easily consider him a “hawk.” And certainly Secretary Rice and Secretary Powell did
not always agree with him; President Bush (2010) likened Powell and Rumsfeld to a “pair of
old duelers who kept their own pistols in their holsters, but let their seconds and thirds fire
away” (87). These differences within the US executive became clearer in the debates leading
up to the US invasion of Iraq, as will be discussed later. The important point here is that
there are no clear indications that President Bush came into office seeking to go to war, or
even considering the use of hard power as the primary tool of US foreign policy, even
though some of his advisors, such as Rumsfeld, had clearer preferences for showcasing US
hard power.
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If the American public was shocked by the 9/11 attacks, it would seem that the US
executive—the primary actor of interest in foreign policy decision-making—was also taken
aback. President Bush (2010) described his initial reaction to the attacks, writing, “My first
reaction was outrage. Someone had dared to attack America. They were going to pay” (127).
Further expressing his anger in rather strong language, he wrote, “My blood was boiling. We
were going to find out who did this, and kick their ass” (128). Dick Cheney, President Bush’s
Vice President, had a similar reaction on 9/11; he wrote (2011) of his realization that
defending and protecting the US would “require going on the offense” and defensive
measures would not be enough (333). Interestingly, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote that
immediately after the 9/11 attacks, he remembered the Beirut bombing that killed
American Marines more than two decades before: for him, the United States’ “hesitant” and
“feckless” responses to terrorist attacks over the years made attacks like the one on 9/11
possible (343). This sentiment appears perfectly in line with Rumsfeld’s preoccupation and
ongoing concern about the demonstration of US hard power strength around the world; in
his eyes, its absence had made the US vulnerable.
It appears that all the primary foreign policy actors of the US executive (the
President, Vice President, Secretaries of Defense and State, and National Security Advisor)
agreed that a US military or hard power response to the attacks was inevitable. President
Bush himself told Secretary Rumsfeld hours after the attacks that he considered them “an
act of war,” and they immediately agreed to escalate the military readiness level of the US
armed forces to DefCon Three, for the first time since 1973. In the same conversation, the
President told Rumsfeld that as soon as they had dealt with the “immediate crisis,” he
“planned to mount a serious military response” (133). Vice President Cheney (2011) and
Secretary Rumsfeld (2011) both recalled that on the day of the 9/11 attacks, the President
and his foreign policy advisors discussed the threat of Iraq and whether or not the US
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should launch a military response against that country. Rumsfeld (2011) wrote that “I had
no idea if Iraq was or was not involved,” but the only responsible reaction would have been
to consider the possibility (347). President Bush (2010) recalled that Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz tried to push for attacking Iraq at the same time as Afghanistan,
with Rumsfeld’s support, although Secretary of State Powell and CIA Director George Tenet
did not support such an attack (189). Ultimately, Cheney (2011) wrote, they decided that
Afghanistan “should be first.” As Secretary Rice (2011) recalled, even before the official
decision was made, in the deliberations right after the attacks, the President’s foreign policy
advisors “all knew” that the US would declare war against the Taliban and go to war in
Afghanistan; the strategy sessions were more about figuring out the details and specifics
than about making the big decision (83). Thus, it is clear that in the face of a direct attack on
US soil, the US response, led by the President, was to use hard power against what was a
short-term terrorist threat.
Indeed, it would appear that President G. W. Bush led the American public to expect
no less. In a speech from the White House on September 11, 2001, the President told
Americans, “Our military is powerful, and it’s prepared” (1). Furthermore, the President
made it clear that the US would target not just the perpetrators themselves, but also those
who gave them sanctuary. He recalled that in his speech to the American public on 9/11, he
announced that any nation who harbored terrorists was responsible for their actions (Bush
2010, 137). Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the US executive’s goals were to prevent
another strike, and make clear to Americans and to the world that “we had embarked on a
new kind of war” (Bush 2010, 140). This idea, that the US War on Terror was a new and
unique global effort, has persisted in the years since its conception. Vice President Cheney
(2011) wrote that intelligence, stopping terrorist support, and dealing with states using and
selling weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) were all priorities “in this new kind of war”
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(330). Secretary Rumsfeld (2011) even went so far as to declare that he never liked the
term the “War on Terror” because it connoted military action when intelligence, law
enforcement, public diplomacy, the private sector, and other aspects of national power were
all part of the struggle (352). This not only indicates the uniqueness of the US effort, but also
reflects Rumsfeld’s view on the necessity of using soft power (e.g., public diplomacy) in
conjunction with military and other kinds of power in this ongoing struggle. Secretary Rice
(2011) also mentioned the broad scope of the War on Terror, and its focus “on terrorists
with global reach who threatened our way of life and that of our friends and allies”; this war
was against not just terrorists but terrorism itself (98).
Although the US executive is the most important decision-maker in US foreign
policy, Congress still has a role to play. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Congress
demonstrated its full support for the President’s determination to exert US hard power in
response to the attacks. On September 14, 2001, Congress passed a war resolution that
authorized the President to use force against states, organizations, or countries that had
perpetrated the attacks, as well as any groups or states that had helped plan or carry out the
attacks or shelter the perpetrators, so as to prevent future terrorist attacks on the US (Bush
2010, 154). President Bush suggested that this resolution was the basis for all his future
actions in the War on Terror, which he saw as legitimized by Congress despite future
criticisms that would be directed at his foreign policy decisions. “In the years ahead,” he
wrote, “some in Congress would forget those words. I never did” (Bush 2010, 155). Bush
(2010) also described ongoing reports of threats from Al Qaeda and Afghanistan, from the
days after 9/11 all the way up to the start of the US invasion of Afghanistan.
Thus, when President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress on September 20,
2001, his ultimatum to Afghanistan’s Taliban government was in keeping with his earliest
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reactions to the 9/11 attacks. In his speech, the President demanded that the Taliban give
up all Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan, release all foreign citizens in their custody and
protect all foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers, close all terrorist training camps,
and give the US access to the camps to make sure they are closed. “[The Taliban] will hand
over the terrorists,” Bush (2001) declared, “or they will share their fate” (11). Describing
the wide scope of the War on Terror, the President explained that the US would use “every
resource at our command,” including diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and
weapons, to disrupt and defeat Al Qaeda (12). From the onset, it is clear that the President’s
strategy included a combined approach of hard and soft power. Furthermore, this would be
a long war, a “lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen” (12). And, in words
that became hallmarks of what the War on Terror was all about, Bush famously declared,
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation
that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a
hostile regime,” and presumably a US target (12). This speech made clear the US’s intention
to wage a military campaign against the Afghan government unless the Taliban conceded to
the President’s demands.
Sure enough, the Taliban did not heed the US ultimatum, and on October 7, 2001, the
US began its offensive in Afghanistan, marking the start of a war it is still waging today.
President Bush (2010) explained his decision to go to war, arguing that it was vital to
protect American national security: “Removing al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan was
essential to protecting the American people…We were acting out of necessity and selfdefense, not revenge” (184). Vice President Cheney (2011) elaborated on the goals of the
war in Afghanistan: the US needed to “take out al Qaeda, take down the Taliban,” and make
sure that no other terrorist operations could be carried out from that country (340).
Rumsfeld (2011) recalled the numerous meetings he had with several regional leaders right
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before the US invasion of Afghanistan. These included the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Egypt, Uzbekistan, and Turkey, all of whom the US asked for help and cooperation in the
upcoming war (379). The suggestions of Uzbek President Karimov particularly resonated
with Rumsfeld (2011), who remembered the former’s suggestion of the necessity of
“putting an Afghan face on the conflict” and having humanitarian aid accompany military
operations in an effort to ensure the support of the population (384).
Indeed, Rumsfeld (2011) wrote that in the first 48 hours of the US military
campaign in Afghanistan, the US dropped 210,000 food rations over the country (387). On
this point Secretaries Rumsfeld and Rice agreed, despite the persistent frictions between
them over the years, disagreements described by Rice (2011) as a “professional conflict”
(18). Rice (2011) recalled that early in the US-led Afghan war, “freeing Afghan women
emerged early as a policy goal,” adding a humanitarian element not just to the US’s
justification for the war, but also impacting the war strategy itself. Also from the beginning,
Andrew Natsios, head of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
led much of this humanitarian work that went along with US military action in Afghanistan
(91). Even in his speech upon the start of the US war in Afghanistan, President Bush (2001)
announced to the American public that the bombing had begun in a campaign that included
allies such as Canada, Australia, Germany, and France, as part of a global war against
terrorism. This war, already drawing on diplomacy, intelligence, freezing assets, and arrests
of terrorists, would also involve dropping food and medical aid to civilians in Afghanistan
(17). About a month later, in his address to the UN General Assembly in New York,
President Bush discussed US and other countries’ aid to Afghanistan in the forms of food
and medicine, explaining that the US had already dropped 1.3 tons of food and 20,000
blankets over the country. Furthermore, the President declared that the US would work
with the UN and development banks to ensure reconstruction after the conflict (42). From
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the outset, then, the US war in Afghanistan, while foremost a military campaign, also
contained elements of soft power. The exact makeup of this combined power would vary
over the course of the Afghan war, as will be discussed later on. Overall, President Bush
(2010) described the decision to attack aggressively in Afghanistan as a “departure” from
weaker US responses to attacks. Almost echoing Rumsfeld’s (2011) logic, Bush wrote that
terrorists had understood weak US responses as weakness and “an invitation to attempt
more brazen attacks” (191).
From the beginning of the US war in Afghanistan, Pakistan became an ally of the US
in its War on Terror, although relations between the two countries would become rockier
over the years. President Bush (2010) wrote that Pakistan had “a troubled history with the
United States” and after President Musharraf came to power in a military coupe, US aid to
the country was almost nonexistent. Days after 9/11, however, Secretary of State Powell
spoke to Musharraf and confronted him with several demands, including condemning the
attacks, not allowing al Qaeda sanctuary in his country, breaking diplomatic relations with
the Taliban, and cooperating with the US in its war against al Qaeda and terrorism.
Musharraf pledged his support for the US (188), marking the beginning of what would
become a strange and tenuous partnership between the two countries. Secretary Rice
(2011) described President Musharraf as a “flawed partner” from the beginning, a leader
from whom the US needed action and not just pledges of support. The US pressured him to
make arrests and freeze assets of suspected terrorists (125), something that happened a
few months later, in December 2001 and January 2002 (126).
The US war in Afghanistan was the first major military offensive in the US War on
Terror, initiated just weeks after the 9/11 attacks. As President Bush (2001) declared in a
November 2001 speech at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, “Afghanistan is just the beginning of the
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war against terror” (46). And yet this was a very important beginning, where the US decided
to attack the country and send ground troops there “until the Taliban and al Qaeda were
driven out,” leaving room for a “free society” to take root (Bush 2010, 191). The former
President described the offensive in Afghanistan, named Operation Enduring Freedom, as
having four phases: first the US would send special forces and the CIA, then begin an air
campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, accompanied by humanitarian air drops, then
send in US and coalition partner ground troops, and finally, the US would stabilize the
country and work with the Afghans to create a free society (Bush 2010, 194). Bush the
Republican nominee had derided “nation-building” as antithetical to US interests and a
waste of US effort during the 2000 presidential campaign. However, as President he saw it
as important to not only rid Afghanistan of dictatorship, but also to rebuild the country, i.e.,
engage in nation-building, because of both a “moral obligation” and a “strategic interest” in
doing so (205).
Former Vice President Cheney also suggested (2011) that the US went to war in
Afghanistan to defend the US from future attacks, and that should remain the priority ten
years later. Rather than being concerned with how long the US would stay in the country,
the US objective should be making sure that the Afghan security forces could defend their
country; thus a strong, probably lengthy US commitment to the country was necessary, so
that the US could avoid the mistake it made in the 1980s when it left the country after the
Soviets were defeated (Cheney 2011, 347). Interestingly, in a tone different from that of
former President Bush (2010) or former Vice President Cheney (2011), former Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld (2011) recalled warning the President against an over-extended US
commitment to the war there. He told President Bush, “We ought not to make a career out
of transforming Afghanistan,” and should instead limit the goal to fighting terrorists, rather
than trying to democratize the country (398). Yet, Rumsfeld (2011) maintains the US
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executive’s position that the US offensive in Afghanistan was not just a military struggle,
writing that as early as October 2003, “it was clear that bullets alone would not win the
wars in Iraq or Afghanistan,” and that an ideological struggle against what Rumsfeld terms
“Islamism” was an important part of this effort (669).
These accounts by President Bush and his foreign policy advisors illuminate the
initial US strategy in the first months after the 9/11 attacks: the US executive decided to use
hard power against the actors it held responsible for the attacks, and those it deemed to
represent a short-term security or terrorist threat. Thus the President authorized the use of
force against Afghanistan less than a month after the 9/11 attacks. Equally important to
note, however, is that the US did not rely only on a hard power strategy in this War on
Terror: in Afghanistan, for instance, the US also dispensed humanitarian aid to the
population. I have argued that this use of combined power, where soft power accompanied
the military offensive, can be explained by the US executives’ determination that both shortterm and long-term security threats existed in Afghanistan, and the former should be dealt
with through soft power to help win over “hearts and minds” to the US side. The US
invasion of Afghanistan as a response to the 9/11 attacks, as well as its accompanying soft
power efforts in the country, clearly supports my first and second hypotheses: the US
executive is more likely to use hard power when facing an immediate, short-term terrorist
or security threat from another country, and more likely to use combined power when
facing a combined, short-term and long-term threat.
The 2002 National Security Strategy
Less than a year later, the US would issue a National Security Strategy, which would
be updated in 2006 and 2010. In the President’s letter accompanying the official strategy,
Bush (2002) wrote that the United States had a “duty” to protect the values of freedom,
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education, and property rights. Because it was a country with unmatched military power
and political influence, the US would seek to “create a balance of power that favors human
freedom” whereby countries could choose political and economic liberty for themselves (1).
In pursuing such a balance of power, the US would fight terrorists and tyrants, build
positive relations with other great powers, and encourage freedom around the world to
defend, preserve, and extend the peace using tools of the military, law enforcement,
intelligence, and disrupting terrorist financing (1). Here Bush (2002) introduced the
doctrine of “pre-emption,” or, “as a matter of common sense and defense, America will act
against such emerging threats [including WMDs] before they are fully formed” (2). The US
would also act to support democracy, economic development, free markets, and free trade
across the country, dealing with weak states that could be dangerous and vulnerable to
exploitation by terrorists and cartels (2). To that effect, the National Security Strategy
(2002) consisted of several parts, including “encourag[ing] change” in the direction of
democracy (3) and utilizing foreign aid to support freedom and those who peacefully seek it
(4). Defining the enemy, the National Security Strategy (2002) declared it to be “terrorism—
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents,” and as
President Bush had declared earlier, the US would not differentiate between terrorists
themselves and those who supported and protected them (5). The US would act with
regional partners against terrorists, providing such allies with military, political, and
financial aid, but “we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of selfdefense by acting preemptively” to prevent terrorists from harming the US (6).
The National Security Strategy (2002) presented another important principle or
facet of this struggle, reflecting the unique nature of the War on Terror and perhaps
explaining why the US would draw upon both hard and soft power while waging this war.
The War on Terror was not just a war against terrorists but also a “war of ideas,” whereby
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the US needed to convince others that terrorism was an illegitimate tool, support moderate,
modern governments, particularly in the Muslim world, focus resources on “at risk” areas
most vulnerable to terrorism, and use public diplomacy “to kindle the hopes and aspirations
of freedom of those in societies ruled by the sponsors of global terrorism” (6). Thus, in
Afghanistan, the US was working with the UN, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and
other countries for humanitarian, political and security aid to rebuild the country (7).
Furthermore, the Strategy (2002) mentions the UN Conference on Financing for
Development in Monterrey that featured a new goal to help nations help themselves, as well
as the subsequent establishment of the Millennium Challenge Account to countries who
reform in the direction of democracy and free enterprise (21-2). Education, HIV/AIDs,
health, nutrition, water, sanitation, and agricultural development (22-3) were all important
areas for the US to address in developing countries. Thus, as the US executive saw the
country facing a combined threat, i.e., not just short-term security threats but also longterm threats from weak, failing, undemocratic states, it laid the groundwork for a combined
hard and soft power strategy.
At the same time, the National Security Strategy (2002) discussed the role of
building US power and capacity: “It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American
military strength. We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge” (29). Not
only must the US overcome any vulnerability to a military challenge, but the President
needed a broader range of military options available to him in this long war (30). This is an
important point, one that dispels any suggestions that the US uses soft power in its foreign
policy simply because it cannot use military strength. The National Security Strategy (2002)
spoke to the contrary, arguing for US international superiority and preemption when
necessary, as well as the importance of promoting development and dealing with poverty,
public health problems, and the like, the latter all domains of soft power. In other words,
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despite being primarily lauded (or disparaged) for its doctrine of preemption, this National
Security Strategy (2002) also advocated a combined (or “smart power”) approach that uses
both hard and soft power in the War on Terror. As Dunn (2006) suggests, it “signal[ed] a
greater willingness to wield [the United States’] diplomatic and military power in pursuit of
its threatened state of security” (23). Put another way, both hard and soft power (and any
smart power combination of the two) were possible policy tools according to the overall
doctrine outlined by the first National Security Strategy. To this end, the Strategy (2002)
also called for more funding to the State Department (30), which would interact with NGOs
and other international institutions and engage in, among other things, public diplomacy
(31). Specific humanitarian goals included building up police forces, enhancing legal codes,
local governments, and electoral systems across countries (National Security Strategy 2002,
31). As former Secretary of State Rice (2011) commented, the Strategy (2002) emphasized
the use of various tools in the War on Terror, including intelligence, disrupting terrorist
finances, promoting open markets, and the importance of making development assistance
conditional on good governance reforms through programs like the Millennium Challenge
Account (155). Of course, even with a clear strategy that calls on using a combination of
hard and soft power, the makeup or proportions of each varies across time and place, as will
be discussed later.
In his memoirs, the former President himself described what came to be known as
the Bush Doctrine, whose principles were outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy,
as one in which the US sees no difference between terrorists and those who harbor them,
and a determination to fight the enemy abroad before they attack the US, or to “confront
threats before they fully materialize” (396). Quinn (2008) points out that this doctrine of
preemption often stands out as the most memorable part of the National Security Strategy
(2002), but this principle is actually tempered by a commitment to a “balance of power that
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favors freedom” also discussed in the Strategy (41). Aside from the doctrine of preemption,
other key elements of the National Security Strategy (2002) include the centrality of values
like democracy and economic liberalism, values declared to be universal and would thus be
actively promoted by the US. Furthermore, the Strategy (2002) also emphasizes that all
Great Powers can cooperate to realize these goals (Quinn 2008, 42). But the irony, as Quinn
(2008) points out, is that the US is the one who can identify what the “common interests”
are, and the Strategy (2002) also emphasizes the necessity of maintaining US military
hegemony (44).
Dunn (2006) also comments on the Bush Doctrine as gleaned from the 2002
National Security Strategy in the context of US grand strategy. This strategy in general, and
the doctrine of preemption in particular, was a departure from what Dunn (2006) refers to
as the containment and deterrent policies that had been the overarching principles and
strategies of US foreign policy for the previous fifty years. Miller (2010) agrees that the
preemption component of the Bush Doctrine marked a change in US grand strategy. Instead
of the defensive (multilateral) liberalism that promoted the US ideology emphasizing
democracy and market economies since the end of the Cold War, the Bush Doctrine
demonstrated an offensive, or more unilateral, liberalism leading to hegemonic behavior, as
exemplified by the Iraq War (46). Under this new doctrine, regime type was seen by the US
executive as increasingly more important because it would dictate a country’s behavior, and
thus regime type became linked to US and global security. Furthermore, tyrants were seen
as potential sponsors of terrorists, signaling a greater threat to the US (48).
The 2002 National Security Strategy, and the ensuing Bush Doctrine, make clear the
specifics of US strategy in the first few years of the War on Terror. The US would use hard
power against terrorists who posed an immediate security threat to the US and its allies, but
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it would also wield force against those who harbored such terrorists or provided them with
sanctuary. Perhaps the ultimate expression of this hard power strategy was the doctrine of
preemption, whereby the US would act alone against such short-term threats to the US. At
the same time, the Strategy (2002) indicated that the US would use soft power efforts, such
as development aid and democracy promotion, in vulnerable countries so as to stave off
what could become immediate terrorist or security threats. In other words, the 2002
National Security Strategy provides further evidence for my first and second hypotheses,
that the US executive will use hard power against what it sees as immediate terrorist or
security threats, soft power against long-term security threats, and combined power against
combined threats.
The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
The US executive released its first National Security Strategy for Combating
Terrorism just a few months after publishing its 2002 National Security Strategy. This
second Strategy (2003) explained its function as supporting the 2002 National Security
Strategy, but while the latter dealt with preventing attacks on US soil, the Strategy for
Combating Terrorism (2003) would deal with the identification and counteraction of
threats before they could reach US soil (1). Like the 2002 Strategy, this 2003 Strategy
defined the enemy as terrorism (1), and against which the US in its War on Terror would
“use every instrument of national power,” including military, diplomacy, economic strength,
law enforcement, intelligence, and information (1). The US would use all of these tools to
pursue a counter-terrorism strategy that would “initially disrupt, over time degrade, and
ultimately destroy the terrorist organizations,” relying on international support when
possible, but acting alone and preemptively when necessary (2).
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The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) went into detail about the
background and structure of terrorism, suggesting that underlying conditions such as
poverty, corruption, and ethnic conflict are exploited by terrorists to recruit members and
justify their causes. The international environment can make their movement easier and
may give them a physical base, and their leadership at the top “breathes life into a terror
campaign” (6). Thus, a loss of leadership can be very disruptive for a terrorist organization.
Terrorist organizations can operate within a single country, such as Abu Sayyaf in the
Philippines, or they can operate regionally, as does Jemma Islamiya, or, most destructively,
they can operate globally, a reach epitomized by Al Qaeda (8-9). In order to combat these
terrorist groups, the Strategy (2003) discussed four fronts in the War on Terror: defeating
global terrorist organizations by attacking safe havens, leadership, communications, and
resources; and denying more sanctuary and sponsorship of these groups by making sure
states take responsibility under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (11). The
third front involves diminishing the conditions exploited by terrorists, focusing on at-risk
areas and working with international community to do so, and finally, the fourth front seeks
to defend the US homeland, citizens, eliminating threats as early as possible (12).
To meet these broad goals, the National Security for Combating Terrorism (2003)
put forth specific methods of implementation: identifying terrorists and their organizations
and locating them (16), and destroying them through law enforcement, military power,
targeting their financing, based on strategies that varied by region (17). Furthermore, the
US sought to end state sponsorship of terrorism and to arrive at international standards of
accountability relating to terrorism (18), to form and maintain international coalitions for
this struggle (19). To this end, the US would work with “willing and able states” through
alliances such as NATO, and would “enable[e] weak states” by helping them fight terrorism
through legal, law enforcement, and military training, as exemplified by US efforts in the
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Balkans and the Philippines (20). Finally, the US would try to persuade “reluctant” states
less willing to cooperate, perhaps for security reasons, through measures such as diplomacy
and financial assistance. States unwilling to cooperate in this global War on Terror would be
held accountable (21). And in a specific explanation of how the US would use soft power in
this extensive war, the Strategy (2003) declared that the US would try to “diminish
underlying conditions” exploited by terrorists through supporting economic, social, and
political development in vulnerable states, often by working with the international
community to fight instability, and to rebuild countries. To this end, the US would work with
governments, NGOs, and public-private partnerships, in programs such as the U.S.-Middle
East Partnership Initiative (23). The Strategy stated that NGOs were key players in
combating terrorism, and the US would work with them to “prevent terrorists from taking
advantage of their services” (18), presumably a reference to allegations that terrorists were
using some charitable organizations as a front to funnel money for their operations. Also
declared in the Strategy (2003) was the United States’ intent to use “effective, timely public
diplomacy” and government-sponsored media to promote open information and support
people’s freedom around the world (24).
Like the 2002 National Security Strategy, this 2003 National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism indicated the US’s intent to deploy hard power (to disrupt and eliminate terrorist
groups and governments that sponsor them) as well as soft power (to stabilize vulnerable
countries and get rid of economic and political grievances) in the War on Terror. The
Strategy (2003) does not clarify the proportions of each kind of power in this intended
combination, and as I have argued earlier and will demonstrate later, the use of each kind of
power will vary by context. In any case, this Strategy (2003) provides further evidence in
support of my second hypothesis, that the US executive is likely to use a combination of
hard and soft power when dealing with a combined short and long-term threat. More
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specifically, these Strategies together suggest that soft power would be targeted at countries
and communities, hard power would be targeted at terrorists, their organizations, and those
who protected them, and smart or combined power would be targeted at contexts in which
both existed.
The War in Iraq
The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was released in February, at
the same time that the US was preparing to go to war in Iraq. As former President Bush
(2010) wrote, after the 9/11 attacks, “we had to take a fresh look at every threat in the
world,” and Saddam Hussein was deemed by the US executive as posing an imminent
security threat to the US because of his history of sponsoring terrorism, firing at US aircraft,
defying 16 UN resolutions, using WMDs, and, according to the intelligence of the time, his
determination to produce and use more WMDs (229). Bush (2010) and Rice (2011)
commented on the link the administration made, in their case to go to war in Iraq, between
al Qaeda and the dangers posed by the Iraqi regime, writing that in the summer of 2002, the
US received intelligence that Zarqawi, a figure affiliated with Al Qaeda, was working in a lab
in Iraq, possibly to produce biological weapons. Vice President Dick Cheney recalled (2011)
that even before 9/11, in late 2000, the US received reports of an Iraqi threat and WMDrelated activities (367). He argued (in retrospect, of course, years after it became clear that
Saddam Hussein was not in possession of WMDs) that after the 9/11 attacks, “there was no
place more likely to be a nexus between terrorism and WMD capability than Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq” (369). Interestingly, the issue of responsibility for 9/11 itself and Iraq was a
contentious one within the Bush administration; Rice (2011) wrote that even though the
CIA demonstrated that “there was simply no convincing case to be made for a link between
9/11 and Saddam,” Vice President Cheney and his staff “were absolutely convinced that
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Saddam was somehow culpable” (170). Nevertheless, it appears that by late 2002, at least,
there was agreement among members of the US executive that Saddam Hussein posed a
direct security threat to the US.
Thus, Bush’s (2010) and Cheney’s (2011) accounts both indicated that in the
months after the 9/11 attacks, the US executive determined the US to be facing an
imminent, short-term terrorist threat from Iraq, mandating that the US go to war there.
Cheney (2011) recalled that there was bipartisan agreement in Congress about the threat
coming from Iraq, as evidenced by the testimonies of Senators John Kerry and Hilary
Clinton and Congressman Rockefeller (392). Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
(2011) wrote in greater detail about the specific warnings of a WMD threat from Iraq. In
August 2002, CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin presented evidence that Iraq had rebuilt
facilities for chemical and biological weapons, had biological warfare capabilities, and that
the country’s nuclear weapons experts still resided there (Rumsfeld 2011, 433). In October
2002, the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq concluded that the country had gone on
with its WMD programs and had rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities (433).
Furthermore, the Estimate suggested that Saddam Hussein did indeed wish to acquire
weapons of mass destruction and might seek terrorist assistance to attack the US (434).
Finally, in October 2002, Congress passed an Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq (Rumsfeld 2011, 436). Before actually beginning the war in Iraq, however,
Rumsfeld (2011) recalled that President Bush knew it was “desirable” to have approval
from the United Nations Security Council to take action in Iraq, although it “was not a
necessary precursor to military action” (440), as the National Security Strategy (2002)
clearly indicates. Rice (2011) suggested that a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force
in Iraq was important not so much for the legitimacy of US action, but in order to “clear up
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any ambiguity about where the international community stood” (180), perhaps to send a
strong, unified signal to Saddam Hussein. The UNSC obliged and passed Resolution 1441,
indicating that Saddam Hussein would face “serious consequences” if he did not comply
with the demands of the international community, but as Rice (2011) indicated, this broad
language did not make it clear what those consequences would be (184). Thus, at the urging
of British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a stalwart US ally, the US sought a second UNSC
resolution explicitly authorizing the use of military force in Iraq, in an attempt to garner
French and German support (Rumsfeld 2011, 442). The second resolution infamously failed
to pass, and the French and German governments vocally opposed the US invasion of Iraq, a
stance Rumsfeld (2011) referred to as a “regrettable position” (443).
In the end, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein a 48 hour ultimatum to comply
with US demands, including “com[ing] clean” about his WMD program. After Saddam
Hussein ignored this warning, President Bush authorized the use of force in Iraq in March of
2003, a decision based on the President and his advisors’ assessment that “the only logical
conclusion was that [Saddam Hussein] had something to hide, something so important he
was willing to go to war for it” (224). Former Secretary of State Rice (2011) explained the
US decision to invade Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein in a similar way, arguing that “we
believed we had run out of other options” in dealing with him (187). Presumably
responding to claims that the US should not militarily impose democracy on other countries
(a constant refrain of critics of the Iraq War), Rice (2011) wrote that the US did not invade
Iraq to democratize the country “any more than Roosevelt went to war against Hitler to
democratize Germany” even though in Germany, after Hitler’s defeat, democratization
became a US goal (187). Instead, the US went to war in Iraq because “we saw a threat to our
national security and that of our allies” (Rice 2011, 187). Thus, in March of 2003, the US and
33 coalition countries sent troops to Iraq (Rice 2011, 204). Despite the extensive
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controversy surrounding the Iraq invasion, it is clear that the US executive at the time saw
itself as facing a short-term terrorist or security threat from Saddam Hussein, and
subsequently decided to use hard power against that regime, in line with the prediction of
my first hypothesis.
President Bush (2010) indicated that even before the US war in Iraq commenced,
the administration worked on a reconstruction plan, working with the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID), and creating the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (249). It is clear that from the beginning the US planned for some
sort of combined power, where rebuilding and reconstruction, efforts that would require
soft power, would accompany or perhaps follow the initial military offensive. Eventually,
the US engaged in deep efforts to bring about democracy in the country; former Vice
President Cheney (2011) regarded these efforts not as the US “impos[ing] democracy at the
point of a gun,” as critics alleged, but as fulfilling an “obligation” to make sure that postSaddam Iraq represented the US values of democracy and freedom (387). Similarly, former
Secretary Rice (2011) indicated that while the US goal in invading Iraq was not the
imposition of democracy there, President Bush thought that after the military campaign, “an
affirmation of the United States’ principles” should follow, which translated into democracybuilding. The logic behind this later effort was that a democratic regime would spill over
into the rest of the Middle East and “address the freedom gap” that was a source of
terrorism (187). Interestingly, former Secretary Rumsfeld appears to have disagreed with
the President, the Vice President, and then National Security Advisor Rice: he wrote (2011)
that he advocated more limited US goals in Iraq and a more limited role for US
reconstruction in the country, with room for more efforts by the UN. “I did not think [that]
paving roads, erecting power lines…and organizing democratic governmental bodies were
missions for our men and women in uniform” he writes, and he sought to avoid Iraqi
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“dependency” on US troops (482). Thus, Rumsfeld (2011) wrote, he did not see
democratization as part of the US role or goal in Iraq, simply because it was too difficult of a
task (500).
This disagreement over US goals in Iraq translated into different preferences for the
kind of strategy or power to be employed there: a more limited military campaign as
Rumsfeld (2011) envisioned, without extended reconstruction and democratization efforts,
would require mostly hard power. On the other hand, a mixed campaign where the US
sought regime change but also (ultimately) democratization, as preferred by the President,
Vice President, and NSA/Secretary of State, would require a greater combination of hard
and soft power. Ultimately, the President would decide not to follow Secretary Rumsfeld’s
suggestions and the US would indeed expend a great deal of money and effort in rebuilding
and trying to democratize Iraq. Rumsfeld (2011) indicated that USAID, the National Security
Council, and the State Department all coordinated on planning for a postwar Iraq, including
creating the Future of Iraq project in the State Department (485). Paul Bremer, the US
interim leader in Iraq, instituted the Achieving Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to Iraqi
People program, which included improving water delivery, health care, and civil society in
the country, all efforts, which Rumsfeld (2011) argued, exceeded the Defense Department’s
plans and resources (513). Former Secretary Rice (2011) also wrote about early postwar
planning in Iraq, which involved strategies on how to end the war, humanitarian concerns,
reconstruction, and political arrangements for a new interim government (190).
Thus the US created not just the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (192) and the Iraqi Interim Authority (193), but also the Iraq Stabilization
Group, months after the US-led invasion (242). Rice (2011) wrote that by 2004, Congress
had approved $18.4 billion for Iraq reconstruction, money that was used for revitalizing
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agricultural lands, schools, hospitals, clean water, bridges, pipelines, and an electric grid. In
retrospect, she added, it may have been more efficient to pursue reconstruction through
smaller and more local projects, a shift that would take place in 2004 and would be
magnified during the civilian and military surge of 2007 (268-9).
In any case, all of these reconstruction projects are examples of the US deploying
soft power, of course in combination with the military offensive or hard power in the
country. It would appear, then, that the US initially went to war in Iraq (i.e., used hard
power) as a response to what it determined was a short-term terrorist or security threat.
Shortly thereafter, the US executive pursued reconstruction, development, and even
political reform or democratization in order to stabilize the country, not just fulfilling a
moral obligation on the part of the US, but also to prevent further security threats (or deal
with long-term threats) from the country, as Rice (2011) indicates. This provides further
support for my second hypothesis: the US executive is more likely to use combined power
against what it sees as a combined threat. Thus what we might call the second major stage
of the US War on Terror involved using combined power: hard power against what was
seen by the US executive as an immediate terrorist or security threat, as well as soft power
to rebuild the country and counteract more long-term security threats against the US. US
strategy in this second front of the War on Terror was not very different from its strategy in
the first front (Afghanistan), insofar as combined power was used in both contexts.
Updated Strategies in 2006
A few years into the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq and halfway into President
Bush’s second term, the US executive released updated versions of both the National
Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The National Security
Strategy (2006) featured a more pointed emphasis on spreading democracy; President Bush
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wrote in the accompanying letter that for the past four years, the US has had “two
inseparable priorities” of winning the War on Terror and “promoting freedom as the
alternative to tyranny and despair,” making the promotion of democracy in the Middle East
a priority, for example (1). Thus, the National Security Strategy (2006) documented US
progress against tyranny around the world, including the removal of the Taliban in
Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as well as witnessing reforms in Lebanon, Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, the Color Revolutions in Eastern Europe, and moves
toward democracy in Africa, Latin America, and Asia (2). For the first time, the National
Security Strategy (2006) made a clear delineation between short-term and long-term
approaches to the War on Terror: in the short run, the US would use military force to kill or
capture terrorists, cut off their funding, and prevent their access to WMDs. In the long run,
however, “winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas,” since ideas can
transform people with grievances into terrorists (National Security Strategy 2006, 9). This
latter, long-term effort presumably depends more on soft power tools, including ones used
to promote and institute democracy, which could help counteract some of the grievances
that give rise to terrorism in the first place (10).
US victory in the War on Terror would require winning the wars in Afghanistan in
Iraq, according to the National Security Strategy (2006), by “consolidating” success in
Afghanistan and continuing with political, security, and economic actions in Iraq (12-13).
The Strategy (2006) also highlighted the growing threat of the Iranian and North Korean
regimes and their violation of non-proliferation treaties, declaring, “we may face no greater
challenge from a single country than from Iran,” where the ultimate goal for the US is the
opening up of the Iranian political system and the protection of freedom there. To that end,
the US would block threats from that country while increasing its engagement with the
Iranian people (20). While the US had a “strong preference” for dealing with these nuclear
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threats through diplomacy with allies, preemption was still in place as a strategy, the
National Security Strategy (2006) continued (23).
An ongoing emphasis on promoting economic growth and trade agreements was
also evident in the National Security Strategy (2006, 25-31) in an extension of what was
outlined in the 2002 strategy. The Strategy (2006) catalogued US development efforts
around the world, including the Millennium Challenge Account, the Emergency Plan for
AIDS Relief, and assistance to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (31-2). Perhaps most
significant in its discussions of the use of soft power, the National Security Strategy (2006)
also outlined the new US “transformational diplomacy,” which it defined as “working with
our many international partners to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that
will respond to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the
international system” by promoting “good behavior” among countries (33). In line with this
new direction, the Strategy announced a new position of a Director of Foreign Assistance in
the State Department, who would also be the head of USAID; this Director’s role would be to
more effectively coordinate an overall US foreign assistance strategy (33).
The National Security Strategy (2006) ended by describing US goals in specific
regions around the world, including the promotion of economic development and the
expansion of democracy in Africa (37), seeking a more democratic, economically liberal
Middle East, with a democratic two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reform
in US allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, supporting people against tyranny in Syria and Iran,
and democracy in Iraq (38). In Pakistan, the US was “eager” to witness more stability and
democracy (39), and the US acknowledged China’s growing economy and calls for peace and
reform there (41). More generally, the National Security Strategy (2006) called for
supporting the State Department in the new transformational diplomacy, including
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increasing public diplomacy around the world through foreign exchange programs, dialogue
with Muslim leaders, and citizen ambassadors (44-5). In the end, though, this National
Security Strategy (2006) came during a time of war, and it updated its description of the
enemy as not just “terrorism” (as in the 2002 NSS), but as “militant Islamic radicalism” (36).
Overall, the National Security Strategy (2006) featured a stronger commitment to
democracy promotion around the world, particularly in the Middle East, than did the
National Security Strategy of 2002. Again, this kind of goal would require more soft power,
rather than hard power. This strategy provides support for my second hypothesis: the US
executive would use a combination of soft and hard power when facing a combined terrorist
or security threat. During the same year, the US executive also released an updated version
of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006), which repeated the refrain of the
War on Terror being both “a battle of arms and a battle of ideas” being waged by the US and
using military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement tools (1). Like the National
Security Strategy issued that same year (2006), this National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism (2006) delineated between short-term and long-term points of focus in the War
on Terror, this time with more detail about terrorist groups and their activities. Thus, for
the short run, the Strategy (2006) declared the goal to be capturing and killing terrorists,
making sure they do not have safe havens or access to weapons of mass destruction,
increasing security in potential target areas, and cutting off terrorist funding and resources
(7). Echoing the National Security Strategy (2006) and demonstrating that this National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism did indeed function as a supplement to the former, the
latter proclaimed that in order to win the “battle of ideas” that is the long-term goal of the
War on Terror, the US seeks the “advancement of freedom and human dignity through
effective democracy” around the world (9). To complement the effort of democracy
promotion, the Strategy (2006) described a US commitment to promoting economic
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development, border control, and stronger justice systems in vulnerable, failing states (16),
particularly with international coalitions and partnerships such as NATO, the EU, the
African Union, ASEAN, and the OAS (19).
As evidenced in part by the National Security Strategy (2006) and the National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006), it is clear that the latter years of the Bush
Administration were characterized by a shift in strategy. This shift was not so monumental
as to replace the use of hard power or military action with soft power through development
assistance, but it appears to have involved an increased emphasis on democracy promotion
and development (both goals that require soft power methods) as a means of ensuring US
national security. Former President G. W. Bush (2010) described this so-called “freedom
agenda,” the last piece of the overall Bush Doctrine, as a commitment to “advance liberty
and hope as an alternative to the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear” (397). Former
Secretary of State Rice (2011) described this freedom agenda and the shift it represented in
the US War on Terror strategy more clearly. When she became Secretary of State in Bush’s
second administration, she recalled that much work needed to be done “to strengthen” US
diplomacy itself, as well as people’s perceptions of it (290). Thus, the second Bush
administration, epitomized through the new Secretary of State, featured a stronger
diplomatic emphasis and a shift away from unilateralism, according to Rice (2011),
whereby “our interaction with the rest of the world must be a conversation, not a
monologue” (298). Moving in this direction meant some reorganization within the State
Department, including a new combined position of “Under-secretary for Democracy and
Global Affairs” (309), a new Bureau of South and Central Asia, so that the region would be
lumped together with Afghanistan rather than Europe (313), as well as the establishment of
a Civilian Response Corps in 2006 for post-conflict reconstruction (314). Demonstrating the
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US’s increasing attention to Iran, Secretary Rice (2011) also created an Iran desk in Dubai,
as there had been no Iran desk prior to that time within the State Department (313).
Aside from just an energetic diplomatic surge on many regional fronts, other
changes took place within the second Bush administration. Former Secretary Rice (2011)
described the evolution of the last part of the Bush Doctrine, or the freedom agenda, as
evolving around 2005 “from the tactical goal of pursuing al Qaeda to creating a strategic
agenda for freedom in the Middle East,” as highlighted by President Bush’s Second
Inaugural Address (325). In this speech, which focused on a new, or at least, expanded, US
goal of promoting freedom around the world, the re-elected President suggested that the
only way the US way of life, its very liberty, could persist was if freedom was spread across
the globe: “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty
in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the
world.” Working toward this goal, which the President admitted would be the “concentrated
work of generations,” was “not primarily the task of arms,” although the US would continue
to use force if necessary. Instead, the US would encourage democratic reforms in other
countries, stand with people seeking freedom, and work with allies in this “concerted effort
of free nations to promote democracy,” a struggle that was “a prelude to our enemies’
defeat” (Bush’s Second Inaugural Address 2005).
Former Secretary Rice (2011) described this expanded US focus on democracy
promotion as a doctrine whereby “U.S. interests and values could be linked together in a
coherent way, forming what I came to call a distinctly American realism” (325). This was
similar to the post-WWII era, when the US combined its interests, which involved
maintaining a certain balance of power in the world, with its values of democracy and
liberty, in its strategizing, presumably through programs like the Marshall Plan. In the
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Middle East, then, while the “immediate problem” was capturing al Qaeda terrorists,
protecting US security, and preventing the proliferation of WMDs (326), “only the
emergence of democratic institutions and practices could defeat terrorism and radical
political Islam,” and thus the “long-term strategic shift in the way [the US] defined our
interests” was necessary (328). This shift bore fruit through the establishment of programs
like the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, kicked off at the Forum for the
Future in 2004, which (using soft power, of course) brought together civil society and
governments in order to press for reform (Rice 2011, 328).
Sharp (2005) describes the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative as
involving development and reform efforts by several countries to promote both economic
and political liberalization in the Arab world. At the first meeting in Morocco, twenty world
leaders from around the world met and pledged a total of $60 million for business
development in the region (Sharp 2005). The following year featured a number of meetings
and conferences of civil society groups in Istanbul, Sanaa, Venice, and Rabat, discussing
issues such as women’s empowerment, political pluralism, and electoral reform (BMENA US
Department of State Archive). Incidentally, the Middle East Partnership Initiative is a State
Department program continuing to this day, currently working with civil society groups in
the region to promote change in line with the Arab Spring uprisings (MEPI website),
perhaps reflecting a shift in US foreign policy goals in the region. In any case, President
Bush’s new Freedom Agenda, which initiated programs like the Broader Middle East and
North Africa Initiative, represented a change in the way the US executive calculated or
considered US interests: promoting democracy, particularly in regions like the Middle East
that were plagued by a long-term threat of terrorism, became an important strategy not just
because it was in line with US values, but because the establishment of democracies in the
region would help eliminate the terrorist threat and ensure greater US security.
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Former Secretary Rice (2011) catalogued other changes she implemented as the
new Secretary of State in the second Bush Administration. As alluded to in the 2006
National Security Strategy, USAID became part of the State Department because, as Rice
(2011) wrote, it was a constant problem not to have budgets and goals of the two agencies
in sync (341). So while it was “controversial” to create a new office of the Director of
Foreign Assistance within the State Department (426), it was important to demonstrate that
instead of just focusing on one development issue at a time and ignoring others, the reform
would ensure her belief that “development assistance ought to support broader US foreign
policy objectives” of promoting democracy and good governance, even if USAID objected
(427). Other changes that Rice (2011) put in place included a rather symbolic new practice
of greeting both members of the military and civilian workers when she visited war zones
such as Kabul and Baghdad, symbolizing that “there was no tidy division between the tasks
of the warriors and those of the diplomats” (343), perhaps reflecting Rice’s commitment to
a US combined or smart power strategy. More concretely, dealing with the shortfall of
“civilian expertise” in Iraq, the former Secretary established Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, borrowed from a presumably effective or successful experience in
Afghanistan. These groups were a “kind of hybrid force” combining military officers,
diplomats, and reconstruction workers from a variety of organizations who worked
together in conflict areas, helping to secure the people’s support in Iraq by providing
economic assistance, reconstruction, and promoting good governance (372). These PRTs
were another quintessential example of the US utilizing combined or smart power in war
zones that had earlier presumably been the domain of just military power.
The Freedom Agenda and its accompanying programs and efforts, including an
increased emphasis on economic development and political reforms in war zones,
demonstrated a clear change in the second Bush Administration toward goals and strategies
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that would rely on more soft and combined power. Eriksson and Norman (2011) catalogue
some of these changes that took place pointing out that in the first Bush administration, the
term “soft power” was not used explicitly in explaining or discussing US strategy, and
former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even famously said that he did not know
what the concept meant. By President Bush’s second term, however, “more emphasis was
put on public diplomacy [a subset of soft power] and its budget [was] somewhat
strengthened,” and Secretaries Rice, Powell, and even Gates increasingly used the term in
their descriptions of US counter-terrorism strategies (430-1). Even former Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, whom I have referred to earlier in the chapter as one of the hawkish
figures within the Bush administration, wrote that a few years into the War on Terror, he
consistently called for more civilian power in the military to “bolster our military’s
expanding humanitarian efforts” such as relief after the tsunami in Indonesia in December
2004. This kind of assistance noticeably shifted public opinion in the region more favorably
towards the US, and by engaging in such humanitarian and relief efforts, “We did well for
America by doing good” (624). Another example was US military help in Pakistan after the
2005 earthquake; there, too, public opinion increased in favor of the US rather dramatically
(624). The Secretary of Defense’s call for more civilian-military integration is certainly a
prime example of a shift toward a more combined or smart power strategy in the War on
Terror; the goal of improving public opinion towards the US, as we have seen in strategy
documents over the years, is certainly in line with “winning the hearts and minds” of
specific populations to help counteract the threat of terrorism emanating from the Muslim
world.
What we might call the third stage in the War on Terror, marked by the updated
National Security Strategy (2006) and National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006),
did not take the War on Terror into new geographic fronts, nor was this stage characterized
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by notable increases in US hard power efforts. Instead, as illustrated by the documents
discussed above, this stage of the War on Terror featured a shift towards more soft power in
what was already a combined power strategy: the use of US military force in Afghanistan
and Iraq was affirmed, but US democracy promotion in the Middle East also took center
stage. This increasing emphasis on soft power may be due to an acknowledgement of an
increased long-term security or terrorist threat around the world, in line with my second
hypothesis. It may or may not be the case that the long-term threat suddenly increased from
non-democratic, under-developed countries, but the shift towards more soft power in
promoting democracy through Bush’s Freedom Agenda at the very least signifies an
increased acknowledgement by the Bush administration that the US faced a long-term
security or terrorist threat from non-democratic countries. As such, it was in the US’s
security interests to more firmly and emphatically promote democracy, particularly in the
Middle East, which would require the use of more soft power.
The Surge
Important changes in US War on Terror strategy were also put in place on the
military front. As former President Bush (2010) described it, the initial military strategy in
the country was “as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down” (356). In other words, the US
would slowly scale back its military efforts in the country until Iraqi forces were in a
position to take over their own security. However, after the removal of Saddam Hussein in
2003, Bush wrote (2010) that al Qaeda found a new haven in the country (358). Former
Vice President Cheney (2011) added that by 2006, the increase in bloodshed in the country
was profound, partly because al Qaeda had entered the country and was killing Shi’a
Muslims and Americans, and Sunnis were fighting an insurgency against the US occupation
(436). It was clear that the strategy of Americans standing down so Iraqis could stand up
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“wasn’t working” (438), and some tactical change had to be implemented. Former Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld (2011) pointed to the bombing of the Shi’a Samarra Golden Mosque in
February of 2006 as a turning point in the Iraq War, a harbinger of increased violence and
sectarianism in the country (679). Cheney (2011) described “the surge” in Iraq, as it came to
be known, as a counterinsurgency strategy with the goal of protecting Iraqis, trying to gain
control of and secure Baghdad and then capturing the enemy, all the while engaging in more
contact with the local population (450). In January 2007, the President made the decision to
send 20,000 extra troops to Iraq, mostly to the capital Baghdad, as well as to Anbar
province, which was “the home base of al Qaeda in Iraq” (455).
Former Vice President Cheney (2011) alleged that Former Secretary of State Rice
(2011) was opposed to the surge in Iraq (449), but she presented a somewhat different
version of the story. Rice (2011) wrote that she saw the surge as a strategy through which
the US would integrate both military and civilian counterinsurgency efforts, deploying
Americans among the Iraqis “to deliver populations security, reconstruction, and
governance” (547). In what sounds like a surge in US smart or combined power, rather than
just military power in Iraq, Rice (2011) added that part of the surge was the President’s
request for a dramatic increase in the budget of the State Department to support not just
the efforts of the surge per se, but also the overall new shift to transformational diplomacy.
This increased budget added 245 new positions in various countries, including 57 new
positions in the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, as well as a
$6 billion dollars of supplemental funding for US efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon
(555). Also included in this additional funding was money to supplement the PRTs in Iraq,
which was important because as Rice (2011) described it, “there was little distinction
between war and peace” there and the teams working on governance and reconstruction
efforts often worked in areas of high security risk. While there was some back-and-forth
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between the State and Defense Departments about who would lead the PRTs, Rice (2011)
wrote that in the end, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were led by the State
Department, and they are “one of the really successful experiments of the Iraq war” (557).
It is important to note that Bush (2010), Cheney (2011), and Rumsfeld (2011) all
pointed to a deteriorating security situation in explaining the decision to undertake a surge
in Iraq. In other words, they suggested that an increase in a short-term military or terrorist
threat made it necessary for the US to increase its military efforts in response. Rice (2011),
in her description of the surge as a combined or smart surge involving both military and
non-military elements, pointed to the shortage or lack of US efforts addressing more longterm terrorist/military threats due to diplomatic, development, and reconstruction efforts
that were not extensive enough for US strategic interests. In other words, not only can the
threat level (short-term, long-term, or combined) explain an initial decision to use soft,
hard, or combined power, but an acknowledged change in the threat level can help explain a
change in the degree to which a certain kind of power is used, e.g., an increase in military
forces in a given context.
President Bush’s decision to carry out the surge in Iraq, whether we consider it in
purely military terms as Bush (2010), Cheney (2011), and Rumsfeld (2011) seemed to do,
or as a surge in combined soft and hard power, as Rice (2011) did, was highly controversial
at the time. Dyson (2010) references the former President’s distinct personality traits as
useful in explaining his decision in selecting the surge policy, against the advice of members
of his Cabinet, military leaders, and members of Congress (557). The Former President’s
closed-mindedness prevented him from acknowledging the failure of the Rumsfeld-Casey
plan (where Americans would stand down as Iraqis stood up), his stubbornness limited the
remaining options under consideration (575), and his risk acceptance made the choice of a
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strategy—viewed skeptically by many and seen as unlikely to be effective—an actual
possibility (576). Former President Bush’s personality and leadership traits did not feature
characteristics like cognitive flexibility, an open advisory system, a deep personal
involvement in details, or pragmatism, which scholars such as George (1980) see as vital for
good presidential decision-making. Yet, concludes Dyson (2010), Bush made the decision to
undertake the surge because of his unique cognitive style and leadership (585). Later on, of
course, politicians who supported the strategy, including Senator John McCain, could point
to it as a success (Donnelly 2008, The New York Times).
While “the surge” is a term used to refer to the dramatic increase in troop levels in
Iraq in 2007, former President Bush (2010) described another surge that took place around
the same time. By late 2006, he wrote, the US strategy in Afghanistan needed adjustment
partly because of limited coordination between countries in rebuilding efforts, coalition
partners’ restrictions on what their troops were allowed to do in the country, and
corruption (211). Because of these factors, Bush ordered what he called a “silent surge” in
late 2006 of 10,000 extra troops in the country. The US also increased its Provincial
Reconstruction Teams there and sent more civilian experts from the US to work with the
Afghan government (212). Because of what appeared to the US executive as an increase in
both a short-term security threat (including limited action or capabilities on the part of
coalition partners) and a long-term security threat due to corruption and problems with
rebuilding, then, the President authorized an increase in both military power and soft
power in the country—this is in line with the predictions of my second hypothesis. Rice
(2011) recalled that by 2008, when she visited Kandahar, the PRTs were not functioning
very smoothly, however, and “it looked as if the civilians and military had no idea what each
other was doing” (636). Rumsfeld (2011) made a similar complaint, arguing that though the
PRTs in Afghanistan were working with local leaders on both military and non-military
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projects, not enough coordination existed between the military and civilian components,
leading to a situation where most of the work ended up being military (687).
Despite the lack of coordination between military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan,
this fourth stage in the US War on Terror was characterized by “surges” in military or hard
power in both Afghanistan and Iraq. According to Secretary Rice, the same period marked
an increase in diplomatic and civilian efforts in Iraq as well. The important point here is that
the emergence of a new threat in a new place is not necessary for a shift in US strategy to
take place—shifts in degrees of threat levels acknowledged by the US executives are also
significant, leading to shifts in degrees of different kinds of power used in various contexts.
In what I called the third stage of the War on Terror, discussed in the section before this
one, the US strategy with an increased focus on democracy promotion, or the Freedom
Agenda, reflected an acknowledgement that the long-term terrorist threat against the US
existed in countries throughout the Middle East, as well as in the war fronts of Afghanistan
and Iraq. In this fourth stage of the War on Terror, the increase in the degree of hard power
used in those same two countries, or the “surges,” was a shift in US strategy orchestrated to
deal with what was acknowledged to be an increasing short-term terrorist or security
threat against the US. These two sets of changes in the degrees of soft and hard power
employed in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively, provide further evidence for my second
hypothesis, that the US executive is more likely to use combined power, with varying
components of hard and soft power, where it sees various combinations of long-term and
short-term security threats.
Enter Obama
After eight years of War on Terror leadership by President Bush and his team, a new
political figure emerged on the foreign policy scene. Even before he was elected president,
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during the presidential campaign against Republican John McCain, Obama’s position was
that the policy in Iraq had been a failure, as the US had sent too many troops to Iraq and not
enough troops to Afghanistan. At a campaign event in July 2008, for example, the
Democratic candidate Obama declared that “This war [in Iraq] distracts us from every
threat that we face and so many opportunities we could seize. This war diminishes our
security, our standing in the world, our military, our economy, and the resources that we
need to confront the challenges of the 21st century. By any measure, our single-minded and
open-ended focus on Iraq is not a sound strategy for keeping America safe” (Boston Globe
2008). As Senator, Obama had voted against the US invasion of Iraq, and throughout the
campaign he continually lambasted his opponent McCain for having supported the Iraq
War. In the first Presidential Debate in September 2008, for instance, Obama repeated that
McCain had been wrong about the Iraq War from the beginning, and like other US
policymakers had failed to predict the counter-insurgency and sectarian violence that
would rip through the country (CNN 2008). At the same time, presidential candidate Obama
did not run on a “dovish” platform that would avoid war at all costs. In his speech accepting
the Democratic party nomination on August 28, 2008 , Obama declared that as president, he
would “never hesitate to defend this nation,” but would only send troops overseas with a
“clear mission” and the necessary logistical support for them to fulfill the job at hand. At the
same time, Obama emphasized “tough, direct diplomacy” to deter Iranian nuclear weapon
ambitions, and a commitment to building partnerships across the globe to tackle the various
challenges of the 21st century
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign2008/dnc2008/speeches/obama.html).
In some ways, Obama’s positions on foreign policy were not very different from
George W. Bush’s in 2000: the US would use military force when absolutely necessary—and
Obama viewed the war in Afghanistan as one such example, where the US should actually
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scale up its military offensive. Of course, as has been explored in detail above, after the 9/11
attacks, former President Bush increasingly looked to hard power as a primary way of
meeting US foreign policy objectives, namely, security, especially during his first term.
Obama’s campaign, which revolved around the theme of change from the Bush Doctrine and
other Bush policies, also focused on the need for the US to use what we can term more soft
power around the world: more diplomacy, engagement, and a reliance on partnerships with
other countries. Ideologically, then, it would be difficult to classify the candidate Obama as a
“dove” a la Sicherman (2011), but neither is he clearly identifiable as a “hawk”: he appears
to have advocated a mixed approach, of smart or combined power. Lindsay (2011)
emphasizes the sharp ideological differences between Bush and Obama, suggesting instead
that the two had “two competing US foreign policy visions” (765). While former President
Bush’s vision was more offensive, President Obama was “rejecting the core principles of
Bush’s worldview,” and specifically what the current President saw as Bush’s failure to
appreciate the impact of globalization and the necessity for diplomatic engagement because
the US could not do everything on its own (765). At the same time, Lindsay (2011)
concludes, both had one thing in common, which was a “conviction that other countries
both wanted and needed US leadership” (765). Thus, Lindsay (2011) describes President
Obama as a foreign policy “pragmatis[t]” who would use hard power when necessary but
also use other forms of power like diplomatic tools and foreign aid to achieve US foreign
policy goals (773). In any case, candidate Obama pledged that as President, he would “end
the war in Iraq responsibly”
(http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign2008/dnc2008/speeches/obama.html).
Ultimately, this position translated into US withdrawal of its combat troops from Iraq by the
end of 2011, almost two years after Obama took office.
A Shift in Strategy
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Obama had made another significant campaign promise, vowing to refocus US
military efforts on Afghanistan, which was, unlike Iraq, the legitimate military front of the
War on Terror. As President, he did indeed increase US military troop levels and offensives
in Afghanistan, but his foreign policy strategy demonstrated a more significant shift. This
change came in March of 2009; just a couple of months after Obama took office, he
announced a new Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) strategy. As General James Jones described
the new strategy in a Foreign Press Center Briefing, it reflected a “change of tone and
change in conduct” of US foreign policy, with more emphasis on dialogue, discussion,
consultation, and listening to allies (1). Furthermore, the US executive had in place a new,
feasible goal for the War on Terror, which was to “disrupt, dismantle, and prevent al-Qaida
[not all terrorists, thus the change] from being able to operate in its safe havens” (Jones
2009, 1). To that end, the US would begin treating Afghanistan and Pakistan as “one
challenge in one region,” which would translate into an increased focus on Pakistan and
major increases in economic and military support in efforts directed at both countries (2). A
month earlier, the President had added 17,000 troops in Afghanistan, and called for 4,000
more to be sent to the country. It is clear, then, that the Obama administration viewed
Afghanistan as presenting a short-term security or terrorist threat to the US, and thus made
the decision to scale up US hard power in that country, in line with my first and second
hypotheses.
An expanded US military presence was not the only aspect of the new AFPAK
strategy, which, as Jones (2009) explained, would also involve “intensive regional
diplomacy” with other South Asian countries and more resources to “civilian efforts” in both
countries, through the State Department and foreign assistance programs (2). For instance,
Jones (2009) declared President Obama’s support for a Congressional bill authorizing $1.5
billion per year in aid to Pakistan over the next five years, as well as reconstruction zones
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along the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders (3). Interestingly, Jones (2009) suggested that
the biggest strategic shift inherent in the AFPAK strategy was the emphasis on “capacity
building” through civilian efforts, and a need for coordination for all the money sent by
various countries and agencies to target locations in the War on Terror. More specifically,
any aid money and work should pay particular attention to issues like establishing the rule
of law and working against the plague of corruption (4). In Afghanistan, not only was a
stronger Afghan army needed, but the country also required more engineers, irrigation
projects, teachers, schools, and hospitals, and increased coordination among existing EU,
NATO, UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and NGO efforts to that end (5). Commenting on what
had become a rocky US relationship with Pakistan, Jones (2009) said it was in “a restart
mode” and the US was working on increasing trust and confidence with the Pakistani armed
forces (6). The 2009 AFPAK strategy definitely reflected a decision to use more smart or
combined power, not only increasing such power in Afghanistan but also adding Pakistan to
the geographic forefront in the War on Terror. The beginnings of a shift toward US military
efforts in Pakistan was evident in the latter days of the second Bush administration, when
the President issued a decision allowing US Special Forces to operate within the country
even without approval by the Pakistani government, due to an increasing US concern that
the Pakistani government was not doing enough to counteract the growing terrorist threat
there (Schmitt and Mazzetti 2008, The New York Times). President Obama’s AFPAK strategy
cemented this change, publicly placing Pakistan alongside Afghanistan as a target of US
military and civilian operations in the ongoing fight against terrorism. Not only did
Afghanistan present a combined security threat, requiring that the US increase both its soft
and hard power efforts there, but Pakistan itself presented both a long-term and short-term
security or terrorist threat to the US, leading to the US escalation of military and non-
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military efforts there. These changes are in line with my second hypothesis: the executive is
more likely to use combined power against what it sees as a combined threat.
In May 2010, the Obama administration issued an updated version of the National
Security Strategy. In the accompanying letter, President Obama (2010) wrote that the US
was ending its war in Iraq but was “renew[ing] our focus” on Afghanistan (1). The President
declared that the US would maintain its superior military power in light of the various
threats it faced from countries, non-state actors and failed states (1), but the US would also
“complement” its armed forces with diplomacy, development, intelligence and law
enforcement (2). To this end, the US needed to build deeper connections with people
around the world through its military, diplomatic efforts, the private sector, NGOs, and
regular citizens (3). The text of the actual National Security Strategy (2010) reflects the
administration’s AFPAK strategy, arguing that the US would, through deeper partnerships
with allies and multilateral institutions, focus on al Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan
(1). Including Pakistan alongside Afghanistan, of course, was a shift from earlier National
Security Strategies. The Strategy (2010) declared that “Al-Qa’ida’s core in Pakistan remains
the most dangerous component of the larger network,” and the US was working with the
Pakistani government against these threats (20). This shift in strategy, then, with an
increased military focus on Pakistan, came as a response to a determination by the US
executive that the short-term terrorist threat from Pakistan had increased significantly, and
needed to be met with US military efforts there.
Weapons of mass destruction were still the biggest threat to the US, according to the
National Security Strategy (2010, 4). Presumably highlighting the differences in the
direction and policies of the Obama administration with those of the Bush administrations,
the Strategy (2010) acknowledged that “some methods employed in pursuit of our security
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have compromised our fidelity to the values that we promote, and our leadership on their
behalf,” making it harder for the US to support things like democratic change around the
world (10). Thus, it was imperative for the US to move towards more “comprehensive
engagement” with partners and other strong countries like China, India, and Russia.
Through diplomacy and development promotion, the US would try to prevent conflict,
increase economic growth, and strengthen weak countries, all the while strengthening
democratic institutions and fighting poverty, climate change and disease around the world.
At the same time, the US military would engage with other countries by working with
foreign governments and in some cases, helping to train their militaries (11). The US would
also “pursue engagements among peoples—not just governments” and engage with civil
society actors to do so (12). It is important to note here that while the Strategy (2010) tried
to set itself apart from the strategies under former President Bush, it remained in line with
some aspects of the Bush Doctrine, particularly the Freedom Agenda highlighting the
necessity of US democracy promotion around the world.
The biggest substantive change inherent in the 2010 National Security Strategy,
then, involved a new focus on Pakistan as a front in the War on Terror. The Strategy also
mentioned explicitly for the first time that the US would deal with potential safe havens for
al-Qa’ida in places like Yemen and Somalia before they took root, by helping governments
there with development and security assistance (21), presumably preventative soft power
efforts against long-term terrorist threats. These countries had not been a major or very
publicized target of the US War on Terror, although Rumsfeld (2011) did write that a few
years into the War on Terror, the US engaged in some operations, including some involving
special forces, against terrorists in the Horn of Africa, North Africa, Pakistan, and Yemen
(631).
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The other major change in the 2010 National Security Strategy was a greater
emphasis on US diplomacy, engagement, and statecraft, tools of power which had been
alluded to in previous National Security Strategies (2002, 2006) but were given a more
extensive platform in this latest incarnation of the Strategy. Thus, while military force was
necessary for defending the US and its allies, sometimes even for humanitarian purposes,
the US would “exhaust other options before war whenever we can.” The Strategy (2010) did
not go so far as to completely abolish the preemption component of the Bush Doctrine,
maintaining that the US could still act unilaterally to defend its interests. Again, though, we
see a nuanced change in tone or degree: the US would abide by its own standards while
doing so, meeting specific objectives and goals (22). In the broader US effort to renew its
global leadership, the US needed to “strengthen the power of our example” to encourage
democratic sentiments and movements around the world, by prohibiting torture, dealing
with terrorist threats legally and transparently whenever possible (36),and protecting civil
liberties and the rule of law (37)1. This mention of avoiding the use of torture was
presumably a reference to the use of waterboarding against US detainees under the Bush
administration, a controversial practice viewed by its critics as illegal torture on the one
hand and stalwartly defended by others, such as former Vice President Dick Cheney (2011)
years after leaving office, as an effective and legitimate interrogation technique.
Under the leadership of President Obama and his foreign policy advisors, including
Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Secretaries of Defense
Robert Gates and then Leon Pannetta most recently, the US continued its extensive
counterterrorism operations, focusing more on Afghanistan and Pakistan and withdrawing
steadily from Iraq. In June of 2011, the White House released an updated version of the

The Obama administration has come under attack for conducting drone attacks in Pakistan, though
(Schmitt 2011, The New York Times).
1
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National Strategy for Counterterrorism, optimistic in tone about the beginning of the end
for al Qaeda. President Obama (2011) wrote in the letter preceding the document that
“today, we can say with growing confidence—and with certainty about the outcome—that
we have put al-Qai’da on the path to defeat.” US Special Forces had killed Usama bin Laden
just two months earlier in Pakistan, “the most important strategic milestone in our effort to
defeat al Qaida” (3). The Strategy (2011) suggested that his death, along with the new
revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, had “changed the nature of
the terrorist threat” and made al Qaeda and its ideology less relevant (1). Again we see a
shift in tone or nuance characteristic of the Obama administration, this time pertaining to
the name given to the US’s global counter-terrorism efforts: the Strategy (2011) said that
the Obama administration was at war with al Qaeda, not with terrorism (i.e., the term “War
on Terror” was a misnomer) or with Islam, and to win this war, the US would use military
and civilian power, as well “the power of our values” (2). The threat of al Qaeda continues,
and an important part of US strategy involved “countering its ideology” (3).
Similar to the 2006 National Security Strategy and National Strategy for
Counterterrorism, this 2011 Strategy differentiated between short-term and long-term
counter-terrorism goals or considerations (7), although it did not make the categorization
much more specific than that. US goals did not appear to have changed much, as reflected in
the Strategy (2011): the US remained committed to protecting the country, its people, and
interests, disrupting and defeating al Qaeda, although “affiliates and adherents” of the group
were added as a target. Furthermore, the US continued in its efforts to prevent terrorists
from acquiring or using WMDs (8) and in its attempts to get rid of terrorist safe havens (9).
The US would counter the ideology of al Qaeda through “focused” foreign and development
assistance, as well as a “positive vision of engagement with foreign publics,” showing that
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while the US was trying to “build” around the world, al Qaeda was only trying to “destroy”
(9).
Like the National Security Strategy (2010), this Strategy for Counterterrorism
(2011) discussed the terrorist threat from Afghanistan and Pakistan, specifically the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the borders (12). In Pakistan, the US was
working with the Pakistani government to weaken al-Qaeda’s leadership, support, and
infrastructure faster than the group could rebuild them, and to this end, the US and Pakistan
needed to cooperate more closely, as only by working with Pakistan would the US be able to
defeat al Qaeda. In Afghanistan, the US and the International Security Assistance Force were
working to make sure al Qaeda would not return, strengthening the Afghan government,
military, and civilian institutions in that undertaking (13). Al Qaeda also posed a threat in
the Arabian Peninsula, specifically in Yemen and from Gulf State money, and to this end the
US was going after al-Qaeda but also working to “stabilize the country and prevent state
failure” (14), a nod to a combined short-term and long-term threats there and a
corresponding combined use of hard and soft power. The Strategy (2011) also mentioned
an al Qaeda presence in East Africa, as well as the presence of the affiliated Al Shabaab
group in Somalia, a country plagued by humanitarian challenges (14) that, it is implied
although not clearly stated, the US would work to alleviate. An Al Qaeda threat was also
acknowledged in North Africa, specifically in Algeria and Morocco, although the Strategy
(2011) says the US would engage in “capacity building initiatives” in those countries to help
governments in the region fight the threat (16). Thus the threat of Al Qaeda in the Lands of
the Islamic Maghrib appeared to be a less pressing threat than the one from other countries
such as Pakistan. Finally, the Strategy (2011) discussed an improving situation in Iraq,
where the ultimate US goal is to strengthen Iraqi capacity to be able to defeat al Qaeda
there, maintaining lasting peace and security in the country (15). Certainly the Obama
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administration deemed the short-term security threat from Iraq as diminished to the point
where the US could gradually disentangle its combat troops from the country, which it did
in subsequent months.
The first few years of the Obama administration featured some important changes
in US counter-terrorism strategy, including bringing Pakistan to the forefront of the US war
on terror, or war on al Qaeda, as it came to be known. In line with this acknowledgement of
an increased combined threat coming from Pakistan, the US increased its hard and soft
power efforts in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, which became part of a single “AfPak”
strategy. The US also increased its hard power efforts and special operations in places
where an al Qaeda threat was deemed to exist, such as Yemen and Somalia. In these
countries, too, as in other countries or regions (such as Algeria and Morocco), the US also
increased its soft power efforts, including humanitarian and capacity building work, in an
acknowledgement of the more long-term terrorist or security threats those countries posed.
Overall, then, US counter-terrorism strategy under President Obama has been characterized
by an increase in both hard and soft power efforts, often combined in countries like
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The exception to this trend has been Iraq, where the US had
withdrawn all of its combat troops by the end of 2011 because the executive no longer
considered the country to pose a short-term security or terrorist threat against the US.
US Relative Power
This chapter has been cataloguing variation in the United States’ hard, soft, and
combined power strategies over the course of the War on Terror and across countries. So
far I have demonstrated that the US executive increasingly emphasized soft power, often
but not always in combination with hard power, starting as early as Bush’s second term.
Some critics or cynics of strategies utilizing soft power may suggest that a country, even the
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US, would increasingly utilize such a strategy as it grows weaker: when using military
power is not an option, then soft power is the other alternative. Certainly one point made in
the 2010 National Security Strategy could be interpreted in such a way. The Strategy (2010)
states that while maintaining a strong military as a deterrent is a foundation of US strategy,
“when we overuse our military might, or fail to invest in or deploy complementary tools, or
act without partners, then our military is overstretched,” and to avoid such a situation the
US must constantly adapt its diplomatic and development efforts, particularly those directly
connected to the military (18). Whether or not this statement is interpreted to mean that
the Obama administration was increasing its reliance on diplomatic and development tools
because the US military was overstretched is not precisely the point here, although the next
section will catalogue the US’s use of soft and hard power in the War on Terror, including
during the Obama administration.
It is worth addressing whether or not US power has indeed been declining in recent
years, in an effort to either totally dismiss the notion that the US may be using more soft
power because it is relatively weaker, or alternatively, to give such an idea some credence.
The debate about US national decline has gained some prominence in recent months, with a
number of scholars publishing articles or books on the topic. Robert Kagan (2012), for
instance, argues that American decline would immeasurably hurt the international world
order that was created and has been maintained by US leadership, and the current order
emphasizing democracy and markets would be replaced by something far more sinister,
hurting the US and the rest of the world. A rise in China, the “leading candidate” for a new
superpower in the face of possible US decline, would mean a global push away from, rather
than toward, democracy, for example (74). So is the US in decline? Kagan (2012) and
Beckley (2011) argue no. The US share of the world’s GDP has remained stable over the past
four decades, Kagan (2012) writes, hovering around 27% or 28%. India’s and China’s
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shares of global economic output have indeed grown, at the expense not of the US, but of
Europe and Japan (105). While China’s economy is expected to surpass the US’s “at least in
terms of sheer volume” sometime during the 21st century, that would not make China the
richest country (102), and such economic growth would not necessarily translate into
overall power in the international system. Comparing the power of China to that of the US
across indicators of wealth, innovation, and conventional military capabilities (56), Beckley
(2011) adds that the US is “wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful
compared to China than it was in 1991” (43). Importantly, Beckley (2011) also points out
the importance of comparing the per capita income, and not just overall GDP, of the two
countries, and finds that the average Chinese citizen is now $17,000 poorer compared to the
average American than he or she was in 1991 (59).
The US “remains unmatched” militarily, and so far there has been no decline in US
relative military capability; the US spends $600 billion a year on defense, more than all
other great powers combined, and spends only 4% of its GDP in doing so (Kagan 2012, 107).
Furthermore, the US military is more powerful than ever before with fewer troops overseas,
and here Kagan (2012) compares the 1 million troops overseas out of a US population of
160 million in 1968 with the current situation, when the US is fighting two wars with a total
of only 500,000 troops overseas out of a population of 313 million people (128). So while
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have reflected the high cost of military power as well as its
high cost, they have not led to a decline in US relative power (138). In line with this
argument, Beckley (2011) argues that the United States gets “more bang for its buck” for
money it spends on the military (74).
In his most recent book, Joseph Nye (2011) himself agrees with Kagan’s (2012) and
Beckley’s (2011) assessments of the prospects of China becoming more powerful than the
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US, writing that at least in the first half of this century, China might “give the United States a
run for its money” but will unlikely become more powerful than the US (202). These
assessments are relevant in this empirical investigation of the United States’ evolving
strategy in the War on Terror because it appears from their conclusions that it was unlikely
that the US executive decided to increase its use of soft power in specific contexts of the War
on Terror because its relative power was declining globally. Not only have Nye (2011),
Kagan (2012), and Beckley (2011) demonstrated that the relative power of the US,
measured in terms of economic and military might, has NOT declined so far, but the primary
competitor of the US is China, a country that is neither a target nor an active participant in
the US War on Terror. It is fair to say, then, that the US’s use of soft or combined power in
the War on Terror can be explained strategically on the perceived merits by the US
executive of soft or combined power, and not because the US is afraid to use military power
more frequently because it is threatened by other powerful nations.
Military Spending in the War on Terror
So far, this chapter has examined the evolution of hard, soft, and combined power
strategies in the War on Terror. The next step in explaining the variation in strategy over
time and place requires an examination of military spending over time, in an alternative
measure of the dependent variable, or the change in US soft, hard, and combined power
strategies over time and place. In a Congressional Research Service Report, Belasco (2011)
documents US government spending on War on Terror Operations between September
2001 and March 2011. She finds that by March 2011, Congress had approved a total of
$1.283 trillion in military costs for the three post- 9/11 operations: Operation Enduring
Freedom mostly for Afghanistan but also on other small operations from the Philippines to
Djibouti, Operation Noble Eagle to enhance security at military bases, and Operation Iraqi
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Freedom. These total costs include military operations, base security, reconstruction and
foreign aid in the respective target countries, embassy costs, and veterans’ healthcare. In
some ways, this total picks up on smart or combined power costs in specific War on Terror
targets, since reconstruction and foreign aid are tools of soft power that the US has used.
Belasco (2011) adds that most of this $1.283 trillion was spent through the Department of
Defense, with a remaining 5% on foreign aid and diplomacy, and 1% on medical care for
veterans. Most of this budget involves “incremental” war costs that are in addition to the
DOD’s peacetime budget, covering things like personnel pay, operation and maintenance,
buying new weapons, research and development, testing and evaluation, the construction of
military bases, and expanding inventory (2). The DOD’s spending documented in this report
also includes programs specifically related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, including
the “logistical costs of allies” such as Pakistan and the counter-terror operations they
perform (funded by the US), the Commanders Emergency Response Program, the Afghan
Security Forces Fund, the Iraq Security Forces Fund, and the IED (Improvised Explosive
Device) Defeat Funds (2).
The level of US troops deployed overseas in War on Terror operations peaked in
Iraq in 2007, as a result of the surge there, but until 2009, not much change in troop levels
took place in Afghanistan after the initial US invasion there (11). Notable recent shifts in
spending over time include a huge increase between Fiscal Year 2009 and Fiscal Year 2010,
when the Department of Defense’s average monthly spending grew from $4.4 billion a
month to $6.7 billion a month—during this time period, the US almost doubled its troops in
Afghanistan, from 44,000 to 84,000 (Belasco 2011). Furthermore, spending on Iraq fell
dramatically in the same period, from an average of $7.9 billion to $6.2 billion, accompanied
by a fall in US troop levels there from 141,000 to 96,000 as the US began its withdrawal
from the country.
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Figure 2 breaks down the total war funding by operation as of March 2011, with
63% or $806 billion going to Iraq, 35% or $444 billion going to Afghani
Afghanistan
stan and other
Enduring Freedom smaller operations, 2% or $29 billion going to enhancing security for US
bases worldwide, and less than 1% or $6 billion “unallocated funds.” Figure 3 provides a
visual image for the breakdown of War on Terror spending by ag
agency.
ency. As mentioned above,
94% of spending, or $1,208.1 billion, went through the Department of Defense, a mere 5%
or $66.7 billion through the State Department and USAID, and 1% or $8.4 billion on
veterans’ medical expenses. A huge majority of War on Terro
Terrorr spending, then, was through
the prime agency for hard power, the Department of Defense, while one measure of soft
power spending, money spent through the USAID and the State Department, puts it at a
mere 5% of the overall budget. This spending is not com
completely
pletely inclusive, however, as the
US does spend money on soft power through other agencies; for instance, some government
funding to NGOs goes through the Department of Defense.
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Nevertheless, to get
et an idea of one measure of soft power spending and how it
changed over time, it is useful to look at the State Department/USAID’s budget as it evolved
through the course of the War o
on Terror, as shown in Figure 4.. US State Department/USAID
funding peaked in 2004, in the second year of the Iraq invasion, and then declined
dramatically in the following year, when US troops were actually drawing down in Iraq.
Even with the Iraq surge in 2007, tthere
here was little change in State/USAID’s budgets until
2010, the same
ame time as the surge in Afghanistan. If the budget for fiscal year 2012 were to
be approved, 2012 would see an increase in the State Depa
Department/USAID’s
rtment/USAID’s budget. Figure 5
shows the changes in DOD, State/USAID, and VA spending over time.
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Figure 4

Data from Belasco (2011), CRS Report
Figure 5

Data taken from Belasco (2011), CRS Report
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Figure 6

Data from Belasco (2011), CRS Report
Figure 6 shows the Department of Defense’s spending over time by operation,
showing that spending in IIraq
raq peaked in 2007, with the surge, and spending in Afghanistan
remained relatively steady between the end of 2001 and 2005, until it rose a bit in 2006
(with Bush’s “silent surge”), and then rose steadily until it peaked in 2010. The shifts in DOD
spendingg by operation correspond to the number of boots on the ground in each country
over time. The initial Iraqi invasion in March 2003 included 94,000 troops, which went up
dramatically in 2004 to 149,000, followed by a drawdown the next year with the next large
lar
increase in troop levels between January and November 2007, when troop levels reached
170,000. By 2010, only 50,000 troops remained in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the troop levels
were relatively low at the beginning of the invasion at 10,000, when the operation
operat
focused
mainly on Kabul, but as insurgent violence increased across the country, the mission
expanded and troop levels were increased to 20,000 in 2006, with the surge during the end
of the Bush administration leading to 45,000 troops in Afghanistan in early 2009 (Belasco
2011). President Obama would, as discussed above, dramatically increase troop levels and
spending in Afghanistan, which regained focus as the center of the War on Terror,
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increasing troop levels twice by 2010, when troop levels in the country reached 98,000. As
discussed earlier in the chapter, increases in DOD spending or troop levels were a result of
the US executive’s acknowledgement of an increased short-term security or terrorist threat
in the respective battlegrounds of the War on Terror.
US Foreign Aid in the War on Terror
Since this is an empirical examination of hard, soft, and combined power strategies
in the War on Terror, it is imperative to document the evolution of US spending on foreign
aid over time and place, with funding for International Non-governmental Organizations
(INGOs) being the primary subset of interest here. In a Congressional Research Service
report, Tarnoff and Nowels (2004) suggest that US policy on foreign aid was “transformed”
after 9/11 and foreign aid has been used as a tool in the War on Terror, dispensed to
various US allies and others including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan and Indonesia.
Most bilateral (or direct country-to-country) aid is managed through USAID (which in 2004
was not yet a part of the State Department), with the Treasury Department giving out
multilateral aid, and the DOD and State Departments dispensing military and securityrelated aid (1). McCleary (2009) agrees, arguing that in the post-9/11 world, the executive’s
concern with fragile and failing states was strengthened, and for the first time, development
in such countries was linked to US national security(152). As of 2004, USAID had laid out
five goals of US foreign assistance: transformational development; strengthening fragile
states; humanitarian assistance; strengthening US geostrategic interests in countries like
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel; and trying to decrease the impact of
global problems such as HIV/AIDS (Tarnoff and Nowels 2004, 3). These goals are very much
in line with the objectives of the 2002 National Security Strategy discussed above. Tarnoff
and Nowels (2004) add that most USAID workers are foreign nationals working overseas,
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where projects are implemented by contractors, consultants, and NGOs (21-2). Andrew
Natsios (2004), a former USAID administrator, points to USAID’s budget of $14.2 billion in
2003, a major increase from its $7.8 billion budget in 2001.
Documenting changes over the course of the War on Terror, McCleary (2009) writes
that NGOs (or Private Voluntary Organizations, PVOs, as USAID calls them) funded by USAID
were more and more frequently required to work with the military in carrying out their
work (155), as discussed above in the example of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).
PVO workers, suggests McCleary (2009), were unhappy with this arrangement, and after
the invasions of Afghanistan and later Iraq, they were “increasingly vocal in their
opposition” to the military carrying out relief work in conflict areas (155). Former Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld (2011) comments on the thorny relationship between NGOs and the
military, recalling in his memoir that NGOs who worked in Afghanistan were unhappy and
talked to the press about US military action that made it difficult for them to deliver food
and were upset “when the Department of Defense declined to help feed the enemy “ (390).
According to Rumsfeld (2011), some NGOs went so far as “tr[ying] to ingratiate themselves
with Taliban authorities” by publicly criticizing US and coalition actions (391), a rather
strong accusation but one that reflects McCleary’s (2009) assessment of the difficult
relationship between the two actors. Lischer (2007) also points out that generally, NGOs are
reluctant to get involved in military interventions because they do not want to violate their
three guiding principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence (100-101; see also
Howell and Lind 2009). NGOs are therefore conflicted about working with military or
government forces, and yet some, like the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and CARE,
receive over half their funding from the US government (108) and have operated in Iraq and
Afghanistan in the current War on Terror.
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Describing changes in the relationship between the US military and foreign aid over
the War on Terror, McCleary (2009) notes that in 2005 the Department of Defense issued a
Stability Operations Directive, giving stability operations, which include peacekeeping and
humanitarian aid and assistance, the same priority as major combat (155). This was clearly
an important shift in US military strategy, codifying the use of combined power within the
US military itself: peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, or soft power efforts, were as
significant as combat or hard power operations. The Department of Defense subsequently
increased its non-military personnel who would work on reconstruction efforts, which,
McCleary (2009) implies, meant the DOD was increasingly doing work that should have
been carried out by the State Department (156). Whether this change was wise or unwise is
beside the point here: the relevant issue here is that with the progression of the War on
Terror, including the evolution of the Bush Doctrine to include the Freedom Agenda, the
Department of Defense began using more soft power and working in domains such as
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, using an increasingly combined strategy.
Demonstrating this increasing emphasis on combining soft and hard power, former
Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates argued (2009) for more of a “smart power” strategy
incorporating both hard and soft power, arguing that while military force will still be
important to fight and capture terrorists in the long run, “the US cannot kill or capture its
way to victory” (12). Gates (2009) specifically mentioned “civilian agencies” and NGOs as
private sector actors who, along with academics, are coordinating with the US military and
providing it with expertise to undertake “various initiatives” that try to deal with grievances
of local populations (12), part of what I have categorized above as long-term terrorist
threats.
NGO-military collaboration is not just in place in formal “war zones,” as Williams
(2009) points out. He writes that since 2003, the US military has become involved in issues
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that were previously outside of its domain and had been dealt with by USAID and the State
department, and thus combining hard power to fight insurgencies with soft power efforts
towards achieving stability in vulnerable regions (220). Williams (2009) cites the regional
Combatant Command zones (COCOMs) as examples of this integrated strategy; these zones
are led by commanders in charge of all US military activity in a geographic region, including
public diplomacy work, humanitarian work, disaster preparation, civic action programs,
and military training (224). Thus the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
was created post 9/11 to prevent the growth and spread of terrorism in the Horn and
works towards regional stability through efforts including humanitarian work, and the
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) works on counterterrorism and
public diplomacy, democracy promotion, and development assistance “to address the
underlying social and economic inequalities that often foment terrorism” (Williams 2009,
226).
Tarnoff (2009a) traces US reconstruction efforts in Iraq, an actual war zone, in
another Congressional Research Service Report. By 2009, the US had appropriated $49
billion for reconstruction in the country (1). There was a decline in US reconstruction
assistance to Iraq by 2010, when Obama became President (8), which coincides with the
start of US withdrawal from the country. Discussing PRTs in Iraq, Tarnoff (2009) describes
them as groups where the military protects civilian US officials and development specialists,
allowing them to work in areas they otherwise could not have without security protection;
at one point there were 15 US-led PRTs in Iraq. These groups work with local community
leaders in Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils on infrastructure projects like
roads, water, schools, and health clinics (16). In Afghanistan, the other major war zone in
the US War on Terror, the US had spent $38 billion in aid to the country, almost two-thirds
of it after 2007 (Tarnoff 2009b, 1). More than half, or 54% of that money, went to security
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programs, 32% went to development and humanitarian-related aid, 5% for governance and
democratization, and 9% for counter-narcotics programs. This aid was dispensed by the
DOD, USAID, the State Department, and the US Department of Agriculture (1). Tarnoff
(2009b) writes that in Afghanistan, the US led 12 PRTs, out of a total of 26 NATO-led PRTs,
with the goal of “improve[ing] governance and provision of basic services” (3). With the
new Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) strategy in 2009, the US began providing more
assistance to the country, focusing more on borders and adding civilian personnel to
monitor and implement aid programs (4). US-sponsored aid programs in the country
include working on village infrastructure, including water, irrigation, roads, schools, and
electricity, economic growth and agriculture (5), public health care, promoting the rule of
law (6), and programs specifically designed for women and girls (7). Tarnoff (2009) adds
that in Afghanistan, NGOs, both international NGOs and local (SNGOs) were important
players in dispensing this aid and carrying out the various programs.
So exactly how much money has the US government spent on NGOs in the War on
Terror, and how has it varied over time? The best source for this data is the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which only starting in 2005, began
tracking money spent by various countries, including the US, to recipient countries and
delivered through a category called “NGOs and Civil Society.” Included in this category is
money funding international NGOs (INGOs) based in other countries like the US, as well as
Southern NGOs (SNGOs), or NGOs from another developing country
http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3746,en_2649_34447_39245773_1_1_1_1,00.html).
The figures below show US aid money delivered through NGOs to South and Central Asia
(which includes Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Georgia, India,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and to the Middle East (which includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq,

147
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates,
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yemen). Since a list of exact countries targeted as part of the
US War on Terror does not exist, I am discussing data from what I have deemed the most
relevant regions in the world with respect to terrorism, South and Central Asia and the
Middle East, to give an important overall picture of US aid to countries through NGOs. The
next couple of chapters will explore in depth US government and NGO efforts in the specific
countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan, to test the parts of my theory not explored in this
general overview. We see that, overall, aid to NGOs peaked between 2008 and 2009, when
Barack Obama became President. In the Middle East, the peak, where US aid through NGOs
reached over $743 million, peaked in 2009, where the peak came later in South and Central
Asia, in 2010 at more than $1286 million. Importantly, US aid through NGOs to South and
Central Asia (which includes both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which in the last few years
have become the primary focus of War on Terror military operations as well) continued to
increase into 2010. In 2010 in the Middle East, however, US aid to NGOs actually fell
dramatically, at the same time that the US was starting its drawdown from Iraq. Figure 7
confirms that the overall Middle East trend reflects the situation in Iraq: the US NGO aid to
Iraq indeed peaked in 2008, then fell dramatically in 2010. On the other hand, US NGO aid to
Afghanistan has only been rising, with a dramatic increase in 2009, as shown in Figure 8. It
is interesting, then, that shifts in NGO aid to these regions has coincided with shifts in
military spending and troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, which suggests a
truly combined strategy in the War on Terror, at least since 2005.

148
Figure 7

Data from OECD
Figure 8

Data from OECD
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Figure 9

Figure 10

Source: OECD
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Figure 11

Source: OECD
What about the period before 2005, in the early days of the War on Terror? Since
the OECD did not begin tracking US aid flows to different countries specifically through
NGOs until 2005, a couple of other different measures can give us an idea about the
evolution in US aid to the same region. The OECD also provides data on total US bilateral aid
to those same regions for the years 2
2000-2010,
010, as shown in figures 12 and 13.
13 Interestingly,
official development assistance (ODA), which includes military aid to Middle Eastern
countries, peaked in 2005, a couple of years into the Iraq war but before the surge, and then
declined dramatically the following year. Data on US ODA to Central and South Asia is
available from 2000, a year before the 9/11 attacks, which is interesting to show just for
comparing aid levels immediately before the War on Terror and afterward. We see a
consistent increase
se over time in US aid to those regions, not just in the year 2001 but for
every year, and the most noticeable spike in aid was in 2008. Since this broader category of
data covers all US aid to those regions, and since I have theorized in particular about NGO
aid, I cannot adequately explain the variation in aid over time to these different regions,
except through a new hypothesis, which I will not test here, that the decrease in overall US
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aid to the Middle East is correlated to the winding down of the war in Iraq. In any case, this
is an interesting finding, that spending on soft power decreased as military hard power
decreased; we might expect the opposite sort of trend, whereby a decrease in US hard
power in a particular location such as Iraq might be ac
accompanied by an increase in US soft
power spending there, presumably to combat a remaining long
long-term
term security or terrorist
threat. In contrast to the Middle East region, no such winding down of the war in
Afghanistan (which is in the South and Central Asia category) has taken place—rather
place
we
have seen an escalation of the war, most noticeably in 2009
2009-2010.
2010. As demonstrated earlier,
throughout the War on Terror we have often seen US soft power being used as a
complement to US hard power, which accounts for my hypothesis, although certainly the
two have not always been used hand
hand-in-hand.
Figure 12

Source: OECD
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Figure 13

Source: OECD

We can only get a rough idea of how much the US spent on funding NGOs, the
specific example of soft power examined in this research project. A good estimate would be
USAID funding of PVOs, their name for NGOs, starting in 2001 or 2002, since the US funds
NGOs extensively through this agency, which became part of the State Department in 2006.
McCleary’s (2009) data set provides information, taken from the USAID, on total federal
revenue spent through USAID on PVOs, up to the year 2005. Figure 14 shows the change
c
over time, from the year 2000, before the 9/11 attacks, up to 2005. Overall, we see an
upward trend, although federal funding of USAID PVOs started to fall in 2005. Of course it is
hard to explain the drop in federal funding of PVOs in 2005, which is why this section is in
essence providing another measure (federal dollars spent on NGOs/PVOs) of US soft power
spending. The next two chapters will attempt to explain variation in federal funding of NGOs
or PVOs in two specific countries, Pakistan and Afg
Afghanistan.
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Figure 14

Federal Funding to USAIDRegistered PVOs, 2000-2005
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Conclusion
This chapter has explored the evolution of US strategy, particularly its hard, soft,
and combined power components, through the course of the War on Terror. The data
presented in this chapter was a measurement of the dependent variable in this project:
changes in US soft, hard, and combined power strategy over time and place. The data in this
chapter shows that the US executive’s strategy in the War on Terror has changed over time
and place, with hard power, as well as increasing degrees of hard power, being used in some
places (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, the surges in Iraq and Afghanistan, increased military
offensives in Pakistan), increased soft power used in other places, as well as an increased
soft power strategy, particularly in the 2006 and 2010 National Security Strategies, and
overall, an increased emphasis over time on a combined power strategy.
Because this project is not just descriptive in nature, and I am seeking to explain
changes over time, I have also tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 in this chapter: the US is more
likely to use hard power against what it sees as a short-term threat, soft power against what
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it considers a long-term threat, and combined power against what it deems to be a
combined threat. Broadly speaking, I have found support for both of these hypotheses, in
the data gleaned from strategy documents, memoirs written by various members of the US
executive, and data about hard and soft power expenditures over the course of the War on
Terror. As the initial invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrate, as well as do the surges
in those two countries and the escalation of US military action in Pakistan, when the US
executive determines that a short-term terrorist or security threat exists, it is more likely to
use hard power. Conversely, this chapter has shown that the US executive is more likely to
use soft power to battle more long-term threats, seen particularly in weak, unstable,
undemocratic states—and a shift towards more use of soft power over time is also clear,
particularly since the 2006 National Security Strategy. More frequently, however, we see an
emphasis in US strategy on a use of combined power: in cases where the US executive has
used hard power, we see soft power, aimed at longer-term threats, also used, presumably
because a combined threat is acknowledged to exist. To test these hypotheses in more
depth, as well as to test the remaining hypotheses, the next two chapters will closely
examine two country studies and the evolution of US War on Terror strategy there.
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CHAPTER 5
US WAR ON TERROR STRATEGY IN AFGHANISTAN
Introduction
Afghanistan was the immediate and initial war front in the US War on Terror that
followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While the narratives and images of US
military action in the country have become etched in the minds of most Americans, along
with the plotlines of the ups and downs, initial victories and later stalemates, of this long
war, many are less familiar with the factors impacting the evolution of US military strategy
in the current Afghan war. Still less familiar might be the factors impacting the development
of US soft power strategy in the country, which when viewed together with US hard power
strategy, has been a case of clear US combined power strategy in what appeared at some
points to be an unending conflict.
This chapter tests the hypotheses laid out earlier in the dissertation through the
case study of the US war in Afghanistan. I begin with a background discussion of US strategy
or policy towards Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks, in order to lay out a frame of
reference from which to compare US War on Terror strategy in the country. Most of the
chapter, however, catalogues the evolution of the War on Terror itself in Afghanistan, from
its beginnings in October 2001 until as near the present day as possible, providing further
testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2. As discussed less extensively in the previous chapter, the
Afghanistan case provides support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, demonstrating the US
executive’s decision to use hard power against what is deemed to be an immediate shortterm terrorist or security threat and combined power in what is deemed to be a combined
short-and long-term terrorist or security threat. Furthermore, this chapter delves more
closely into the specifics of the Afghan country context and the regulatory environment to
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test the impact of those variables on the US government’s use of a specific kind of soft
power, funding the work of NGOs, finding support for Hypotheses 3 and 4. The socioeconomic and political needs of a target country shape the kinds of NGO projects the US
government will fund, and the US government is more likely to fund NGOs in a country with
a relatively open NGO regulatory environment. Finally, by examining both the big picture of
US-funded NGO work in the country, as well as the work of two specific INGOs in the
country, supported by original interview data, I test Hypotheses 5 and 6: the US is likely to
fund NGOs whose mission and goals align with its own, and more likely to continue this
funding relationship if the relationship between them has been more cooperative. I find
mixed support for them, although more in terms of projects carried out by specific INGOs
than partnerships or relationships between the US government and those INGOs
themselves.
Background: US Policy Towards Afghanistan Before 9/11
While this entire research project tests my theory explaining variation in US
strategy in the War on Terror, it is useful to begin with some background on US policy
towards a country that started out as, and has gone back to being, the primary US front in
that war. Recent US involvement in the country infamously began more than three decades
ago at the height of the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union.
While its neighbor, Pakistan, clearly allied itself with the US in that decades-long conflict,
Afghanistan instead reached out to the Soviet Union, which provided it with economic and
military aid and diplomatically supported it against Pakistan (Rais 2010, 204). At the same
time, the US did provide some development assistance to Afghanistan during the Cold War,
although it is telling to compare the levels of US and Soviet assistance to the country:
between 1955 and 1987, the USSR provided $1.27 billion in economic aid and $1.25 billion
in military aid to Afghanistan, while the US dispensed $533 million in economic aid, a
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fraction of those numbers, and no direct military aid, to the country (Rais 2010, 205).
During the Cold War, only a small number of American NGO workers had operations in
Afghanistan, funded by both the US and the USSR (Burke 2011, 81), something that would
dramatically change a few decades later.
In the aftermath of a bloody coup in 1978 against the ruling Afghan government, a
pro-Soviet, Marxist government was installed. Faced with a widespread insurgency against
the new government, the Soviet Union officially invaded Afghanistan in 1979 (US State
Department 2011, “Background Notes: Afghanistan”). The United States saw the Soviet
invasion as problematic for regional security in countries economically important to the
West (Rais 2010, 207), so it stepped into the conflict, albeit indirectly. Through Pakistan, the
US conducted an anti-Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan (US State Department 2010,
“Background Notes: Pakistan”). Pakistan essentially became the “key transit country for
arms supplies to the Afghan resistance” in the US fight against the Soviets (Epstein and
Kronstadt 2011, 4), and collaborated with the US until the end of that war (Ajami 2010, 32).
Finally, in the Geneva Accords of 1988, the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw from the
country, and did so the following year, ending a decade-long war that cost the Afghans
about a million people. After the Soviet retreat, Afghanistan plunged into a civil war until
the Taliban came into power in the mid 1990s, cementing its rule over 90% of the country
by 1998. The US essentially stayed out of the picture in Afghanistan during the 1990s,
except for its cruise missile attacks on an Osama bin Laden terrorist training camp in
August of 1998 (US State Department 2011, “Background Notes: Afghanistan”). In fact, the
US, along with most of the world, did not recognize the Taliban government at all.
US Military Strategy in Afghanistan After 9/11
Against this backdrop, of indirect US support to the Afghan resistance against the
Soviets through Pakistan during the Cold War, followed by a lack of US involvement in the
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country in the decade following the Soviet withdrawal, US policy towards Afghanistan since
October 2001 stands in sharp contrast. As catalogued in an earlier chapter, President Bush
issued an ultimatum to the Taliban government of Afghanistan, demanding that it hand over
the al Qaeda members responsible for the 9/11 attacks and cooperate with the US, or face
the wrath of the US military. Shortly afterwards, on October 7, 2001, the US began its
military operations in Afghanistan, clearly in response to what the President and his
advisers determined was a short-term, immediate terrorist and security threat against the
United States. The first stage of the US war in Afghanistan, however, consisted mostly of US
Special Forces working with Afghan Northern Alliance troops, relying primarily on US air
power rather than boots on the ground. The high-risk, fast-paced strategy was planned by
CIA counterterrorism head Cofer Black (Rothstein 2012, 60). Initially, the goal of Operation
Enduring Freedom was to wipe out or capture al Qaeda and dethrone or oust the Taliban,
and thus the US wanted to keep a “light footprint” in the country (Burke 2011, 47). The
international Bonn Agreement in 2001 created an interim Afghan government and the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an international force authorized for a sixmonth mandate by a UN Security Council Resolution to deal with the security situation in
the capital, Kabul, and its surroundings, as well as ensure the necessary conditions for the
delivery of humanitarian aid in the country. The United Kingdom led the ISAF force for the
first three months, followed by Turkey, although ISAF was still ultimately under the
authority of US Central Command (Weinberger 2002, 6-8); later on, ISAF would no longer
be led by a specific country but would be taken over by NATO forces.
By May 2002, a total of about 13,000 troops were in Afghanistan, 8,000 of them
from the US and 4,650 of them ISAF troops. While the goal of US troops was to kill or
capture al Qaeda and Taliban officials, the ISAF troops were to provide security and
eventually reconstruction to the country (Burke 2011, 85). A couple of things become clear
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here: first, the US went into Afghanistan with a relatively limited goal, that of capturing or
killing al Qaeda and Taliban officials seen as posing a short-term terrorist or security threat
against the US. Second, from the outset, the US coupled its hard power strategy with some
level of soft power, not only providing some humanitarian assistance from the moment it
began military operations (Rumsfeld 2011), but also identifying reconstruction and
ensuring humanitarian access as the responsibility of the ISAF troops. Therefore US
strategy in Afghanistan was a combined one from the outset, as predicted by Hypotheses 1
and 2, because of the combined threat posed by the country; changes in US strategy in the
country would be one of degree, not kind, as will be examined in the following pages.
The US initially defeated Taliban troops in Afghanistan, leading Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld to declare a shift in US strategy to “stability and stabilization and reconstruction
activities” in a visit to Kabul in May 2003 (Rothstein 2012, 61). However, the insurgency
against the US and NATO forces had begun in the spring of 2002 against the Afghan interim
government, with the goal of forcing US and NATO forces to leave the country (Jones 2006,
116). The US created an Afghan National Army in 2003 (Weinbaum 2005, 169), although
the training of this fledgling force was actually handed off to British, French, Romanian,
Bulgarian, and Mongolian coalition ISAF forces, rather than US troops (Rothstein 2012, 61).
Between 2002 and 2006, the Taliban reasserted its presence throughout Afghanistan, using
its ethnic kinship with other Pashtuns who felt politically sidelined as a basis for increased
support across the country (Burke 2011, 304). By late 2005, large parts of Kandahar,
Helmand province, and the Southwest were back under Taliban control (310), and the US
increased its troops to Afghanistan in 2006 and the ISAF mission was extended (311).
Despite the resurgence of the Taliban and increase in insurgency activity against US,
ISAF, and NATO forces, no significant overhaul of US strategy in Afghanistan took place until
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2009, partly because after 2003 US attention was focused on another war in Iraq. After
President Obama took office, however, he put in place a new strategy for Afghanistan in
March of 2009 to refocus on Afghanistan and Pakistan; this Af-Pak strategy relied heavily on
what became known as the COIN (counterinsurgency) “shape, clear, hold, and build”
strategy adopted from the Iraq war, based on the pillars of security, governance,
reconstruction, and development (Rothstein 2012, 62). Under the leadership of General
McChrystal, this new COIN strategy, which also included a dramatic surge in US military
troops in the country, also focused on protecting Afghans, state-building, and improving
relations with insurgents; it limited the conditions under which airstrikes were allowed in
order to limit Afghan civilian casualties (65). In addition, Afghan President Karzai put in
place his own rules in 2009 to limit Afghan casualties, including provisions like prohibiting
night searches, mandating that US troops be accompanied by Afghan troops, having women
search women, and decreeing that US troops could only fire on suspected enemy targets
unless the enemy fired first (66). Obama’s new Af-Pak strategy, which treated Afghanistan
and Pakistan as two parts of the same operation, also involved attempts to have former
insurgents join Afghan security forces (Celso 2010, 186).
Etzioni (2011) suggests that this Af-Pak strategy that was unveiled in March 2009
“was basically framed as a counterterrorism mission” that would be conducted by the CIA
and the military (3). In fact, the 2009 Af-Pak strategy went back to a “more pragmatic,
security-based intervention” in the country and a goal of decreasing, rather than completely
wiping out, the Taliban threat (Burke 2011, 443). The Obama administration’s goals were to
“disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their
return to Afghanistan” (US State Department 2011, “Background Notes: Afghanistan”), with
military surges in 2009 and 2010. In 2010, President Obama fired General Stanley
McChrystal in the aftermath of comments he made to Rolling Stone magazine that “belittled”
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other members of the US Afghan strategy team and appointed General Petraeus in his stead;
the President claimed that the direction of US strategy in the country would not change in
light of this leadership handoff (Cooper and Sanger, June 23, 2010, New York Times).
Perhaps inevitably, however, some changes in US strategy did take place as General
Petraeus assumed leadership in the Afghan war: he focused on counterinsurgency, which
involved the US building a government seen as legitimate, and “holding” or keeping control
of territories it had gained (Etzioni 2011, 4). Petraeus’s strategy focused again on security
and pursuing the enemy, and not just protecting the Afghan people (Rothstein 2012, 70):
one innovation was the creation of Village Stability Operations (VSOs), local security forces
that included Afghan tribal leaders with local legitimacy (74). This sort of strategy that
involved building legitimacy was presumably meant to deal with the issue of a perceived
lack of legitimacy of government officials in the country; this dearth of faith in the country’s
government was a problem exhibited most prominently in the aftermath of the fraudulent
2009 re-election of President Hamid Karzai (Burke 2011, 438).
One of the changes that took place with the new COIN doctrine, implemented in
Afghanistan with the unveiling of the Obama Af-Pak Strategy in 2009, was an increase in the
number and activities in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These groups have
existed in the country since mid-2003, and are led mostly by US troops but also by some US
allies such as Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands; each PRT is a team consisting of
representatives from the central government, the military, and civilian experts such as
engineers (Weinbaum 2005, 170-1). PRTs were constructed to work on “post-conflict and
preemptive-conflict development and reconstruction” to meet the goals of security,
development and governance; they often include representatives from the US State
Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and sometimes
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). They work with local Afghan
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governments and ministries to engage in projects like school construction and other
rebuilding efforts (Blosser 2007).
More recently, some PRTs specifically work with Afghan government officials on
women’s issues to “build capacity and opportunity for Afghan women” by conducting and
attending local community meetings, or shuras (Michel 2010). PRTs in Afghanistan have
carried out other projects, including building health clinics, infrastructure, and helping to
establish a legal system in the country (Jones 2006, 118). The increase in PRT work that was
a part of the 2009 COIN strategy in Afghanistan was part of a broader shift that included the
creation of the Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
Office, along with a new Center for Complex Operations (Bodine 2010, 28). This
intensification of complex operations, when “multiple agencies assume complementary
roles and operate in close proximity—often with similar missions but conflicting mandates”
included the Department of Defense adding stabilization and reconstruction work to its
repertoire (Miklaucic 2010, xi-xiii). Here, then, we see a paradox in US military operations
in Afghanistan: with the progression of the US-led war in the country, there has been a
changing role for the military, from an actor or institution engaged just in hard power to
one that has increasingly adopted elements of soft power to make it a force of combined
power in US strategy. As discussed in the previous chapter, this increase in the use of soft
power came with an increased acknowledgement, particularly under the Obama
administration, that fronts in the War on Terror, including Afghanistan, presented a
combined terrorist or security threat to the US and must therefore be the target of
combined US power, as Hypothesis 2 predicts.
The increase in soft power took place at the same time as an increase in US hard
power in Afghanistan, as illustrated by the surge. Along with announcing a military surge
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President Obama’s Af-Pak strategy, increases in US hard power to meet the increased shortterm security or terrorist threat acknowledged to be coming from both Afghanistan and
Pakistan, the President declared that a drawdown of troops after the surge would begin in
June 2011. This gradual withdrawal of US troops, which continues to this day, was instituted
as a response to what was expressed as a decreasing security threat to the US. On May 1,
2012, President Obama gave a speech during a surprise visit to Kabul, outlining an
agreement he signed with President Karzai to cement the US withdrawal of combat troops
from the country by 2014. In his speech, Obama said that Afghans could now ensure their
own security, and in 2013 NATO and US troops would shift from combat to counterterrorism and training operations. The US was to have an “enduring partnership” with
Afghanistan, and the President pledged some form of unspecified US support to the country
until 2024. “Our goal is not to build a country in America’s image, or to eradicate every
vestige of the Taliban,” he declared; such a goal would require a much longer US
commitment, more US money, and more US lives (Landler 2012, The New York Times). The
US State Department describes the 10-year Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement
signed by Presidents Obama and Karzai as one that reflects the United States’ “enduring
commitment to strengthen Afghan sovereignty, stability, and prosperity and continued
cooperation to defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates,” as well as a prelude to the US declaring
Afghanistan a Major Non-NATO Ally. Militarily, the US would be shifting security
responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces but continue providing humanitarian
assistance, security, capacity building, counter-narcotics, and infrastructure support for the
country (US State Department 2012, “U.S. Relations with Afghanistan”).
This overview of the evolution of US military strategy in Afghanistan provides
support for Hypothesis 1, demonstrating that when faced with what it acknowledges is a
short-term security or terrorist threat, the US executive will decide to use hard power.
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Initial US operations in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks reflect such a phenomenon, as do
increases in US troop levels in the country, particularly in 2009 and 2010, in response to
increased insurgent attacks against the US and thus an increasing terrorist or security
threat. Indeed, the number of insurgent attacks in Afghanistan against US and NATO troops
gradually increased in 2009, peaking in August of that year to almost 900 attacks per week,
followed by a dip in insurgent attacks until January 2010. In 2010, insurgent attacks
increased until they reached an all-time high of more than 1600 weekly attacks in
September 2010, decreasing until they returned to a relatively stable 800 attacks per week
by June 2011 (Livingston and O’Hanlon 2012). Figure 15 demonstrates the level of US
troops in Afghanistan, beginning with 0 troops on the ground in 2001, up to an increase
reflected in the surges of 2009 and 2010 to 98,000 US troops on the ground by September
2010. The gradual withdrawal of US troops from the country reflects an acknowledgement
by the US executive of a decreasing threat level against the US: it is important to note that in
his speech announcing the proposed end of US combat operations in the country, President
Obama declared not that the Afghan security situation was resolved, but that Afghan troops
would be able to assume responsibility for the country’s security. In other words, threats
against the US and NATO no longer existed to such a degree as to justify US combat
operations in the country after 2014. The increase in insurgent attacks in April and May
2012, up 31% from May 2011 and the first increase in insurgent attacks in 11 months
(Hodge and Totakhil 2012, Wall Street Journal), may challenge this determination of a
declining security threat, but the strategy for US combat troop withdrawal was already in
place by the time this increased violence was occurring. It is also significant that the US will
continue some level of support, particularly for capacity-building, infrastructure, and
humanitarian assistance, until 2024, perhaps reflecting an acknowledgement by the US
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executive that a long-term
term security threat still exists, dictating more of a soft power
strategy.

Figure 15

asco 2011, CRS Report
Data from Belasco

US Soft and Combined Power Strategy in Afghanistan
Country Context

This research project seeks to explain temporal and geographic variation in the US’s
hard, soft, and combined power strategy in the War on Terror. As I have argued
argue in the
theory chapter, one explanation for variation in the specifics of a US soft or combined power
strategy is the country context: Hypothesis 3 states that the US is more likely to fund NGO
projects, for example, that deal with the most pressing socia
social,l, political, and economic needs
of a particular target country it determines poses a long
long-term
term and combined terrorist
threat. Thus, it is imperative to lay out the Afghan country context to test Hypothesis 3.
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Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, and the accompanying
social and economic problems are not very surprising. For instance, in 2011, the life
expectancy of the average Afghan was only 49 years, and the literacy rate was only 28.1%,
with 43% of males and only 12% of females able to read. High unemployment abounds in
the country, and before the current US war in the country, only about 10% of Afghans had
access to electricity. The healthcare needs of the population are quite extensive, as access to
healthcare is quite limited. In addition, Afghanistan is an ethnically divided society, with
about 42% Pashtuns, 27% Tajiks, 9% Hazaras, and 9% belonging to other ethnic groups; the
country is also split among religious lines, with 80% Sunnis and the rest mostly Shi’a. In
Afghanistan, kinship ties are extremely important, with religious and traditional customs
playing a predominant role in people’s lives, particularly in the rural areas (US State
Department 2011, “Background Notes: Afghanistan”). Indeed, the challenge of creating a
strong central government in Afghanistan dates back to the insurgency against British
colonizers in 1841: the country has a long tradition of decentralized rule, with local
populations dealing with their own problems through processes of mediation and
arbitration by community leaders of their choosing (Barfield 2012, 54). Tribal, ethnic, and
clan identities reign supreme, rather than a national or state identity in Afghanistan (Hill
2010, 164), posing a significant challenge for governance and even military control in a wartorn country.
Another challenge in Afghanistan, one that continues long after the US-led war in the
country, is corruption: in 2009 it ranked 179 out of 180 in the global Corruption
Perceptions Index (Rodriguez and Lorentz 2012). Patronage networks are frequently
determinants of political favors and even the dispensation of development aid itself.
Furthermore, the narcotics trade, specifically from poppies for opium, is an important part
of the agricultural sector and has been used to fund the insurgency to a tune of $60 to $100
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million a year, by some estimates (Rodriguez and Lorentz 2012, 195-6). After the rural
economy was destroyed following years of war with the Soviets, the opium trade and
smuggling became rampant, especially after the US and other countries sharply decreased
development assistance to the country in the 1990s (Riphenburg 2005, 46). With
Afghanistan producing about 87% of the world’s opium, poppy cultivation has been a
persistent problem, with a resurgence following the US invasion: 74,045 hectares of poppy
were cultivated in 2002, jumping to 131,000 in 2004, decreasing to 104,000 in 2005 (Jones
2006, 115). Another figure is quite telling: out of $8 billion Gross National Product in 2007,
the narcotics industry accounted for $3 billion, and by 2008, the industry was worth twice
what it had been in 2002 (Burke 2011, 316). The biggest problems plaguing Afghanistan,
then, appear to be poverty, a lack of education, especially among females, and access to
electricity and healthcare. Governance challenges include a lack of national identity and the
predominance of ethnic or tribal identities, corruption, and the opium trade. The question,
then, is whether or not US soft power strategy, which in a war zone has been combined with
or complementary to its hard power strategy to produce combined power, addresses these
aspects of the Afghan country context, as my theory would suggest. The preceding chapter
already tested Hypothesis 2, demonstrating that Afghanistan was seen by the US executive
as posing a combined terrorist or security threat to the US since 2001, leading to the
implementation of US soft power (which increased over time) along with hard power.
Afghanistan, acknowledged to pose a combined threat, has been the target of combined soft
and hard power efforts by the US, particularly in the last few years.
The NGO Regulatory Environment
The specific type of soft power wielded by the US government and of most interest
in this project is its funding of NGOs and their projects, for reasons outlined previously. I
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have argued that the regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in the target country, in
this case Afghanistan, will impact this US soft power strategy, with more restrictive NGO
regulations or oversight providing an obstacle to the implementation of such a strategy.
Afghanistan is an interesting case, not only because it has been a warzone since the earliest
days of the US War on Terror, but because the political apparatus installed in the aftermath
of the US invasion has been heavily influenced by the US and its allies, dating back to the
UN-sponsored Bonn Agreement in December 2001. Aside from establishing ISAF (discussed
above), this Agreement also laid out a two year schedule for a political transition, with an
Interim Afghan Authority to be headed by Afghan exile Hamid Karzai. An Emergency Loya
Jirga (a traditional communal decision-making event) would determine the makeup of the
Transitional Authority in 2002, followed by the adoption of a new Constitution, with
elections two years later (Papagianni 2005, 749). Hamid Karzai was elected President in
2004 and then again in 2009, despite widespread allegations of fraud in the second
presidential election (Burke 2011, 438; Al-Tamimi 2012).
It follows, then, that the Constitutional and legal system in the country, heavily
influenced by foreign powers, namely the US, might be favorable to US interests,
particularly in the realm of international development assistance that has been such a
central part of the Afghan war. On paper, then, the NGO regulatory environment is rather
open and unrestrictive, which, as my theory predicts, favorably impacts a US soft power
strategy that utilizes NGOs. Again, however, when examining this regulatory environment,
the obvious caveat is that it was impacted by actors who would benefit from an open, less
restrictive regulatory environment; the efficacy of a US NGO-based soft power strategy,
then, can be at least partly attributed to the US itself. Significant restrictions on NGO
activity, then, may come from less formal features of the political and economic system,
such as corruption and patronage networks; such a feature of the regulatory environment
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comes across in the interviews of INGO workers in the country, discussed later in the
chapter. Nevertheless, it remains useful to catalogue the most prominent features of the
official, codified NGO regulatory environment as it currently exists in Afghanistan.
The 2002 transitional Afghan government put in place a Law on Social
Organizations, but the most current and most relevant piece of legislation pertaining to
NGOs operating in Afghanistan is the 2005 NGO Law. Although some proposed amendments
to the NGO Law are taking place in the country’s legislature , the 2005 NGO Law stands
today without any changes (NGO Law Monitor: Afghanistan 2012). This law mandates that
organizations must register with the Ministry of Economy, although some issues remain
unclear even with the law: the number of members an organization must have, the number
of foreigners allowed, the exact reporting requirements, and the specifics of tax benefits to
non-governmental organizations (Irish and Simon 2007). A non-distribution constraint
does exist, as is typical of NGO regulation, although the law does not refer to it explicitly as
such: profits or income generated by a non-profit organization (i.e., NGO) may be used only
for the activities of the organization (Law on Non-governmental Organizations 2005, 6). All
NGOs must submit project documents to the Ministry of Economy, except when conducting
emergency humanitarian documents; annual financial records must be submitted to the
Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, and any relevant donor agencies (8-9), in the case
of foreign-funded organizations. Foreign-funded NGOs, or what I have referred to in this
project as INGOs, face stricter rules, with additional reporting requirements including proof
of registration and work in another country to be submitted to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, as well as statements from their headquarters about the organizations’ activities
and goals, to be submitted to the Ministry of Economy. Several government institutions are
involved in the NGO application review process, including the NGO Department of the
Ministry of Economy, with final review by the High Evaluation Commission that brings
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together representatives from the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry
of Finance, Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (6).
Other important elements of regulations on NGOs include a prohibition against their
work on construction projects or contracts, unless an exception is granted by the Ministry
of Economy. NGOs must also submit twice-annual reports with the Ministry of Economy for
every project they carry out, and they are not allowed to participate in political activities
such as campaigning or fundraising for candidates. Currently, about 1,550 NGOs and 1,700
Social Organizations (the latter being organizations formed specifically for “social, cultural,
educational, legal, artistic, and vocational objectives,” according to the 2005 NGO Law) exist
in Afghanistan, with 72,000 Afghans working with NGOs. Organizations classified as NGOs
by the law (and the organizations discussed in this project fall under that category) face no
prohibitions on foreign funding. Also, Social Organizations (SOs) are officially not allowed to
receive foreign funding, a provision that is not always enforced. Some NGOs have faced
challenges in the country regarding the extensive reporting requirements: in January 2012,
Economy Minister Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal closed down 600 Afghan and 195 foreign NGOs,
citing their failure to meet the reporting requirements outlined in the 2005 NGO Law (NGO
Law Monitor: Afghanistan 2012). Aside from the considerable reporting requirements for
NGOs in the country, it appears that the official NGO regulatory environment in Afghanistan
is relatively unrestrictive, which is reflected in the extensive US-funded NGO activity in the
country, to be discussed in more detail shortly. This finding provides some support for
Hypothesis 4, which predicts that the US government is more likely to fund NGOs in
countries with a more open NGO regulatory environment. Particularly when compared to
NGO work under Taliban rule and before the US invasion, the NGO regulatory environment
in Afghanistan is not very restrictive, leaving room for foreign-funded and local NGOs to
operate widely in the country.
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US State Department and USAID in Afghanistan
It may be useful to start with an overall look at US aid to Afghanistan that is
channeled through “NGOs and Civil Society Organizations,” a category that includes both
INGOs and local NGOs in Afghanistan. This data, shown in Figure 16 and taken for from the
OECD and available for the years 2005
2005-2010,
2010, demonstrates an upward trend in US funding
of such organizations, with a dramatic increase between 2008 and 2009, and an increased
budget for 2010.
Figure 16

More broadly, the
he United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
(USAID
which has been part of the US State Department since 2006, is the primary actor
implementing soft power in target coun
countries,
tries, including Afghanistan, during the War on
Terror. The agency describes itself as “furthering America's foreign policy interests in
i
expanding democracy and free markets while also extending a helping hand to people
struggling to make a better life, recover from a disaster or striving to live in a free and
democratic country,” especially in the war contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan
(www.usaid.gov).
). USAID is an agency of interest in this research project not just because it
dispenses US development assistance in general, but also because it funds a great deal of

172
NGO projects, work that will be discussed shortly. In Afghanistan, USAID has worked on
economic growth, healthcare and education, and infrastructure, often as a partner with the
US military (USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012, 3), in the
ultimate expression of combined power.

Table 1
Sector
Agriculture (Inc. Environment)
Alternative Development
Roads
Power
Water
Economic Growth
PRTs (Inc. Civilian Assistance
Program)
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
National Solidarity Program
Democracy/Governance Including
Civil Society
Rule of Law
Education
Health
Program Support
Food Assistance/FFP 480 Title II
Total

FY2002-FY2006 Obligations ($millions)
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006
27
56
50
77
27
3
1
5
185
121
51
142
354
276
220
3
77
286
65
2
1
27
21
1
21
12
84
91
46
11
56
85
20

Total
227
315
1,043
430
51
253
172

41
22

40
34

93
10
132

103
15
88

50
10
17

327
35
293

4
19
8
5
159
471

8
21
56
6
51
462

21
104
83
17
49
1172

15
86
111
16
57
1511

6
50
52
4
60
748

54
280
309
49
376
4363

USAID/Afghanistan FY2002-FY2006 Budget . Source: USAID Afghanistan 2012
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/about/budget
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Table 2
Sector
Agriculture
Alternative
Development
Roads
Power
Water
Economic Growth
Cash for Work
PRTs
State PRT
Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust
Fund
National Solidarity
Program
Support to
GIRoA/Crosscutting
Democracy/Governance
Inc. Civil Society
Election
Strategic
Communication
Rule of Law
Education
Health
Program Support
Embassy AIR
Food Assistance/FFP
480 Title II
PAs, DOC, and IPA
Total

FY2007-FY2011 Budget ($Millions)
FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 Total
67
56
130
447
88
789
229
176
165
263
66
899
365
195
2
69
126

274
237
16
76
115
70

129
116
19
171
100
245
30
150

167
403
27
223
97
373
35
425

140
538
5
97
36
203
383

1076
1489
70
635
233
1063
65
1065

38

15

75

90

175

-

355

19

24

44

61

26

173

82

143

205

231

93

754

52

90

181
50

12
87

18
-

352
137

10
63
113
35

31
99
113
16

33
112
93
44

16
95
156
15

-

10

47

43
145
146
30
46
58

16

132
514
621
140
46
131

1478

1621

2153

3496

63
2053

63
1082

USAID/Afghanistan FY2007-FY2011 Budget. Source: USAID Afghanistan 2012
http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/about/budget
Tables 1 and 2 show USAID’s budget by sector in Afghanistan between 2002 and
2006, and 2007 and 2011, respectively. Some categories represent broad categories (rule of
law, governance, etc.) while others represent specific projects (the National Solidarity
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Program, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, etc.). “GIRoA/Crosscutting” includes
programs for outreach, gender, public outreach/information systems, and evaluation.
Several things stand out: first, there is a general upward trend in terms of USAID spending
in Afghanistan: it started out with $471 million in 2002, peaked in 2010 at $3,496 million,
then decreased in 2011 to $2,053 million. The rapid increase between 2008 and 2010
coincides with the US military surge in the country in 2009 and 2010, and the decreased
budget in 2011 coincides with the beginning of US troop withdrawal from the country in
2011. It is equally important to examine USAID spending on specific sectors or categories in
Afghanistan over time: between 2002-2006, roads and power appear to take up the most
spending, peaking in 2005. The biggest increases in budget during the same period took
place in the education, healthcare, and alternative development sectors, peaking in 2004.
Food Assistance spending was very high in 2002, immediately after the US invasion, then
decreased dramatically in the years after that. Later on in the Afghanistan war, between
2007 and 2011, the most spending took place in the sectors of alternative development,
roads, power, democracy/civil society (which peaked in 2010), PRTs (which previously had
not taken up much of the budget), and healthcare. There was considerably more spending
on Democracy/Governance and Civil Society in the second period than in the first period.
The most dramatic increase took place in the agricultural sector, which went from $67
million in 2007 to $447 million in 2010, and back down to $88 million in 2011. Programs
for water and general program support were categories in which spending was consistently
low for the entire period of 2002-2011.
While some of this USAID spending is outsourced to NGOs, as will be discussed later
(even outside the category of “civil society”), this USAID budget is a measure of more
general soft power spending , which in Afghanistan, is part of a combined power strategy.
The sectors discussed here presumably reflect the US government’s assessment of the
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country’s needs, and many of them line up with those discussed earlier in the chapter,
providing some support for Hypothesis 3, predicting that the socio-economic and political
needs of a country would shape the kinds of NGO projects funded by the US government. As
expected, US soft power spending through USAID, focused on issues like economic
development, power, healthcare, education, and governance. There is less of a focus, at least
by USAID, on combating poppy or opium production, although spending on the Agriculture
sector addresses this challenge, as will be discussed later in more detail.
Figure 17

USAID-Managed Afghanistan Budget by Sector,
2009: $2.1 Billion
Agriculture 14%
Economic Growth 8%
Infrastructure 13%
Health 5%
Education 4%
Stabilization 18%
Dem. and Governance 38%

Source: USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012
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Figure 18

USAID-Managed Afghanistan Budget by Sector,
2010: $3.4 Billion
Agriculture 23%
Economic Growth 7%
Infrastructure 13%
Health 5%
Education 4%
Stabilization 15%
Dem. And Governance 33%

Source: USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012

Figure 19

USAID-Managed Afghanistan Budget by
Sector, 2011: $2.0 Billion
Agriculture 8%
Economic Growth 5%
Infrastructure 33%
Health 8%
Education 5%
Stabilization 12%
Dem. And Governance 29%

Source: USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012
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Figures 17-19 provide a more general breakdown of USAID’s budget in Afghanistan
by sector between 2009 and 2011. Several trends are noteworthy here: as indicated above,
there was a spike in USAID’s spending in Afghanistan in 2010; I have hypothesized that this
was to accompany the military surge in the country that took place between 2009 and 2010.
The USAID budget itself more than doubled in 2009 with the civilian and military surge put
in place by President Obama, with civilian personnel increasing from 44 people in the
country to almost 380 (USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012, 816). Second, as indicated in the pie charts above, the Democracy and Governance Sector
consistently takes up the largest proportion of the Afghanistan USAID budget, although it
decreases from 38% in 2009 to 29% in 2011. Third, spending on Agriculture rose
significantly from 14% of the budget in 2009 to 23% of the budget in 2010, then decreased
quite a bit to only 8% of the budget in 2011. Infrastructure spending was consistent
between 2009 and 2010 (13% of the budget), but increased to 23% in 2011, despite the
decrease in the overall budget. Spending on Health, Education, Economic Growth, and
Stabilization did not vary much from 2009-2011. While explaining the exact reasons for
such variation in USAID’s spending in Afghanistan by sector are beyond the scope of this
project, it is probable that spending by sector varied due to the assessment of the country’s
needs by USAID and/or military staff in Afghanistan, along the lines of what Hypothesis 3
predicts.
As reflected in the budget data on USAID’s activities in Afghanistan since 2002, the
agency has worked on a variety of sectors and needs in the country. It has collaborated with
NGOs and the Afghan government on healthcare and clinics (USAID in Afghanistan:
Partnership, Progress, Perseverance 2012, 24), established 34 community centers to teach
people their legal rights, as well as promoted local governance by creating 112 community
councils (23); and secured micro-finance loans for 830,000 people, new jobs, and mobile
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phone subscriptions to promote economic development (20). Additionally, USAID in
Afghanistan has carried out cash-for-work and short-term income programs for farmers,
working with the Afghanistan Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock to come up
with alternatives to poppy production in the agriculture sector (19). For instance, USAID
started an Agriculture Rural Investment and Enterprise Strengthening program, with
microfinance projects in southern regions facing the most violence, and its Office of Conflict
Management and Mitigation worked on community-based development in areas of conflict,
with microfinance projects targeted at refugees, women, and farmers, in order to provide
alternatives to poppy farming for the latter (Ohanyan 2008, 118-122). For these
microfinance projects, USAID often funded INGOs as implementing partners, including
Mercy Corps, CARE, WfW International, CHF International, International Catholic Migration
Committee, World Vision, and Catholic Relief Services (Ohanyan 2008, 126). Other USAID
projects include building or refurbishing more than 680 schools, printing and distributing
millions of textbooks in Dari and Pashto (the two most common local languages), and
focusing on female education (USAID in Afghanistan: Partnership, Progress, Perseverance
2012, 27). USAID in Afghanistan has also ensured increased access to electricity to the local
people by activities such as building power lines, and it has built a number of roads across
the country as well (28).
USAID has worked with other international donors on several of the projects it has
funded in Afghanistan over the years. For instance, in March 2002 the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund was set up as a part of the country’s transitional budget, with
education as one of the major projects, with $1.45 billion raised by 2007 from 25 donors.
Most of the project money was used to pay teachers’ salaries and cover children’s
enrollment in school for grades 1-12 (Berry 2010, 588). As indicated in the charts above,
this Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was one of the projects on which USAID
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spending increased over time until it spiked to over $400 million in 2010, only to drop off in
2011. NGOs have worked on education, sometimes with the Ministry of Education, to
implement parts of projects like the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (Berry 2010,
589). Another part of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund has been the National
Solidarity Program, which builds Community Development Committees to provide services
based on demands determined by local communities: at least 300 schools have been built
through this program, also funded partly by USAID (590). Such a program can be said to
address not only sectors pertaining to the specific needs of local communities (such as
education, described here), but also to promote civil society or local governance in
Afghanistan by empowering communities to participate in development decision-making.
Particularly during the Bush administration, USAID’s work in Afghanistan on
democracy promotion focused more on formal institutions of liberal democracy, such as
putting in place a constitution codifying legitimate elections, an independent judicial
system, the rule of law, and the subordination of police, military, and intelligence forces to
democratic rule (Hill 2010, 156). Often the agency itself was responsible for establishing the
“’blueprints’ for the[se] plans,” working with Afghan and American-based NGOs to do so
(163). After spiking in 2004 under the Bush administration and then decreasing
dramatically, democracy, governance, and civil society was increased with the Obama
administration between 2008 and 2010, as indicated in the budget data above, reaching an
all-time high of $231 million of the USAID budget in 2010, then decreasing to about $90
million the following year. However, there are suggestions that USAID democratization
efforts in Afghanistan were dictated less by the agency and more attuned to the Afghans
themselves under the Obama administration, as part of what Ambassador Eikenberry
referred to in a memo as the “Afghanization” of US development assistance, so that it would
be led by Afghans (Hill 2010, 168).
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As mentioned earlier, USAID is the development arm of the US Department of State,
but the State Department itself has also worked with NGOs in Afghanistan. For instance, the
US embassy in Afghanistan has partnered with the Afghan government and NGOs to
improve reading among Afghan children and adults. The embassy has worked with civil
society organizations [i.e., NGOs] in the country to provide literacy classes to 7,000 adults,
at least half of them women, and has partnered with NGOs to supply books to schools,
orphanages, and libraries (Baxter 2011). The US embassy in Afghanistan has also
collaborated with the country’s Acting Minister of Women’s Affairs to implement a program
promoting gender equality in the country, pledging to provide $27 million in grants over
three years to improve Afghan NGO and civil society groups that work on women’s issues in
the areas of education, healthcare, skills training, and family counseling (Hart 2010). Not
always acting alone, the US embassy in Afghanistan sometimes works with allies on
development in the country, through funding such projects like the NATO-led “SILKAfghanistan” (to the tune of $3.1 million), which since 2002 has provided high-speed
internet access to university students and teachers; this project includes a partnership with
the Afghan Ministry of Education (Peters 2010). Other divisions of the US State Department
also fund humanitarian or development projects in Afghanistan: its Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration funds NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) and others to “provide protection and assistance to refugees, returnees, internally
displaced persons, and victims of conflict in the region,” with $10.4 million in funding in
2008 alone (Pierce 2008). The sectors addressed by these projects have much in common
with the sectors identified in the USAID budget discussed above: healthcare, education,
women’s issues, but also include humanitarian work for refugees, which was not specifically
delineated as a category in the USAID budget. Once again, it is clear that the socio-economic
and political context of a target country helps shape the kinds of projects funded, including
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NGO-implemented projects, funded by US government agencies such as USAID or the State
Department more broadly, lending support to Hypothesis 3.
NGO Work in Afghanistan
This is a research project aimed at explaining US government strategy in the US War
on Terror, specifically variation in its hard, soft, and combined power components. Thus, in
the previous section, I catalogued the work of US government agencies, namely USAID and
the State Department, and their funding of various development and humanitarian projects,
as well as partnerships with NGOs since the beginning of the current war in Afghanistan. To
get a more detailed and varied understanding of the work of NGOs in the country—
particularly since NGOs and their projects are the specific form of soft power of interest in
this project—InterAction is a useful source of information. Describing itself as the “largest
alliance of U.S.-based international non-governmental organizations (NGOs),” this umbrella
organization has more than 190 members. It “seeks to shape important policy decisions on
relief and long term development issues, including foreign assistance, the environment,
women, health, education and agriculture,” and information-sharing about development
and humanitarian needs, as well as the activities of its members, is an important part of
InterAction’s work (www.interaction.org/about). Sources of information useful for this
project include member activity reports describing the work of US-based INGOs in
Afghanistan, and InterAction has made four of these annual reports publicly available, for
the years 2004, 2008, 2009, and 2010. These reports provide a useful look at the US-based
INGOs working in Afghanistan and the projects they have conducted over the years,
including efforts funded by US government agencies, as well as the main challenges or
concerns the organizations face working in this war-torn part of the world.

2004 Interaction Report
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In 2004, for instance, the biggest challenges for the InterAction member INGOs
working in Afghanistan were demining, helping returning refugees to settle in their home
country, working with farmers to produce crops other than opium poppies, ensuring the
smooth running of elections, creating or rebuilding the banking system, and building or
rebuilding infrastructure (Bashan 2004, “Interaction Member Activity Report, Afghanistan,”
4). About three years into the US-led war in Afghanistan, 65% of the population in cities and
81% in rural areas had no access to safe water, only 6% had access to electricity,
malnutrition plagued some 50% of children under five years old, and the negative impact of
Taliban rules on women were still being felt, particularly in the areas of healthcare access,
education and training for the workplace (Bashan 2004, 5). In addition, the security of
international and local NGO workers was a top concern; the continued presence of INGOs in
the country after their initial flood into Afghanistan with the onset of the war in late 2001
was being threatened (6). Security has been a persistent challenge for NGO workers in the
country, as later InterAction reports and interviews with INGO workers will attest.
Against this backdrop of socio-economic, humanitarian, and development needs, the
work of the 29 member organizations who contributed to the 2004 InterAction report for
Afghanistan comes as no surprise. There is a clear split, however, between INGOs that began
work in the country after the US-led invasion in 2001, and those that had been working in
Afghanistan for years prior to the war. Organizations including Action Against Hunger,
Adventist Development and Relief Agency International, AirServ International, American
Jewish World Service, AmeriCares, Christian Children’s Fund, Food for the Hungry, and
World Vision started projects in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the war. Older, veteran
organizations, some of whose work in Afghanistan dates back to the 1950s and many of
whose work dates back to the 1980s, include the Aga Khan Foundation, CARE, Catholic
Relief Services, Church World Service, Concern Worldwide, International Medical Corps,
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International Rescue Committee, and Save the Children (Bashan 2004). The binary variation
of INGO presence in Afghanistan is interesting insofar as it reflects humanitarian or
development needs in Afghanistan far before the US war, but also an intensification of
needs, as well as greater access for INGOs to work in the country, after October 2001. INGOs
have been present in Afghanistan for at least the last three decades, and their existence
there can be divided into four stages. During the Soviet invasion which began in 1979, many
operated from nearby countries in a period of humanitarian consensus about the country’s
needs; during the civil war between 1992 and 1996, institutions were destroyed in the
country and no coordination existed between INGOs. During Taliban rule between 1996 and
2001, more coordination existed among INGOs who worked in the country, and after 9/11,
INGOs and their work became seen as having ties to NATO forces (Donini 2009, 7), and the
number of INGOs working in the country increased significantly, as the InterAction report
(Bashan 2004) attests. As discussed earlier, the regulatory environment became much
friendlier to INGOs after the US-led war in 2001, with the presence of US and NATO forces in
the country, which is correlated with more US funding of NGO projects in Afghanistan as
Hypothesis 4 predicts.
What kind of work did INGOs conduct in Afghanistan, as of 2004? Their work can be
divided into several broad categories, which again come as no surprise, given the country
context: nutrition and food, agriculture, healthcare, education, women’s needs (including
education, literacy, and work training), rebuilding infrastructure, refugee assistance, water
and sanitation, and business and economic development (Bashan 2004). Interestingly,
many of the INGOs whose work is documented in the 2004 InterAction report partnered
with ministries of the Afghan government to implement projects. The Aga Khan Foundation,
for instance, has worked with the Afghan government on the National Solidarity Program, a
community-based development project in which local communities decided which small
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development projects they needed most (17); GOAL has also worked on the National
Solidarity Program (46), as has Oxfam (66). CARE has worked with ministries like the
Afghan Ministry of Education in implementing its education projects, with a special focus on
girls (30), as did Catholic Relief Services (31). World Vision has partnered with the
Ministries of Public Health, Education, Agriculture, and Rural Relief of Development in the
country (81). Such a trend of INGO partnerships with local and national governments once
again reflects a regulatory environment friendly to INGOs in Afghanistan, which, as
Hypothesis 4 predicts, positively impacts US funding of INGOs and their projects in the
country.
As expected, many of the INGOs whose work is featured in the 2004 InterAction
report have carried out projects funded by US government agencies. The Aga Khan
Foundation, for instance, has implemented a US government-funded project to limit poppy
production among Afghan farmers, albeit with limited success since local law enforcement
did not cooperate with them in such an endeavor (21). AirServ International’s air
transportation for humanitarian organizations to remote or insecure areas, which began in
March 2002, has been funded by the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, part of USAID
(22). Work on areas including agriculture, education and training, women’s programs,
healthcare, and local governance by the Christian Children’s Fund, which started in
December 2001, has also been funded in part by USAID (36). Concern Worldwide’s food
security, community infrastructure, water and sanitation, and emergency intervention work
has also been bankrolled in part by the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (40), and
USAID has also been a donor of the emergency food and shelter program and the National
Solidarity Program work of GOAL (46-7). The International Rescue Committee’s work
providing shelter, water, education, healthcare, and protection of refugees has also been
funded by USAID and the US Department of Labor (55), and Relief International’s

185
agriculture, business development, education, women’s issues, healthcare, infrastructure,
refugee, and rural development program have been the object of US government funding as
well (70). The US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, part of the US State
Department, has been a source of funding for the United Methodist Committee on Relief’s
healthcare, hygiene, vocational training, relief supplies, and education projects as well (75).
Another trend that emerges in the work of INGOs in Afghanistan is their
partnerships with local organizations or NGOs, who help them carry out parts of specific
projects, including some of the ones funded by US government agencies. Thus it is
important to keep in mind that a US government NGO-based soft power strategy includes
funding that reaches both INGOs and local NGOs. In the earlier section, I broke down the
various sectors of US government-funded humanitarian and development work, some of it
carried out by INGOs or local NGOs, and how spending varied over time. Cataloguing the
work of specific INGOs and their projects, especially those funded by different agencies of
the US government, helps fill in the picture of a US NGO-based soft power strategy in
Afghanistan. From the outset of the war in Afghanistan, INGOs have worked, on their own
and with local NGOs and Afghan government agencies, to carry out projects in healthcare,
education, infrastructure, women’s issues, refugee support, agriculture, and economic
development, with some projects focusing on local governance in conjunction with
development (e.g., the National Solidarity Program). These sectors broadly fall in line with
Afghanistan’s socio-economic and political needs indicated earlier in the chapter, as
predicted by Hypothesis 3.
Changes and Consistencies over Time: 2008 and 2009 InterAction Reports
What kinds of changes do we see, if any, in the work of INGOs and the challenges
facing them in Afghanistan with the progression of the War on Terror and the US-led
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offensive in that country? For one thing, security appears to be a persistently escalating
concern for INGOs in the country. In 2008, “security [was] a continued and increasing
concern as conditions have deteriorated over the past year,” with threats sometimes
becoming so severe that NGOs had to remove their staff from some areas of the country, as
well as “minimize visibility or extent of program coverage” (Ruchala 2008, “InterAction
Member Activity Report: Afghanistan, 4). In the following year, security continued to
escalate as a concern for INGOs and local NGOs in the country, with increased violence and
threats that resulted in a “shrinking humanitarian space,” as well as more and more
“resentment” by the Afghan people of the deteriorating social and economic and security
conditions in the country (Fass and Hass 2009, “InterAction Member Activity Report:
Afghanistan, 4). Security was listed as a concern of NGOs in 2010, with 80 security incidents
against such organizations taking place that year (O’Brien 2010, “Afghanistan Member
Activity Report,” 5).
In 2009, other problems or challenges were also mentioned, including
reconstruction needs after the US/NATO invasion, the continued challenges of putting
women in the workforce and education them, children’s education, healthcare, limited
access to drinking water, food insecurity, poppy cultivation, and increased negativity by the
Afghans about “the prospects of US policy objectives” accompanying the deterioration of
security, increased corruption and government incapacity (Fass and Hass 2009, 6). Another
change in 2009, linked to the arrival of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke on the scene,
included the linking of the US’s Afghanistan strategy to Pakistan (i.e., the Af-Pak strategy),
along with a “civilian surge” and increased US staff in the country beginning in May 2009
(Fass and Hass 2009, 7). Interestingly, by 2010, a new concern for INGOs in Afghanistan
involved their relationship with the Afghan government, particularly in light of President
Karzai’s ban on private security companies in the country. While most INGOs do not employ
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these private companies, they expressed a concern that such a ban would further
compromise their security and access in the country. Furthermore, INGOs indicated a
concern of shrinking funds for their work, citing a 2/3 decrease in humanitarian funding by
international donors, particularly the US, since 2004 (O’Brien 2010, 5). The timing of such a
concern is rather surprising, particularly since, as indicated several times above, USAID
funding appears to have peaked in 2010, along with the US military surge in the country,
dropping off significantly in 2011. Perhaps the concern for funding by the INGOs in this
2010 InterAction report reflects worries about the future of US humanitarian funding, or
perhaps the proportion of funding specifically allotted to INGOs shrank in 2010 despite an
increase in the overall USAID and State Department budgets; it is hard to tell.
The issue areas addressed by INGO work in 2008 do not exhibit much change from
their work documented in 2004: healthcare, education, medical and relief supplies, refugee
support, infrastructure, and rural and economic development are all consistent sectors of
INGO projects. US government-funded projects listed in 2008 include Counterpart
International’s 3 year USAID program “to increase the role and viability of civil society in
Afghanistan” (Ruchala 2008,29), which appears to be a new endeavor not discussed four
years earlier. The International Medical Corps, working with the Afghan government to
provide immunization, surgical care, and medical training in the country, also carried out
USAID funded projects (30). The International Rescue Committee was involved in
implementing a USAID program to improve the Afghanistan education system (34). Save the
Children carried out another USAID-funded project in conjunction with an Afghan
government body, this time the Ministry of Public Health: this Health Service Support
Project set out to improve that Ministry through information, education, and
communication (43). USAID-funded partnerships between INGOs and government
ministries in the country once again reflect the active role by the US in shaping governance
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in Afghanistan, which, it appears, reflects positively on the regulatory environment facing
INGOs in the country. Such an open environment in turn probably positively impacted the
propensity for the US government to fund NGO projects in Afghanistan, as expected by
Hypothesis 4. I did not predict, however, what appears to be this endogenous relationship
between the legal or regulatory system, shaped in part by the US in Afghanistan, and US
funding of INGOs in that country: it appears the US helped mold the conditions favorable to
a society where NGOs are allowed to operate freely, which impacted its funding of NGOs and
a reliance on them to carry out development projects there.
Again by 2009, there does not appear to have been much change in terms of the
kinds of projects carried out by INGOs in Afghanistan. US government-funded projects
include the education and training, winterization, healthcare, water and sanitation, and
refugee shelter work by the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (Fass and Hass 2009,
14). Additionally, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development carried out
projects addressing local governance, rural development, supporting internally displaced
persons (IDPs), hygiene and water, and emergency relief, with USAID as a donor (20).
CARE’s work, partly funded by USAID, continued to deal with women and children’s issues,
education and economic development, maternal and infant healthcare, subnational
governance, IDPs and refugees, and disaster relief (24). Catholic Relief Services worked on a
project promoting access to education, called the USAID Partnership for Advancing
Community-Based Education in Afghanistan, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education
(27). The healthcare programs of Church World Service were funded by the US Department
of State Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration (33), as were the child development
and protection programs of Childfund International (34).
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Counterpart International continued to promote civil society in 2009, particularly
through its USAID-funded Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society, a five-year program in
place since 2005 that worked with 220 CSOs (civil society organizations, another name for
local NGOs), with a focus on women’s organizations. Additionally, Counterpart International
was implementing a three-year USAID program called Support for Electoral Process, to
educate and train voters, which began in 2008 ( Fass and Hass 2009, 37). USAID also funded
Counterpart International’s radio roundtables with community and religious leaders (37),
in another project aimed at community and civil society development. International Medical
Corps’ healthcare programs, specifically targeting women, and refugees, were also funded
by USAID as well as the USDA (41-2). International Relief and Development was involved in
several USAID programs, including the Human Resources and Logistical Support program,
scheduled through 2011, to provide technical capacity and inspection of programs and
ministries for public works (44). The Strategic Provincial Roads was another USAID
program started in 2007 to build roads, and the Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased
Production of Agriculture was also carried out by International Relief and Development
after the 2008 drought, working with Afghan ministries and providing cheap fertilizer and
seeds to farmers (45). Mercy Corps was another INGO implementing several US
government-funded programs, including USAID’s Incentives, Driving Economic Alternatives,
North, East, and West program to ensure livelihoods for rural communities, as well as
USDA’s Afghanistan Agri-Business and Agricultural Development Program, helping farmers
to produce and sell fruits and nuts, in conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Agriculture,
Irrigation, and Livestock (51). Other USAID-supported Mercy Corps projects include one
supporting farmers selling raisins and pomegranates, as well as the Food Insecurity
Response for Urban Populations, providing access to food for people in cities affected by the
increasing costs of living and the global food crisis (52).
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The United Methodists Committee on Relief implemented an Integrated Returns
Program partially funded by the US State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration, beginning in 2004 and extended in 2009, as well as the USAID-funded
Winterization and In-Kind Material Aid program (60). Finally, World Vision was
implementing a USDA Food for Education program, in place since 2004, to distribute food in
schools to increase enrollment (66), and a Health and Education Initiative in Ghor
(HEALING) program for nutrition, agriculture, and health (67). Other World Vision projects
funded at least in part by US government agencies include the USAID-supported Better
Health for Afghanistan Mothers and Children to provide improved maternal and child
health care, and the USAID Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations, aimed at crop
diversification and better farming production (68). By 2009, then, we see a trend of USgovernment projects in healthcare, civil society development, education, and agricultural
development, although as indicated above, many of these projects had been in place for
several years by that time. The pattern of INGOs working with Afghan government agencies,
including provincial and local governments, as well as partnering with local NGOs to
implement their projects, continued into 2009.
Most Recent Updates on INGOs in Afghanistan: 2010 InterAction Report
By 2010, when the US military surge in Afghanistan was well under way, the work of
US-based INGOs continued. Such efforts proceeded despite the worsening security
environment in the country, marked by a 31% increase in civilian casualties from the year
before, according to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (O’Brien 2010, 5). Project
areas continued to include agriculture and rural development, healthcare, education,
refugee support, economic assistance, and civil society promotion. The Academy for
Educational Development worked on a USAID-funded program called the Afghanistan
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Higher Education Project, in place since 2006, as well as the USAID FORECAST Participant
Training Project for Afghanistan, aimed at development and training for various Afghan
institutions (8). Catholic Relief Services continued to implement projects in various areas,
including the USAID-funded Partnership for Advancing Community-Based Education in
Afghanistan, along with the Ministry of Education (17). ChildFund International carried
forward in its USAID and State Bureau of Populations, Refugees, and Migration projects
(20), and Church World Service implemented projects in health care and health education,
funded partly by State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (22). The USAIDfunded civil society programs carried out by Counterpart International were extended, with
the goal of improving the skills and capacity of local organizations, civic education and
training, gender equality, democracy and governance (26).
Management Sciences for Health implemented a USAID project for Basic Support for
Institutionalizing Child Survival, in place since 2007, as well as the USAID Grant
Management Solutions Project (O’Brien 2010, 35-6). The refugee project carried out by the
United Methodist Committee on Relief was extended by USAID, focusing on helping refugees
find jobs, providing them with vocational training, wells, hygiene, and winterization (45).
Finally, World Vision’s Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations, as well as the USDA
funded programs to increase school enrollment by providing food in schools, continued
(47), along with USAID-funded midwifery training, in place since 2008, and the USAID
Better Health for Afghan Mothers and Children project (48). By 2010, then, we did not see a
great deal of qualitative difference in the kinds of projects carried out by INGOs in
Afghanistan, or the ones funded by the US government: healthcare, education, women’s
issues, agriculture, and civil society promotion continued to dominate. Partnerships with
government agencies and local NGOs persisted as well. The US government funding of NGOs
through 2010 still supports Hypothesis 3, predicting US funding of NGOs whose work deals
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with the socio-economic and political needs of a country, although it appears that funding of
specific NGO projects, as opposed to specific NGOs, is more accurate, as will be confirmed by
the data from interviews with INGO workers.
INGOs and the US Government
The previous sections have discussed at length US soft power in Afghanistan—
which has been implemented in conjunction with US military strategy since 2001, in a
combined power strategy—specifically in the form of USAID/State Department programs
and the work of NGOs. Broadly speaking, the data on humanitarian and development
programs funded by USAID and the State Department, and often implemented by NGOs,
supported Hypothesis 3: the US government appears more likely to fund NGO projects that
meet the specific socio-economic and political needs of a target country. The final piece of
the puzzle, then, explaining variation in US soft or combined power strategy in the form of
funding and partnering with NGOs, has to do with the relationship between specific NGOs
and the US government. Hypothesis 5 predicts that the US is more likely to fund NGOs
whose mission does not conflict with its own strategy, and Hypothesis 6 predicts that a
more positive, cooperative relationship between the US government and a specific NGO
makes a continued partnership between the two more likely. As the data below will begin to
suggest, and as data from the interviews will later confirm, I find support for these
hypotheses not for NGOs per se, but more for specific projects carried out by NGOs and
funded by the US government.
The biggest area of tension between US-based INGOs and its US government agency
funders such as USAID has to do with the NGO-military interaction. As discussed above, part
of the US combined power strategy in Afghanistan since the early years of the war, a trend
which has intensified since the Obama Af-Pak strategy was put in place, with its reliance on
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COIN, has been a dependence on PRTs to conduct stabilization, reconstruction, and
development work across the country. The existence of these groups, which bring together
civilian workers and military personnel, has posed a problem for many NGOs. The US and
other donor countries often pressure INGOs to work with PRTs, which does not hold well
with the INGOs themselves. In addition, INGOs that receive US funding are prohibited from
interacting with the Taliban and other groups on US terrorist lists, which makes it difficult
for them to negotiate access into Taliban-controlled areas (Donini 2009, 9) and can thus
limit the reach of their programs. When British NGO worker Linda Norgrove was killed in
Afghanistan, one of many aid worker casualties since the start of the US-led war, a “row”
emerged between US government agencies and INGOs about the practices of aid delivery in
conflict areas. The death of a colleague provided an occasion for INGOs to “lament that the
distinction between them and the military is being blurred, hindering their ability to
develop critical trust from the community” (Labott 2010, cnn.com). In some cases, NGOs
have refused to be accompanied by PRTs, and instead of relying on them for security, have
spoken to locals to assess the security risk of specific areas and whether or not it was safe to
conduct work there. Furthermore, INGOs have been critical of US commitments to shortterm projects in what they see as a preparation for a US withdrawal of troops (Labott 2010).
CARE is an INGO that has been a very vocal critic of US military strategy and its
relationship with INGOs in Afghanistan. In the 2009 InterAction Member Activity Report for
Afghanistan, the organization expressed its concern about civil-military relations and
indicated that it was trying to make the environment “more respectful of international
humanitarian law and the humanitarian principles” which guide INGOs; CARE described
itself as working against the “militarization of aid” from USAID, as exemplified through the
agency placing more conditions on contracts and its attempts to increase the interaction
between NGOs and PRTs as part of the COIN strategy (Fass and Hass 2009, 25). In the 2010
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InterAction Member Activity Report for Afghanistan, CARE expressed the same concerns
about INGOs and US military strategy (O’Brien 2010, 15). CARE is not the only INGO with
worries about its role in US military strategy in Afghanistan; in 2009, ActionAid, AfghanAid,
CARE, ChristianAid, CordAid, Dacaar, the International Rescue Committee, Marie Stopes
International, Oxfam, and Save the Children collaborated on a report highlighting the
challenges posed to civilians by the security strategy in the country. The paper issued
“recommendations on how the security strategy of the international community should be
changed in order to minimize the harm caused to Afghan civilians and reduce the disruption
to development and humanitarian activities in the current environment in Afghanistan”
(Caught in the Conflict 2009, 3). Aside from calling for specific actions by the US and NATO
forces to do things like issue and implement rules for uniform compensation for civilians
subjected to losses or damages in the war (5), the report clearly expressed the INGOs’
stance on the work of PRTs in the country. In conditions where “specialized development
actors” can work, “the military should not be engaged in activities in the development or
humanitarian sectors” because it is “unsuitable” and its work in such areas “ineffective and
unsustainable,” taking funding away from civilian institutions and increasing the mistrust of
Western troops by the local population (5). Thus, these INGOs cite the failure of US and
French troops to identify themselves as combatants when delivering aid as a problematic
practice; such an “integrated approach” to development places both the independence and
security of NGOs operating in the conflict environment at risk (6).
Another area of concern for INGOs regarding US policy in Afghanistan has to do with
funding and the proposed cuts to US aid in the country in 2012 and beyond. The US State
Department and foreign aid budget in 2011 was cut by $8 billion dollars, with steeper cuts
to follow in 2012 (Cornwell and Quinn 2011, Reuters). The US plan to withdraw combat
troops from the country has been “raising anxieties that Afghanistan will be abandoned and
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that the hard-earned development gains in the country will be reversed” (Norland 2011,
The New York Times). CARE, for instance, experienced an 80% cut in its US government
funding in 2011, and was forced to lay off 400 of its 900 employees in the country; other
INGOs such as the International Rescue Committee have been undergoing a similar
challenge. To adapt to these funding challenges, INGOs have been trying to shift their work
to geographic areas where aid money (e.g., from government donors such as the US) is still
available, but those tend to be more insecure places like Kandahar and Helmand Provinces
in the south, as opposed to areas that are actually in more dire need of development or
humanitarian assistance (Norland 2011). This latter concern is also reflected in the
comments of InterAction’s CEO Sam Worthington’s comments in 2011, that too much aid
money from the US government goes to military operation areas, and that funding should be
more “geographically balanced” (InterAction News Release, Dec. 21, 2010). Some INGOs are
concerned not just about US budget cuts, but about a shift in international donor strategy to
more “on-budget” funding, or channeling more aid directly through the Afghan government
to increase its capacity and accountability ot the people, according to a report by the
International Rescue Committee (IRC) (Phillips et al. 2012, 10). Along with a decrease in US
civilian assistance to Afghanistan, INGOs such as the IRC express concern about the increase
in the percentage of that aid that goes directly to the Afghan government, reaching 46% in
2011, up from a mere 10% in 2008 (11). Examples of specific INGO projects impacted by
such a shift include the suspension of USAID funding for a community education project in
Afghanistan, which began in 2006, but was transferred completely to the Ministry of
Education by 2009. The problem with such a change, according to the IRC report, stems
from the hasty nature of the shift and the end result, which was that much of the education
program came to a halt as soon as the Ministry of Education took over (13), presumably
because the Afghan government agency did not have the capacity to carry it through.
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It is likely that projected cuts in US development assistance, or even shifts in budget
directly to Afghan government institutions instead of to INGOs in Afghanistan, are in large
part a result of the US budget crisis, a variable not examined in this project. However, there
is also a correlation, indicated above, between the beginning of US withdrawal from
Afghanistan and cuts to the USAID budget, seen in 2011. Such a trend, along with a US
government focus on development assistance to combat zones in Afghanistan, appears at
odds with the goals and missions of INGOs, who prefer to dispense aid based on need rather
than military or security strategy. The reluctance of INGOs to engage with PRTs, and their
expressions of concern for a “militarization of aid” in Afghanistan, provides some support
for Hypotheses 5 and 6. To some it extent, the evidence suggests that the US government is
more likely to fund NGOs whose mission and goals align with itself, and is more likely to
continue that partnership if the relationship between those two actors is a positive one. As
will be demonstrated in the interview data below, a conflict between the goals or missions
of the US government and INGOs is more likely to be expressed when it comes to specific
projects, rather than the entire partnership between and INGO and the relevant US
government agency.
Mini-Case Studies and Interviews
To get a clearer understanding of the work of INGOs in Afghanistan, particularly
their relationship with the US government agencies from which they receive funding, I
conducted interviews with employees of two INGOs operating in Afghanistan. Initially, my
selection criteria had been to choose INGOs who operated in Afghanistan and were from
among the top ten recipients of USAID funding in the War on Terror, using list taken from
McCleary (2009). However, given the busy schedules and security concerns of the INGOs
operating in Afghanistan, only one of the 10 largest INGO recipients of US government
funding in 2005 (6 or 7 of whom operate in Afghanistan), agreed to be interviewed for this
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project. I was able to gain access to a second organization that also works in Afghanistan
and receives USAID funding, but I had to branch out of my initial selection criteria and
choose a smaller organization to do so. In accordance with the conditions under which I
conducted these interviews, and the conditions of my Institutional Review Board approval,
both the organizations and the individuals I interviewed will be given pseudonyms here.
The original data from these interviews allowed for a more in-depth test of Hypotheses 5
and 6, about the likelihood of the US government to fund NGOs with similar missions and to
continue partnerships when the relationship is a positive one, with some support for them.
INGO A
INGO A is the name that will be given here for one of the ten largest recipients of
USAID funding in 2005, a few years into the War on Terror, based on data from McCleary
(2009). In 2010, its total revenue was over $500 million, up from over $400 million the year
before; more than $200 million came from government grants or contributions in 2010,
according to its annual 990 tax report (www.nccs.urban.org). Not all of this money goes to
its work in Afghanistan, as this organization operates in 120 countries around the world. It
has operated in Afghanistan since 1976, but conducted its projects from across the border
in Pakistan until after the US invasion in 2001. INGO A’s work focuses on women’s groups
and children because “they suffer most and first,” according to the organization’s Chief of
Party, Livelihoods and Food Security, whom I interviewed in English via Skype from his
office in Kabul, Afghanistan and whom I will call Chief X here. I asked him about some of the
most urgent needs and challenges in Afghanistan, and his answer referred to the problems
of a “man-dominated country, [where it is] very difficult for women and children, [who are]
vulnerable people” in a country torn apart by war for decades. He cited the lack of job
opportunities for people, as well as the lack of development, particularly in remote areas,
where the “community doesn’t know what a vehicle is, and has never seen it before.” He
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also mentioned a divide between the capital and the rest of the country: “Afghanistan has
two faces. Kabul is very different from the remote areas, where we have no access because
of the Taliban.”
Chief X made clear to me repeatedly that INGO A does not consider itself a “political
organization, but a humanitarian organization.” Thus, it is not interested in the activities of
the Taliban in the country, and works where it is needed: “where the community accepts
our activities, we go,” after an assessment by its security department. In some areas, the
Taliban does not allow access to UN organizations or INGOs, and in those areas, INGO A
tends to rely on local NGOs, whose “capacity is not good, [but] they are improving.” The
security situation in Afghanistan has been precarious, particularly in recent years; in 2010,
2 members of INGO A’s staff were kidnapped when they were riding in a white vehicle,
which is the color of vehicles in which government officials tend to ride. After the
kidnappers found out that they had kidnapped INGO A staff, and not government workers,
and because of the support of the government and the community, they released them two
and a half weeks later.
INGO A carries out a number of projects in Afghanistan, but Chief X described a
change over the years: they have gone from a focus on projects meeting more short-term
needs, like food security and livelihood, to “more sustainable projects” aimed at developing
infrastructure and roads. One of their most recent USAID-funded projects was a community
development program, carried out over the course of two and a half years, with a budget of
$19.5 million dollars. This Community Development Program was started in March of 2009,
and was the second incarnation of what had been a Food Insecurity Response for Urban
Populations program (“Community Development Program-North: Final Program Report”
2011, 4). The program funded the building and rebuilding of roads, walls for schools and
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clinics, building community centers, micro-hydro power stations, bridges, irrigation canals,
women’s handcraft businesses, and educational training for youth (6). The main goals of the
projects were income generation (8), youth engagement (9), sustainable infrastructure
(13), and community mobilization and contribution (16). The program was implemented by
INGO A and Mercy Corps, in coordination with the Afghan government, including various
local and provincial authorities, and local NGOs (18). In 2006, INGO A implemented a
different USAID-funded project, which began in 2003, this one in the area of healthcare,
with an objective to “achieve a sustained reduction in under-five and maternal mortality”
and improve household health practices (Parker et al. 2006, 6). Thus, this project included
training of workers in the Ministry of Public Health and the Provincial Health Office, as well
as training community health workers, carrying out immunization, and distributing food
and iodized salt to the Jawzjan Province community (6). As further evidence of
collaboration with the Afghan government, this project, carried out by INGO A, helped
implement the Basic Package of Health Services used by government-run facilities in the
country, with a focus on immunization, nutrition, disease control, and maternal and
newborn care (8). The report on the project indicates that INGO A consulted with USAID “to
ensure that its views and priorities were reflected in the design and work plan of the
project” (51), indicating extensive USAID involvement in the project planning. These USAIDfunded projects carried out by INGO A, in the areas of infrastructure, education, community
development, and healthcare, fit in with the larger picture of USAID-funded projects in
Afghanistan that reflect the socio-economic needs of the country, as predicted by
Hypothesis 3.
When asked about the changes in funding levels from USAID over the years, Chief X
responded that the beginning of the Obama Af-Pak strategy marked a period when “we
s[aw] a lot more funds,” but that in the last year, funds have been cut. He speculated that
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this cut in funding had to do with a change in USAID’s strategy over the past year, and
challenges to USAID budgets from the US Senate, resulting in funding cuts not just for his
organization, but also for other INGOs in Afghanistan including World Vision, Mercy Corps,
and CARE. This answer suggests that domestic factors, including budget challenges, may
also impact the implementation of the US government’s soft power strategy, a variable I
have not included in this project but that may be of interest in future research.
Asked about INGO A’s relationship with USAID, its US government funder, he
responded that the organization had been a recipient of USAID support long before the start
of the current Afghan war, and emphasized the positive aspects of funding from this agency.
USAID is “more realistic than other donors,” he said, and can “realize your problems, and
always support us to sort out our problems.” They are “very easy to work with.” Unlike
other donors (such as the World Bank or the UN), USAID is more cognizant of the problems,
including security and corruption, facing the INGOs who implement the projects they fund,
according to Chief X. In addition, USAID has a “very good relationship” with Afghan
government officials, and helps mediate any issues that arise between INGO A and the
government. While repeating that INGO A was not a “political organization,” Chief X agreed
that USAID had its own priorities, although he personally agreed with them: “If we provide
[the Afghans] with more opportunity for education, they won’t become involved with the
Taliban and terrorist activities. They need a safe place where they can work, a good job, and
family. If the situation improves, automatically Taliban activities [are] reduce[d].”
Nevertheless, this alignment of strategy does not extend so far as to a relationship between
INGO A and the military: any relationship with the military is “absolutely restricted” by the
organization. “It is very simple,” Chief X told me. “If we will allow [the military] to come to
our office with guns, the people will understand that we are involved against the Taliban.
We are working for the community. If the security situation is ok, we will definitely go. This
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is our basic policy.” The implication here is that INGO A prefers to operate with a needsbased approach, regardless of where the Taliban operates, and does so along as it can
ensure access to the needy. Despite going after and receive US government funding, INGO A
does not like to align itself with US or NATO military activity, and see any work with PRTs as
compromising its neutrality in the eyes of the local population, and thus the trust and access
they have in Afghanistan. This provides support for Hypothesis 5, which predicted that the
US government would fund NGOs with missions similar to its own, although in the case of
INGO A, this is probably more true for specific projects. Where INGO A sees a USAID-funded
project as being in line with its own mission, including providing aid to any needy group in
Afghanistan, it will seek such project funding. On the other hand, it will not work in areas or
seek project funding that necessitates its work with PRTs or any other military body in the
country.
In order to receive funding from USAID, INGO A must prepare a project proposal for
the agency, and if it receives approval, the funds are granted and project implementation
begins. Because INGO A has a “good reputation” with USAID, according to Chief X, it has
repeatedly received funding from the agency. However, changes in USAID rules have posed
a problem for INGO A: new USAID regulations require that the agency vet not only the
INGOs whom it funds, but also any local NGOs with whom the INGO subcontracts for
projects in the amount of $150,000 or greater. This procedural change is due to a USAID
concern regarding corruption and any possible ties to the Taliban. This new vetting process
has disrupted the grant process between INGO A and USAID, and funding for one of its
projects has been “hanging,” so INGO A has been negotiating with USAID for the past few
months. Here we see a reluctance on the part of a US government agency to fund a
particular project due to specific concerns it has, ones which INGOs may or may not share.
Nevertheless, Chief X firmly maintained that INGO A will continue to go after USAID funding.
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“USAID is one of the big donors for us, and if we lose their money, it is a big problem for us.”
Such a position makes the empirical reality much more nuanced than Hypothesis 5 and 6
predicted, although the general direction of the prediction holds: an organization like INGO
A will not go after funding for projects and may resist USAID requirements that go against
its mission or values, such as ones involving engagement with PRTs, but this does not mean
that an INGO will seek to end its overall partnership with USAID. Chief X showed a clear
desire on his part for the relationship between INGO A and USAID continue, despite this
particular funding challenge. On the other hand, a US government agency itself may have
qualms about funding particular projects with INGOs due to particular strategic concerns it
has, although Chief X gave no indication that USAID has professed an unwillingness to fund
other INGO A projects in the future. On the contrary: the ongoing negotiations to which he
referred reflect an eagerness on both sides to continue the partnership between INGO A and
USAID, specific projects notwithstanding. Such a result was unanticipated by Hypothesis 6,
which predicted that the US government is more likely to continue partnerships with NGOs
when the relationship between them is positive, and vice versa.
Asked about the regulatory environment within Afghanistan, Chief X responded that
even during the Taliban period, INGO A was registered and “accepted” by the Afghan
government, although the “challenges [have been] reduced” since the days of Taliban rule.
INGO A “needs” to work with local and provincial governments in carrying out its projects,
and for the most part, they are “supportive,” although “I cannot say [their support extends
to] 100%” of the time, said Chief X. He suggested that nepotism and corruption had a role to
play in the cases where government support for INGO A’s work was limited: sometimes,
“government people are looking to support those areas where they have relatives.” Working
in large cities is particularly challenging, because government officials “are interested to see
great [amounts of] funds, and they want donors to give money directly to government.”
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INGO A is leery of project money going directly through government agencies in
Afghanistan, because “whatever we are doing, most of the money goes to the community.
When it goes through government, only 20% goes to the community.” In other words,
corruption poses a challenge for the work of INGOs working in the country. Thus, while I
indicated extensively above that the official regulatory environment is non-restrictive and
friendly to INGOs in Afghanistan, making it likely that the US will fund INGOs to work there,
as predicted by Hypothesis 4, it appears that unofficial restrictions, such as corruption and
nepotism, can pose challenges to INGOs in the country.
Furthermore, Chief X indicated that the Afghan government “is trying to restrict
some of the NGOs who are not working well” and “doesn’t want to see those NGOs who are
involved in political activities. Some NGOs are working with religious [i.e., Christian]
activities and they don’t like to see that.” This kind of restriction exists despite the fact that
the 2005 NGO Law does not officially limit the activities of Christian NGOs, and is another
example of unofficial regulations affecting the work of INGOs in Afghanistan. Whether
problems influence the propensity for the US government to fund such organizations is not
particularly clear, although Chief X’s discussion of INGO A’s current face-off with USAID over
its new rules about sub-contracting to local NGOs because of concerns about corruption and
money reaching the Taliban suggest that perhaps even these unofficial barriers or
restrictions on INGO activity will make the US government unwilling to fund, even
indirectly, local NGOs affected by these problems.
INGO B
The second INGO that granted me interview access will be referred to here as INGO
B. As mentioned earlier, it does not meet my initial selection criteria of being one of the top
ten recipients of US government funding, However, simply gaining interview access to its
Program Officer for Asia, Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa was enough for me to
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include it in this dissertation. Although not one of the top recipients of US government
funding, INGO B is still a sizable organization, with a total revenue of $317,301,472 in 2010,
up from $281,854,094; in 2010, $200,438,135 (i.e., more than half its revenue) came from
US government grants/contributions, according to its 990 tax report (www.ncss.urban.org).
Just as in the case of INGO A, however, this revenue does not all go to INGO B’s work in
Afghanistan, as the organization operates in 40 different countries, with an emphasis on
humanitarian work and “emergency relief, protection of human rights, post-conflict
development, [and] resettlement assistance and advocacy,” according to the mission
statement included in its 990 report. I interviewed the Program Officer for Asia, Caucasus,
the Middle East and North Africa, whose purview includes the country of Afghanistan, in
English over the telephone; I will refer to him hereafter as Officer X.
As was the case with INGO A, INGO B is not an organization that swooped into
Afghanistan after the US-led war in 2001; it has been implementing programs in the country
since 1988, focusing especially on Afghan refugees and conducting much of its work on the
Pakistan side of the border during the decade-long Soviet invasion. In the late 1980s and
1990s, INGO B mostly provided humanitarian assistance in the areas of health, education,
water and sanitation, and disaster relief to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Currently, much of
its work has shifted to “supporting the returns process” of Afghan refugees, who have
flooded back into the country since the start of the current war. “We help returnees resettle,
develop sustainable livelihoods, [provide them with] access to healthcare and education
services, and [any] humanitarian assistance they need,” said Officer X. After the onset of the
2001 war, with the “huge increase of returnees” as the Taliban was initially defeated, the
homecoming of what was “the largest refugee population in the world at the time,” mostly
from Pakistan, kept INGO B very busy. Helping to sustain INGO B’s activities, especially at
the start of the current war, was the fact that “lots of funding [was] available to do this work
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[with refugees] and humanitarian work generally. There was an endless need for
humanitarian and development assistance” in Afghanistan, Officer X told me.
The influx of donor funding to INGO B has not been steady or necessarily consistent,
according to Officer X: “There are definitely ups and downs in funding, [with] a lot of
funding going into Afghanistan in the early years after 2002,” and a decline more recently.
Funding and grants, especially by US government organizations, has been “very closely
linked with US counterinsurgency strategy, in terms of its geographic targeting in the
country,” and here Officer X pointed to a divergence of strategy or mission between the US
government and INGO B. “[Our organization] doesn’t work that way,” Officer X declared,
adding that many funding opportunities by the US government had been available “that we
wouldn’t have sought.” When pressed about this issue, he explained that it is “important it
keep our impartiality and neutrality for operational reasons and humanitarian principles.
We want to target assistance to people who are most needy rather than for US foreign
policy reasons.” Furthermore, Officer X suggested that “most humanitarian aid agencies”
had similar outlooks, in contrast to for-profit contracting agencies employed by the US
government. Thus, while INGO B does accept US government funding, “we are careful about
our activities and expectations and whether we are able to preserve our neutrality,”
avoiding altogether any projects that would involve working with PRTs, for instance. Here
in the experience of INGO B, then, we see a much more explicit tension between the
organization’s mission and its perception of the US government’s mission, accompanied by
a resistance to being pulled in to “US foreign policy goals” instead of its own humanitarian
principles. Such a conflict provides some support for Hypothesis 5, although the empirical
reality is once again more nuanced than my hypothesis had predicted: INGO B seeks US
government funding despite the differences it perceives between its own mission and that
of the US government or military, but avoids going after grants for certain projects that it
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sees as potentially compromising its mission and principles. Just like Chief X of INGO A,
Officer X of INGO B gave no indication that his organization would stop seeking US
government funding because of such differences.
Indeed, the grant process and INGO B’s relationship with USAID allows for this kind
of selectivity and thus a continuation of the partnership between the organization and the
government agency, providing some support for Hypothesis 6. Officer X characterized his
organization’s interaction with USAID as “different depending on the funding mechanism”
or the exact terms of the funding agreement. In many cases, donors such as USAID “will set
out general priorities, but sometimes [they] will be more specific, sometimes less, but they
usually define what kinds of activities they want to support in sector areas.” After
understanding USAID’s (or another donor’s) priorities and deciding that these priorities are
not in conflict with its own, INGO B writes a project proposal “that describes the approach
we would take and makes the argument for how we could meet those objectives” in its bid
to secure that particular funding opportunity. INGO B also receives funding from the US
State Department, which has been “targeting returnees who are resettling” in Afghanistan.
What is the exact nature of the programs carried out by INGO B in Afghanistan? At
the moment, it is carrying out a large education program “focused on community-based
education” in rural areas “where the Ministry of Education isn’t able to manage fully-fledged
schools,” according to Officer X. This program is “a way of bringing in children and others
who missed out on education, particularly girls,” into the public education systems, and it
also works to recruit teachers from local communities. Eventually, this “informal” education
program is “linked up” with the public education system in the country. Interestingly, this
program is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency, but that was not
always the case, Officer X explained. The current incarnation of the community education
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program is a follow-up to a USAID-funded community education program, but two years
ago, USAID “took the decision to fund the Ministry of Education directly rather than NGOs,”
a decision which Officer X clearly disapproves of. After USAID decided that directly funding
the Afghan Ministry of Education to implement the program would be more efficient, the
program “fell apart” due the Ministry’s inability to continue the program. “Of course the
[Afghan] government should be taking responsibility for those things [like education] but
they are often not ready to take on that kind of funding. The policy isn’t always
implemented the right way.” Faced with this sudden cut in donor funding for its education
program, INGO B sought other donors, and found a willing partner in the Canadian
government. Here we see a disconnect not necessarily between the missions of the US
government donor agency and INGO B, but in the actual strategy of how to implement a
specific project, in this case setting up an informal community education system that would
feed into the formal public education system. The difference in strategy led the US
government agency to forego INGOs as implementing partners—Officer X indicated that his
organization was one of several INGOs working on the PACE program—much to the
disapproval of INGO B. Such divergence in strategy is not something I hypothesized about
specifically, although the continued partnership between INGO B and USAID indicates that
disagreements over how to carry out certain projects may terminate specific projects, but
not the entire relationship between the two actors, a more complex reality than Hypothesis
6 predicted.
When asked about the environment in Afghanistan itself, Officer X indicated that the
“security environment has gotten worse” in the last few years, which has impacted INGO B’s
work in the country. “It is more restrictive for us, [in terms of] where we’re able to travel,
especially to have expats travel in the country, especially outside Kabul.” Thus, INGO B has
had to “develop remote management for rural areas” where foreigners are too vulnerable to
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travel. However, INGO B remains undeterred in its mission and its determination to carry
out that mission in Afghanistan: even though “it’s gotten more challenging, [it] hasn’t
prevented us from doing the work that we can do.” Adjusting its strategy, INGO B has come
to rely more on national Afghan staff to carry out the work in remote areas, since they can
“travel more freely than foreigners can” and are less likely to be viewed with suspicion.
Because of the problematic security situation, INGO B gets a waiver for the USAID
requirement to display its logo on products distributed in the country, although INGO B still
uses the USAID logo on official documents or reports. Explaining the danger of publicly
displaying the logo in Afghanistan, Officer X said, “Communities do know that we are an
international organization that gets funding from the US government, but not everyone that
we run into would have the same [positive] understanding of who we are.” To mitigate the
security risks of INGO B in Afghanistan as much as possible, “reputation is important,” and
INGO B generally has a positive reputation among Afghans, due to its long history of
working with Afghan refugees. “The relationship with the local population is critical.
Everything revolves around that,” he added.
Like INGO A, INGO B also works with local NGOs, for two reasons, as Officer X
explained. First, “it’s good practice to develop local capacity,” according to Officer X, and
INGO B helps local NGOs obtain funding because on their own, they would be unlikely to
secure grants for projects such as emergency response. INGO B also lends technical support
and expertise to Afghan NGOs. A second advantage to outsourcing some of its work to local
NGOs is that they often “have reach into places that [we] don’t have, and can respond more
effectively than we can,” in a situation similar to the one described by Chief X of INGO A.
Working with local NGOs is not without its challenges, however. “One typical challenge is
they tend to be personality-based, with strong leaders driving the whole organization, but
they don’t have systems and institutions. When one person moves on, the whole
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organization collapses.” INGO B seeks to help these organizations establish uniform
procedures and stronger institutional structures to prevent such “collapses” from occurring.
As discussed at length earlier in the chapter, INGOs working in Afghanistan or any
other target country must also deal with the government of that country, and “the relations
can be difficult,” said Officer X. INGO B must spend time working with ministries and local
government, often coordinating with them and “bring[ing] them on board, especially with
larger programs. We are often trying to build their capacity,” in line with the trend of
USAID-funded projects aimed at strengthening Afghan government agencies, discussed
earlier. The relationship between INGO B and government agencies is often formalized
through a memorandum of understanding with a particular ministry, outlining the specific
activities of a particular program. Thus, one of the biggest challenges for INGO B, in its work
with Afghan government officials, can be “to get a negotiated final document and getting it
up to the senior person” because they are often quite busy. “It is more of an investment of
time in negotiating something like a memorandum of understanding.” Interestingly, Officer
X spent much less time discussing the problem of corruption in the country than did Chief X
of INGO A, although Officer X did admit that corruption is “always there. It happens, and we
try to make sure it doesn’t happen.” Because INGO B “is not a conduit for money to go to the
Afghan government,” in other words does not give grants to Afghan government agencies,
corruption is less of a problem than it might otherwise be, Officer X suggested. In order to
maintain a smooth relationship with the Afghan government and avoid pitfalls like
corruption, “it helps to clarify what the requirements are for us,” and INGO B complies with
all the reporting requirements about its work to the relevant Afghan government agencies.
Generally, then, INGO B has no problems in fulfilling its registration requirements, or
obtaining visas and work permits in Afghanistan: “it’s something that we manage.” Thus, it
appears that the restrictions on INGO B’s activities from the Afghan side come more from
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challenges like the deteriorating security environment than from formal or even informal
regulations or problems such as corruption, in contrast to the testimony of INGO A’s Chief X,
providing more support for Hypothesis 4 than did the experience of INGO A.
Conclusion
This chapter provides an in-depth look at the case of Afghanistan in order to test the
hypotheses laid out earlier in the dissertation about variation in US hard, soft, and
combined power strategy in the War on Terror. I first provided a brief background
discussion of US strategy or policy towards Afghanistan before the 9/11 attacks, laying out a
frame of reference from which to compare US War on Terror strategy in the country. The
majority of the chapter, however, catalogues the evolution of the War on Terror itself in
Afghanistan, from its onset in October 2001 to the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed
by Presidents Obama and Karzai, outlining the withdrawal of US combat forces by 2014.
Through this case study, I further tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 as well as the rest of the
hypotheses laid out at the beginning of this dissertation. As discussed briefly in the previous
chapter, the Afghanistan case provides support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, demonstrating the
US executive’s decision to use hard power against what is deemed to be an immediate
short-term terrorist or security threat and combined power in what is deemed to be a
combined short-and long-term terrorist or security threat.
Furthermore, this chapter explores in detail the specifics of the Afghan country
context and the regulatory environment to test the impact of those variables on the US
government’s use of a specific kind of soft power, funding the work of NGOs, finding support
for Hypotheses 3 and 4. The regulatory environment in Afghanistan is relatively
unrestrictive, making it more likely for the US to fund INGOs and (often indirectly) local
NGOs who can operate freely in the country. It is important to note, however, that the US
government itself had a role to play in setting up the regulatory and legal environment for
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NGOs in the country, making for a potentially endogenous relationship between the
regulatory environment and increased US funding of NGOs in such an environment.
Furthermore, it appears that unofficial restrictions or challenges, such as the problem of
corruption, can hinder the activities of NGOs in the country and make US government
agencies more cautious about funding specific projects, something that was not predicted
by my hypotheses. As predicted, however, the US government appears to have been funding
humanitarian and development projects (many implemented through NGOs) through
agencies such as USAID based on the socio-economic and political needs of the country.
Thus, we see a great deal of funding for healthcare, education, infrastructure, economic
development, agricultural development, and women-oriented projects in both the budgets
of USAID over the years and the work of INGOs themselves.
Finally, by examining both the big picture of US-funded NGO work in the country, as
well as the work of two specific INGOs in the country, supported by original interview data,
I tested Hypotheses 5 and 6 and found mixed support for them. It certainly appears that
when a tension or conflict exists between the mission of a US donor agency and an INGO, a
US government-funded project is less likely to be carried out. However, this pattern holds
for specific projects, and not an entire INGO-US government partnership: the interview data
provides evidence that specific INGOs may be consistent recipients of USAID funding but
not for projects through which the missions of the INGO and USAID are at odds. Similarly, in
a more complex picture than what I predicted in Hypothesis 6, an unwillingness by an INGO
to cooperate with the US government on certain issues (such as working with PRTs or
becoming involved in counterinsurgency strategy) does not necessarily lead to an end to the
entire partnership between the two actors, but rather a selectivity regarding the specific
projects funded by the US government agency.

212
Perhaps one of the more surprising findings in this chapter has to do with the
closeness between US military strategy and its soft power strategy, specifically US
government funding of development and humanitarian projects, many being carried out
through international and local NGOs. A pattern emerges of a correlation between an
escalation in US military operations in Afghanistan and an increase in USAID’s budget, and
vice versa. As the US began its withdrawal of combat forces in 2011, the USAID budget
shrank after it had reached an all-time high in 2010 that accompanied the military surge in
the country. The question, then, is whether this decreasing emphasis on a soft power
strategy that accompanies a dwindling hard power strategy can be attributed to a
determination by the US executive that the long-term security or terrorist threat has
diminished along with the short-term security or terrorist threat. It appears counterintuitive that the long-term security threat would decrease at the exact time as the shortterm security threat, although it is too early to tell either way in the case of Afghanistan. It
certainly does appear to be the case, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, that the US executive is
indeed likely to use soft power against what it sees as long-term security or terrorist
threats, but it may also prove to be the case that in cases such as Afghanistan where a
combined threat is deemed to exist and a combined power strategy is used, the US executive
is likely to decrease the use of soft power at the same time as it draws down its hard power,
regardless of the assessment of the long-term security or terrorist threat. Of course, other
factors may come into play as well, including budget issues and other domestic factors,
variables which were not tested in this project but which may be worth testing in future
research.
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CHAPTER 6
US WAR ON TERROR STRATEGY IN PAKISTAN
Introduction
If Afghanistan has been on the front lines of the US War on Terror, for much of the
past decade, Pakistan has been a footnote in that same struggle, until it moved to centerstage under President Obama’s Af-Pak strategy in 2009. This chapter examines the case of
Pakistan as a target country of US hard, soft, and combined power in the War on Terror,
seeking to explain the changes over time that have taken place in a geographic and political
context quite distinct from Afghanistan, as discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike
Afghanistan, Pakistan has not been the object of a full-fledged war by US and NATO forces;
although, certainly in the past few years the US has increasingly carried out military
operations inside the country. At the same time, the US has leveled a great deal of military
and economic assistance (the latter an example of soft power) at Pakistan since the start of
the War on Terror. The in-depth look at the Pakistan case in this chapter will provide an
opportunity to test the hypotheses laid out earlier in the dissertation in order to explain the
evolution and change on US War on Terror strategy in Pakistan over time, as well as to
compare it to the Afghanistan case.
As in the Afghanistan case study, I begin with a background on US strategy or policy
towards Pakistan before 9/11, providing a starting point from which to compare
developments in the War on Terror. Post 9/11 US strategy in Pakistan stands in stark
contrast to pre-9/11 strategy, and the test of Hypothesis 1 will demonstrate that the US has
indeed used hard power in Pakistan when facing what it deemed was a short-term,
immediate terrorist or security threat, and that as the threat level has escalated in recent
years, US hard power strategy has also intensified. Interestingly, however, in Pakistan the
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US was mostly working in conjunction with the Pakistani government in its hard power
efforts, until recent years, when the US began to act alone militarily against targets within
Pakistan. I also find support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted that the US government will
use soft power against a long-term threat and combined power against a combined threat.
The US has used soft power in Pakistan from the early days of the War on Terror, in what
appear to be efforts to stave off a potential long-term terrorist threat. Since then, there has
been an intensification of soft power efforts, which at some point involved into combined
power efforts, when Pakistan has been faced with things such as natural disasters or
refugee crises. As Hypothesis 3 predicts, then, the socio-economic and political country
context in Pakistan has indeed dictated the kinds of US soft power programs and NGO
projects implemented in the country. It appears, however, that as the regulatory
environment in Pakistan has become more restrictive towards INGOs, at least unofficially,
INGOs have had some difficulty implementing their work; although, there is not much
evidence to suggest that this has stopped the US from funding NGO work in the country.
Finally, the tests of Hypotheses 5 and 6, which predicted that the US will fund NGOs whose
mission align with its own and continue the partnership when the relationship is positive,
do not yield results nearly as interesting as they did in the Afghanistan case study. This is
mostly because it appears that in a context where the US is not technically at war, conflict
between the US and INGOs is less likely, and thus it is less likely that the two actors will fail
to cooperate or fail to partner, even on specific projects. The situation surrounding the US
raid on Osama bin Laden, however, presents an example of INGOs being at odds with the US
government, providing some support for Hypotheses 5 and 6. The original interview data
from the mini-case study of a US-based INGO at the end of the chapter provides a further
test of these hypotheses, with similar results.
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Background: US Policy Toward Pakistan Before 9/11
The focus of this research project, including the country case studies of Afghanistan
and Pakistan, is an attempt to explain variation in US strategy over the course of the War on
Terror. However, one cannot adequately understand US strategy in Pakistan during this
ongoing War without grasping what US policy towards that country was in the years
prior—certainly a great contrast exists when comparing the before and after situations. The
history of US relations with Pakistan dates back to the early days of the Cold War, when
Pakistan sought help from the US and clearly aligned itself with the US in the decades-long
conflict with the Soviet Union. In 1954, Pakistan signed a mutual security agreement with
the US and joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); in return, it became a
recipient of US military aid (Ziring 2010, 178). US military assistance to Pakistan peaked in
1962, when Pakistan also joined the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and further
cemented itself as a US and Western ally (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 4). This pattern of US
military assistance continued until 1966 and was then resumed between 1975 until 1979,
when the US abruptly cut off military aid to Pakistan (US State Department 2010,
“Background Note: Pakistan”). President Jimmy Carter suspended US military aid to the
country when Pakistan refused to allow nuclear inspections to take place, but a few years
later, the situation would change dramatically as the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. Between
1983 and 1988, the US restored military assistance to Pakistan in exchange for its
involvement in resisting the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (Ahsan 2005, 241). During this
period, President Reagan authorized a five-year, $3.2 billion aid package, with military as
well as economic components, to the country, as Pakistan became a “key transit country for
arms supplies to the Afghan resistance” and took in millions of Afghan refugees, some of
whom still reside in Pakistan today (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 4). In other words,
Pakistan was “Washington’s chief proxy in the ongoing struggle with international
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communism,” and throughout this period of hard power cooperation between the US and
Pakistan, the CIA developed close ties with its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) (Ziring 2010, 183), a relationship that would sour decades later.
It appears, then, that when the US required Pakistani assistance to meet its security
or military objectives, provision of military aid, which we might refer to as hard power
assistance or cooperation, as well as economic aid, or soft power, became tools through
which the US encouraged Pakistani cooperation, a pattern that would play out again during
the War on Terror. When the US ceased to require Pakistani assistance after the Soviet
invasion, however, US military and economic aid to Pakistan would end just as abruptly. In
1990, after the Soviets had been forced to withdraw from Afghanistan, the United States
suspended its aid to the country because of concerns about its nuclear program, and even
ended its training of the Pakistani military (Ajami 2010, 32). Under President Bill Clinton,
the US put in place sanctions against Pakistan in 1998, when the country conducted its
nuclear tests, and instituted new sanctions in 1999 after President Musharraf seized power
in a military coupe (Ahsan 2005, 242). During this period, US relations with Pakistan’s
historic rival, India, greatly improved, as economic ties between the two countries
progressed (Ajami 2010, 32). When the 9/11 attacks on the US took place, then, relations
between Pakistan and the US were strained by sanctions and a burgeoning relationship
between the US and Pakistan’s arch-enemy. The War on Terror would soon change the USPakistani dynamic.
US Hard Power in Pakistan After 9/11: Cooperation, then Conflict
In the days and weeks after the 9/11 attacks on the US, Pakistan went from being a
country that was a target of US hard power in the form of sanctions, to an ally with which
the US cooperated and provided with both hard and soft power assistance in order to
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respond to its own short-term security and terrorist threats. From the beginning of the US
war in Afghanistan, Pakistan became an ally of the US in its War on Terror, in an about-face
of the relationship that had previously characterized the two countries. President Bush
(2010) wrote that despite Pakistan’s “troubled history with the United States,” in the days
after 9/11, things suddenly changed. Secretary of State Powell spoke to President
Musharraf and confronted him with several demands, including condemning the terrorist
attacks, not allowing al Qaeda a sanctuary in his country, breaking diplomatic relations with
the Taliban, and cooperating with the US in its war against al Qaeda and terrorism.
Musharraf pledged his support for the US (188), marking the beginning of what would
become a strange and tenuous partnership between the two countries. Secretary Rice
(2011) describes President Musharraf as a “flawed partner” from the beginning, a leader
from whom the US needed action and not just pledges of support. The US pressured him to
make arrests and freeze assets of suspected terrorists (125), something that happened a
few months later, in December of 2001 and January of 2002 (126).
As Pakistan became an ally in the US War on Terror, the US removed its sanctions on
the country, resuming both military and economic assistance (Ahsan 2005, 242). President
Bush secured a $600 million emergency package for Pakistan in September 2001, as well as
annual payments of $600 million, half of that in military assistance, from 2005 onward.
Between 2002 and 2010, two-thirds of US aid to Pakistan had been in the form security aid
(Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 5-6). In 2002, Congress began reimbursing Pakistan for
supporting US-led operations in the country related to the War on Terror, through what
was called the Coalition Support Fund (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 11). Also under the
leadership of President George W. Bush, US military forces helped train the Frontier Corps,
a paramilitary group in the country, training them to better conduct counter-terrorism
operations (15). The fruit of such cooperation has been significant: as of October 2010,
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Pakistan had captured 600 or more al-Qaeda members and allies in return for US military
(and economic) assistance (US State Department 2010, “Background Note: Pakistan”). The
Pakistani case is an interesting one, because as Hypothesis 1 predicts, the US did use hard
power against what it deemed was a short-term security or terrorist threat, but for the first
half or so of the War on Terror, the US used hard power in conjunction with Pakistan,
against terrorist targets within the country and sometimes in Afghanistan itself. In other
words, for the first half or so of the US-led War on Terror, the US did use hard power in
Pakistan, but the Pakistani government was a US ally, cooperating in exchange for generous
US military and economic assistance. This situation stands in stark contrast with the Afghan
situation, where the US went to war against Afghanistan, a war that continues to this day.
Furthermore, US hard power efforts in Pakistan mostly took the form of hard power
assistance, i.e., military aid and training for the Pakistani armed forces.
The US-Pakistani hard power partnership would not remain smooth, however, and
the US would suspect, and then directly accuse, Pakistani officials of being too soft on or
even making deals with US enemies. Former Vice President Cheney (2011) describes one
deal, around late 2006, between President Musharraf and tribal leaders on the border with
Afghanistan, where the tribal leaders agreed to deny sanctuary to the Taliban and al Qaeda
and Musharraf would leave them to their own devices. Such negotiations were problematic,
suggests Cheney (2011), and showed that “increasingly [Musharraf’s] commitments [to the
US] were not translating into actions from his government” (498). Rice (2011) recalls that
soon after, in the summer of 2007, the US was able to convince President Musharraf to put
off his intended declaration of emergency law in the country. Rice engaged in extensive
mediation between him and Benazir Bhutto, who was campaigning for President, to reach
some sort of power-sharing agreement in a move toward more democratic governance in
the country (609). Public and Supreme Court outrage followed the elections in October of
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2007, because Musharraf was still both the political and military leader of the country, and
in November Musharraf suspended the constitution (610). At the urging of the US,
Musharraf agreed to have parliamentary elections within a couple of months, but Bhutto
decided she would no longer deal with him (611). In late November, Musharraf gave up his
role as head of the military (613), and Bhutto was assassinated a short while later (620),
leading to a political crisis in the country. Former secretary of Defense Rumsfeld (2011)
suggests that the US insistence that Musharraf give him up his military leadership, which
was former Secretary Rice’s idea, was a mistake, because he ended up losing control over
the country and fomenting instability there (633). By August 2008, Musharraf was forced to
resign as President of Pakistan (Burke 2011, 359).
These political crises in Pakistan are worth recounting because they serve as a
background for the instability in Pakistan and the tense relations between the US and
Pakistani government, at around the same time that US hard power cooperation with
Pakistan appeared to be at risk. The start of the problems plaguing this hard power
partnership appear to have begun in late 2006, as Cheney (2011) indicated, when President
Musharraf began making deals with tribal leaders in the border area with Afghanistan. By
early 2008, the US had mounting evidence that at least some parts of the Pakistani
intelligence agency, the ISI, were supporting the Afghan Taliban (Burke 2011, 370). Thus, in
January 2008, Mike McConnell, the US Director of National Intelligence, said in a statement
that the “Pakistani government regularly gives weapons and support [to insurgents] to go
into Afghanistan and attack Afghan and coalition forces” (371). The Pakistani response to
these US allegations appeared mixed. On the one hand, the Pakistani military began
conducting strikes against US and coalition targets within its own borders (372). Pakistan
even intensified its military offensives in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal
Agencies) region along the Afghan border, particularly in the SWAT Valley in response to US
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pressure to do so and increasing US counter-terrorism assistance; the Pakistani military had
also become a target of insurgent attacks, further prompting it to take military action
(Burke 2011, 390).
On the other hand, the US was clearly frustrated with what it saw as insufficient
Pakistani action against War on Terror targets. In May of 2008, some US officials strongly
stated that Pakistani officials had “no interest” in preventing the new phenomenon of
attacks into Afghanistan from across the Pakistani border, a situation so unsettling to
American officials that they described at as “prompting a new level of frustration,” since the
Americans viewed the FATA as an important front of the US War on Terror and its
operations in Afghanistan (Perlez 2008, The New York Times). Thus, between January and
May 2008, the US had launched four Predator missile attacks in Pakistan, demonstrating
that statements by Pakistani officials such as Owari Ghani’s, governor of the Northwest
Frontier Province, that “Pakistan will take care of its own problems, you [the US] take care
of Afghanistan on your side” raised serious concerns for the US (Perlez 2008). So while US
hard power cooperation with the Pakistani government (heavily rooted in generous US
military assistance to the country) continued on some fronts, by 2008 US hard power
strategy in Pakistan began to change, with the US starting to conduct some unilateral
military operations against what it saw as increasing short-term security threats in Pakistan
itself, due to either an inability or unwillingness by the Pakistani military to conduct such
military operations itself. Such a shift does not contradict the predictions of Hypothesis 1:
the US was still using hard power against what it saw as short-term security threats, but
now along with US military aid and cooperation with Pakistan, the US was also conducting
its own military offensives against targets within Pakistan itself without the approval or
sometimes even knowledge of the Pakistani government.
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The change in US strategy, in order to meet what the US executive saw as an
increasing short-term terrorist or security threat in Pakistan, culminated in President
Obama’s Af-Pak strategy that was unveiled in early 2009. The US would continue its military
and intelligence cooperation with Pakistan and the ISI, who remained a valuable
intelligence tool in the US offensive against al Qaeda; an enduring cooperation between the
US and Pakistan was also necessary to ensure the NATO supply route through Pakistan into
Afghanistan (Staniland 2011, 135). The monumental shift in US strategy, however, was
reflected in the “treat[ment] of Afghanistan and Pakistan as two countries but one
challenge,” with the goal of defeating al Qaeda in both countries and make their return
impossible to either, and an escalation of US military action in Pakistan (Ahmad 2010, 201).
Specifically, the US stepped up its drone attacks in the Pakistani tribal areas (195). The new
Af-Pak strategy, which was put in place after Musharraf’s departure and the election of a
new civilian President, heightened tensions between the US and the Pakistani government
and “caused waves of resentment in Pakistan” (Hoyt 2011, 49).
For instance, the US wanted Pakistan to extend its own military operations into the
Northern Waziristan region in order to attack the Haqqani network, seen by the US as
posing an immediate terrorist or security threat, but Pakistan was unwilling to do so
(Ahmad 2010, 197). The US demanded that Pakistan curtail the activities of the
organization’s leader, Siraj Haqqani, who was a Taliban warrior, but had “been rebuffed by
the Pakistani military,” even after a written message was delivered by the US embassy to
the head of the Pakistani military (Perlez 2009, The New York Times). It appears that the US
was prepared for a Pakistani refusal of such a demand, as US officials simultaneously
indicated that in the case of Pakistani inaction against Siraq Haqqani, the US would intensify
its drone attacks in Pakistan (Perlez 2009). In 2009 alone, the US launched 42 drone attacks
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in Pakistan, up from 36 attacks in 2008 and a mere 5 attacks in 2007, according to a
Brookings Institution report (Livingston and O’Hanlon 2012, 6).
The increase in US hard power action against what it saw as short-term terrorist or
security threats in Pakistan was a change that began in 2008 from what had predominantly
been US military aid to Pakistan in exchange for cooperation in US counter-terrorism
efforts. The US raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2010,
and the assassination of the al Qaeda leader, serves as another example of the changing
nature of US hard power strategy in Pakistan. President Obama hailed the death of bin
Laden as “the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat al Qaeda,”
and indeed the US acted alone during this raid, neglecting to inform Pakistani intelligence in
advance of its plans to strike at the compound (Baker et al. 2011, The New York Times). In
Pakistan, however, the US raid was seen as an infringement on Pakistani sovereignty, even
amid efforts by the US to placate the Pakistani government and secure its commitment to
action against “extremist” targets, a commitment Pakistani officials refused to publicly make
during Secretary of State Clinton’s visit to Pakistan a few weeks after bin Laden’s death
(Myers 2011, The New York Times). It appears, then, that while the US intensified its
unilateral hard power actions in Pakistan due to what it saw as a Pakistani unwillingness or
inability to take action against short-term terrorist or security threats, this same escalation
heightened tensions between the US and Pakistani governments.
The US Af-Pak strategy in Pakistan continues, and the rocky relationship between
the US and Pakistan emerging from hard power confrontation rather than cooperation has
persisted as well. In November 2011, NATO forces mistakenly killed 25 Pakistani soldiers in
a raid, prompting the Pakistanis to close the NATO supply route into Afghanistan in
dramatic fashion (Evans and Krasner 2012). The recent incarnation of US strategy in
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Pakistan might be characterized as “criticism couple with continued assistance,” stemming
from a fear by the US that the Pakistani state would collapse if US military (and economic)
assistance halted and that without Pakistan’s help, US counterinsurgency efforts in
Afghanistan would certainly fail (Kramer 2012, 88). Public criticism of US drone attacks by
Pakistani officials, particularly when civilian casualties are involved, has added to this tense
relationship (89), but the closing of the NATO supply route served as perhaps the biggest
public confrontation by Pakistan against the US. Eventually, five months after blocking the
supply route, Pakistan reopened the route through its Southwest border, but only after
Secretary of State Clinton personally called Pakistan’s foreign minister to apologize for the
November airstrike (Masood 2012, The New York Times). Perceived ISI support for the
Taliban-affiliated Haqqani network, which continues to wage attacks from Pakistan against
US troops in Afghanistan, remains a contentious issue between the US and Pakistan,
particularly with Pakistani refusal to take military action against the network in North
Waziristan, despite US entreaties (Walsh and Schmitt 2012, The New York Times). It
appears, then, that the ups and downs in the US-Pakistani relationship are destined to
continue, but more significantly, US hard power efforts in Pakistan itself, as well as some
level of cooperation with Pakistan against targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan, will continue
for the time being as well. Unlike the plan for a US withdrawal of combat troops from
Afghanistan in 2014, it is unclear what might mark the end of US hard power in Pakistan,
whether it be unilateral US action against targets in Pakistan or continued cooperation
between the US and Pakistan against mutual targets.
US Soft and Combined Power Strategy in Pakistan
Country Context

224
This dissertation seeks to explain temporal and geographic variation in the US’s
hard, soft, and combined power strategy in the War on Terror. As I argued extensively in the
theory chapter, one explanation for variation in the specifics of a US soft or combined power
strategy is the country context: the US is likely to fund NGO projects, for example, that deal
with the most pressing social, political, and economic needs of the specific target country it
determines poses a long-term and combined terrorist threat. Thus, it is imperative to lay
out the Pakistani country context to test Hypothesis 3. Pakistan is a very poor country, with
a GDP per capita of only $2,800 in 2011, ranking 174th in the world. Spending only 2.7% of
the GDP on education, making it 143rd in the world, the country also has a low adult literacy
rate of 54.9%, with an evident contrast between males, 68.6% of whom are literate, and
females, only 40.3% of whom are literate (CIA World Factbook 2012). Furthermore, fewer
than 50% of Pakistanis have electricity, and the country is plagued by water shortages and
very limited access to healthcare; tribal areas, especially the FATA region, are especially
poor and underdeveloped (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 1).
Pakistan also has a troubled political environment, with a military that has
traditionally been very strong (Staniland 2011, 137): as mentioned earlier, US sanctions on
Pakistan were intensified after President Musharraf seized power in a military coupe in
1999, and his simultaneous leadership of the armed forces and the civilian government was
a point of tension in US-Pakistani relations even after the country pledged itself as a US ally
in the War on Terror. Even after Musharraf’s resignation and the election of Benazir
Bhutto’s widower, President Zardari, Pakistani politics remain unstable and riddled with
problems. President Zardari and his administration are tainted with the perception of
widespread corruption and ineffectiveness, and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani is seen
by the public as incapable of providing the basic needs of the population (Staniland 2011,
138). Civilian politics is very fractionalized, and even members of parties critical of the

225
military before coming into office, such as the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan
Muslim League-N, end up cooperating with that powerful apparatus once they are elected
into office (Hoyt 2011, 48). The reach of the military is quite extensive, then, as the army in
Pakistan is “in many respects as autonomous and pernicious an institution as the Mexican
drug cartels,” and the country’s ineffective legal system moves at a very slow pace (50).
Furthermore, public opinion poses a problem for the US, particularly as the US
fights the War on Terror on the Pakistani front: a Pew research poll conducted in the
summer of 2010 indicated that only 17% of Pakistanis viewed the US favorably, and despite
massive amounts of US aid to Pakistan, 48% of the population thought the US gave either
little or no assistance at all to their country. A 2012 version of the Pew poll found Pakistani
public opinion to be deteriorating, with a mere 12% of the population viewing the US
favorably (Pew Research Center 2012). In addition to the widespread poverty, illiteracy,
and political turmoil, and negative attitudes towards the US, Pakistan has also been crippled
by natural disasters of massive proportions in the last few years. The 2005 earthquake
killed 75,000 people across the country and left 2.5 million homeless (US State Department
2010, “Background Note: Pakistan”). More recently, the summer 2010 monsoon season
brought with it widespread flooding that affected 62,000 square miles in the country,
affecting 20 million people and washing away great swaths of infrastructure across Pakistan
in “the nation’s worst natural calamity” (Gall 2010, The New York Times). A cataloguing of
the country’s socio-economic and political problems, then, would predict that US soft power
efforts, including its funding of NGO projects in Pakistan, would be focused on the areas of
education, economic development, infrastructure, healthcare, good governance, and
disaster relief, perhaps accompanied by efforts to improve public opinion towards the US,
according to Hypothesis 3.
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The NGO Regulatory Environment
The specific kind of soft power wielded by the US government and of most interest
in this dissertation is not just economic assistance or bilateral aid, but government funding
of NGOs and their projects, for reasons outlined previously. I have argued that the
regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in the target country, in this case Pakistan, will
impact this US soft power strategy, with more restrictive NGO regulations or oversight
providing an obstacle to the implementation of such a strategy. Pakistan is different from
the Afghan case because unlike the latter, Pakistan has not been invaded by US or NATO
forces. Afghanistan, however, has been occupied by the US and NATO since 2001, and has
had an overhaul of its entire political system, complete with a new Constitution, first-time
elections, and attempts to build democratic institutions with heavy US influence. Thus, the
US has had much less impact, if any, on the regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in
Pakistan than it did in Afghanistan; there is no endogenous relationship here between the
regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in Pakistan and US support for their activities.
That makes a test of Hypothesis 4, predicting that the US government is more likely to fund
NGOs where the NGO regulatory environment in the target country is more open, more
definitive and clear-cut.
According to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 45,000 citizen
organizations or NGOs existed in Pakistan as of May 2012, employing 300,000 people and
attracting 200,000 full-time employees, but 38% of these nonprofit organizations were not
registered with the Pakistani government (NGO Law Monitor: Pakistan 2012). Because the
Pakistani state is unable or unwilling to deliver social welfare services to a large part of the
population, it has opened up space for NGOs to perform this kind of work, and thus the
country’s regulatory environment towards NGOs is generally enabling. The country’s
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Constitution, in place since 1973, allows for the freedoms of association, speech, and
expression, providing the backdrop to an environment friendly and open to the operation of
NGOs. As is typical for NGOs or non-profit organizations around the world, many nonprofits are tax-exempt in Pakistan; this provision generally applies to nonprofits that
benefit society at large and not just their members. NGOs must register with the Economic
Affairs Division of the government, as well as with provincial offices, to be officially
sanctioned to operate within the country (NGO Law Monitor: Pakistan 2012).
Recent obstacles to the work of NGOs in the country include attempts to revise
Pakistan’s NGO laws. For instance, Senator Tariq Azeem of the Pakistan Muslim League
(PML) party has put forth a new bill called the Regulations of Foreign Contributions Act
2012, seeking to curtail the freedom and operations of foreign-funded NGOs on the premise
that they are using foreign money for agendas that contradict the public interest. Specific
provisions of this pending legislation, which has yet to be voted on by the lower house in
the Pakistani Parliament, include a requirement for NGOs to obtain government permission
to receive foreign funding, a five-year expiration date on registration, an ambiguous
application process for the government to approve foreign funding, and a maximum of 20%
on the administrative expenses of such organizations. Furthermore, Azeem’s proposed
legislation allows the Pakistani government leeway to cancel the registration of foreignfunded NGOs at its discretion, also granting government officials expansive powers of
inspection, and subjecting NGOs and their employees to criminal penalties if they violate
these laws (NGO Law Monitor: Pakistan 2012).
Even if Azeem’s law is not passed, it certainly reflects a suspicious attitude towards
foreign-funded NGOs that prevails at least among some people or groups in Pakistan; it is
difficult to separate such sentiments from recent US military actions in the country or from
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the very negative attitudes towards the US among the Pakistani public. In addition, as the
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law’s report on Pakistan suggests, threats and
attacks on foreign-funded NGOs in the country, especially on organizations that work on
issues such as female education, demonstrate that “cultural barriers, more than legal
barriers… constrain the work of some [NGOs] in some parts of Pakistan” (NGO Law Monitor:
Pakistan 2012). Just as corruption and nepotism may serve as unofficial restrictions on NGO
activities in Afghanistan, it appears that cultural attitudes and suspicion of foreigners may
act as unofficial restrictions on NGO activities in an otherwise NGO-friendly regulatory
environment in Pakistan. Of course, if Azeem’s legislation passes, the legal environment
surrounding NGOs, particularly INGOs, in Pakistan will change dramatically, no doubt
impacting US funding of such organizations in the country. Like Afghanistan, Pakistan is also
weighed down by corruption across a variety of political institutions, and “corruption and
lack of sufficient transparency is identified as a key obstacle to effective implementation of
U.S. aid programs in Pakistan” (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 27). Corruption, too, appears to
be part of the unofficial or informal regulatory environment for NGOs in the country.
Indeed, the issue has impacted US aid programs in Pakistan: because of concerns about
corruption, USAID enlarged its Inspector General’s Office, its oversight body, in Pakistan to
include 9 auditors in 2010, up from only 2 auditors in 2009 (Perlez 2011, The New York
Times).
As discussed earlier, the US raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad
and the subsequent assassination of the al Qaeda leader was met with negative reception in
Pakistan. The impact of this US action has affected the INGO sector in the country,
particularly the organization Save the Children. The background here concerns the
involvement of a physician, Dr. Shakil Afridi, with the CIA and his intelligence work in
preparation for the raid; Dr. Afridi was later arrested by Pakistani intelligence and is still in
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custody, despite requests by US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta that he be released. Dr.
Afridi claims that Save the Children introduced him to CIA officials, something the INGO
vigorously denies. In any case, the organization has been subject to what appear to be
retaliatory measures by the Pakistani government: many managers working in Save the
Children have not been allowed to leave Pakistan, others have not been granted visas to
enter the country, and some aid supplies brought into Pakistan by the organization have
been held up in customs. Save the Children holds that these actions by the Pakistani
government have prevented the INGO from helping 35,000 infants receive medical care
across the country over the course of three months. Other INGOs have seen similarly new
restrictions on their activities in the aftermath of the bin Laden raid (Walsh 2012, The New
York Times). Here are cases that exhibit an increasingly restrictive environment for INGOs
in Pakistan, despite the fact that officially, the NGO regulatory environment still does not
codify prohibitions on the travel of INGO employees, or sanction the government holding of
their supplies. Hypothesis 4 would predict that such a tightening operating environment for
INGOs might lead the US to limit or at least be more careful about funding such
organizations who work in Pakistan, but there is no evidence of that yet. However, the
expansion of the USAID Inspector General’s Office in Pakistan in order to deal with the
problem of corruption in aid delivery reflects an adaptive strategy by the US government to
deal with another unofficial problem impacting the work of INGOs in the country, lending
some support to Hypothesis 4.
USAID in Pakistan
Given the socio-economic and political needs of Pakistan, as well as the official and
unofficial regulatory environment for NGOs and INGOs in the country, what sorts of soft
power, in the form of economic assistance and funding of NGOs, has the US government
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wielded in Pakistan since the start of the War on Terror? Figure 20 shows the level of US
economic assistance through USAID to Pakistan since the year 2000, data taken from the
Center on Global Development, with figures held constant in 2009 dollars. In 2000, because
of the US sanctions on Pakistan,
akistan, USAID did not dispense any economic assistance, but we
see that in the following year, the agency spent about half a million dollars on Pakistan
(recall that the War on Terror began toward the end of 2001). USAID aid to Pakistan spiked
dramatically
y the following year, reaching more than $700 million dollars, gradually
decreasing over the next few years. In 2009, USAID spending in Pakistan increased a great
deal, rising to $1076 million dollars, and increasing again the following year, to $1529
million dollars.
Figure 20

Source: Center for Global Development
Figure 21 shows data, taken from the OECD, on US aid to Pakistan between 2005
and 2010 channeled through “NGOs and Civil Society Organizations,” a category that
includes both INGOs and local NG
NGOs
Os in Pakistan. Unfortunately, figures before 2005 are not
available, but this six-year
year window is useful to examine nonetheless. Overall, an upward
trend emerges, with US aid through NGOs in Pakistan standing at a mere $11 million dollars
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in 2005, increasing
ng until it reached a high of more than $232 million dollars in 2009, and
then dropping off slightly
lightly in 2010 to $223 million.
Figure 21

Source: OECD
As indicated by the figures above, US economic assistance to Pakistan was resumed
swiftly after the 9/11 attacks and the Pakistani government’s pledge to ally itself with the
US in the War on Terror. President Bush’s $600 million emergency package in September
2001 included economic aid (and not just the military assistance discussed earlier in the
chapter), and the annual payments of $600 million from 2005 onward included $300
million in economic assistance. These steep amounts of aid were meant to meet the six
objectives of the Bush administration in Pakistan: peace and security, governing justly and
democratically,
atically, investing in the people, economic growth, humanitarian assistance, and
monitoring, evaluation, and oversight (Esptein and Kronstadt 2011, 21). Beginning in 2003,
the US began sending aid to Pakistan targeted specifically at the development of the tribal
FATA areas, for the sectors of education, healthcare, and economic growth (6). The
immediate and consistent injections of US economic aid to Pakistan since the start of the
War on Terror reflect a determination by the US executive that a long
long-term
term terrorist or
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security threat existed in the country, a threat that would be mitigated by US aid, as
Hypothesis 2 predicts. Thus, from the very beginning of the War on Terror, the US has
wielded a combined power strategy in Pakistan, although the levels of spending and
emphases have changed over time, as exemplified by the changes and intensification of US
hard power in the country as discussed above.
Although US aid to Pakistan targeted specifically at the FATA tribal areas was in
place beginning in 2003, in 2007 the US escalated those soft power efforts, pledging to give
$750 million to Pakistani tribal areas over the next five years. USAID planned to use this
money as a “counterinsurgency tool,” according to its statement announcing the program,
and would work on projects in healthcare, education, water and sanitation, agriculture, and
political reform, the latter of which was intended to improve the effectiveness of this aid.
The agency would also rely on local and international NGOs to implement the projects; the
INGO Save the Children, for instance, promptly received $11 million in funding at the onset
of this program (Perlez 2007, The New York Times). This injection of economic assistance to
the Pakistani tribal areas, particularly the specific mention of this form of soft power as a
“counterinsurgency” effort, reflects an acknowledgement by the US government of an
increasing long-term security or terrorist threat from the Pakistani tribal areas. This threat
could be mitigated, according to the logic of this strategy, by soft power in the form of
economic assistance, much of it implemented through NGO projects.
US soft power efforts in Pakistan, part of a combined power strategy that also
included US military aid and eventually US military operations in Pakistan, came to a head
in 2009, under the Obama administration. Nonmilitary aid to Pakistan increased
dramatically under President Obama; the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, also
known as the Kerry-Lugar-Bergman bill, was the ultimate expression of a change in US
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policy and an intensified focus on Pakistan in the War on Terror, as part of the broader AfPak strategy. This law, passed by Congress, authorized $1.5 billion a year in aid to Pakistan,
to be spent on the development of democratic institutions, the rule of law, economic
development, investment, and public diplomacy, making Pakistan the second-largest
recipient of US foreign aid. Furthermore, the Kerry-Lugar-Bergman bill made US security
assistance to Pakistan conditional on its cooperation with the US on its nuclear program and
against terrorism (Epstein and Kronstadt 2011, 8). The spike in USAID spending on
Pakistan in 2009 and 2010, shown in Figure 20, then, reflects the provisions of this KerryLugar-Bergman bill. This upward trend was a part of the overall increase in civilian or nonmilitary aid under the Obama administration; by 2010, 45% of US aid to Pakistan was
economic, rather than military, a huge increase from the 24% of non-military aid in 2008
(Kramer 2012, 92). Interestingly, this increase in soft power came at the same time that the
US escalated or changed its hard power strategy in Pakistan, conducting military operations
on its own starting in 2008 rather than just providing military assistance to the
government. Such a change reflects an acknowledgement by the US executive, inherent in
the Af-Pak strategy, that both the short-term and long-term security or terrorist threats
from Pakistan had increased by 2009, warranting an increase in US combined power in the
country, as predicted by Hypotheses 1 and 2.
USAID in Pakistan by Sector
It is not enough to examine changes in the USAID overall budget in Pakistan over
time; equally important is a look at USAID spending in Pakistan by sector, particularly in
order to test Hypothesis 3. Unfortunately, detailed data on USAID spending in Pakistan by
sector is not publicly available before 2009, i.e., prior to the implementation of the Af-Pak
strategy under President Obama. Nevertheless, it is worth examining more general figures,
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such as the breakdown of aid to Pakistan by international donors in general (including the
Asian Development Bank, the IMF, the World Bank, the US, and other countries) by sector in
the years 2002-2009. According to this data from the Brookings Institution, the US
government was the third-largest donor to Pakistan during that time period, in a list that
spans 28 other donors including the governments of countries as well as several IGOs
(inter-governmental organizations), totaling commitments of $31,964 million and actual
disbursements of $16,765 million (Livingston and O’Hanlon 2012, 25). Table 3 breaks down
those commitments and disbursements by sector.
Table 3
Sector
Balance of Payments/Budgetary
Support
Energy Generation
Transport
Banking, Finance, and Insurance
Education
Health and Nutrition
Governance
Agriculture and Livestock
Rural Development
Water and Sanitation
Social Welfare
To Be Specified
Gender and Women Development
Crisis Prevention/Disaster
Reduction
Environment/Natural Resources
Urban Development
Tourism/Culture/Youth Affairs
Science and Technology
Population Welfare
Trade
Oil and Gas
Housing and Construction
Industrial Development
Information
Technology/Communication
Unallocated
Total

Committed ($Millions)
9,794

Disbursed ($Millions)
5,865

4,045
3,458
2,387
2,340
1,726
1,558
1,503
1,417
745
743
536
505
380

988
1,314
1,637
1,244
1,397
1,389
754
805
574
417
22
218
351

234
177
102
101
97
52
50
43
35
18

52
53
1
1
68
3
50
44
26
18

3
31,964

0
16,765
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International Aid to Pakistan By Sector, 2002-2009. Source: Brookings Pakistan Index,
Livingston and O’Hanlon 2012
The reasons for the discrepancies between the levels of “commitment” and
“disbursement” of aid to Pakistan are beyond the scope of this project. As indicated in Table
3, a great deal of aid to Pakistan went to budgetary support, followed by various categories
involving infrastructure and social welfare services: energy, transportation, education,
health and nutrition, agriculture and livestock, rural development, etc. Interestingly,
governance was the 7th largest category based on spending, with $1,558 million in
commitments and $1,389 million in disbursements. Other notable categories include
spending on Gender/Women Development ($505 million in commitments and $218 in
disbursements), and the two categories of Crisis Prevention/Disaster Reduction and
Enivronment/Natural Resources (for a total of more than $600 million in commitments and
about $400 million in actual disbursements). The breakdown of aid to Pakistan by sector is
not surprising, given the socio-economic and political context of the country: a country with
high rates of poverty and low levels of literacy and education would need a great deal of aid
for infrastructure and social services. Furthermore, as indicated earlier, Pakistan has been
plagued by several natural disasters, so it is unsurprising that some of the aid was allocated
to deal with such issues. Low levels of female literacy reflect a need in Pakistan for womenspecific programs, another category of aid spending, and the political problems and turmoil
in the country make the category of “governance” aid unsurprising as well. Thus, the
empirical record of aid by sector in Pakistan between 2002 and 2009 generally fits in with
Hypothesis 3. The caveat, of course, is that this data refers to aid by many international
donors, and not just the US—each country or IGO is likely to vary in its priorities, resources,
and reasons for aid spending allocated to Pakistan. Nevertheless, this data provides a useful
look at the kinds of aid committed and dispersed to Pakistan during the first three-quarters
of the War on Terror.
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Since this is a project explaining variation in US strategy in the War on Terror, a
more useful source of data on US aid to a target country such as Pakistan would come from
USAID itself. Figure 22 shows a breakdown of US aid to Pakistan by sector, between October
2009 (after the adoption of the Kerry-Lugar-Bergman Bill) and March 2012. Figure 23
shows the breakdown of US aid to Pakistan in the areas of emergency flood response and
recovery, presumably in the aftermath of the summer 2010 floods. As Figure 22
demonstrates, most of US aid to Pakistan during this period was for “Stabilization,” a very
broad USAID category referring to post-conflict development efforts, followed by
Social/Humanitarian Programs and Education, Healthcare, Rule of Law, Economic Growth,
and Democracy and Governance, for a total of $1,864.6 million during this period of about
two and a half years. Interestingly, US aid to Pakistan in response to the floods is its biggest
spending category, and about a third of that aid ($316 million) went to the UN and NGOs for
their work in Pakistan after the floods. Again, this breakdown of categories of US soft power
spending in Pakistan is in line with the predictions of Hypothesis 3, that the US will fund the
work of NGOs based on the socio-economic and political needs of a target country. Once
again, it is worth mentioning here that often, USAID programs are implemented through
INGOs or local NGOs, even when such outsourcing is not specified by the USAID budget
category. One other noteworthy issue here is that it would appear, based on the Pakistan
case, that when the US is not officially at war in a target country in the War on Terror, a
great deal of its soft power budget may be spent on programs in response to particular
crises, such as natural disasters. A further examination of USAID’s work in Pakistan will
provide further evidence of this, although of course whether or not this is a generalizable
finding must be confirmed by broader empirical testing and an in-depth look at more cases.
Nevertheless, the contrast with USAID’s work in Afghanistan, an actual war zone, is
noteworthy here.
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Figure 22

US Civilian Assistance to Pakistan, Oct.
2009-March 2012 ($Millions)
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Source: USAID Pakistan 2012
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Figure 23

US Flood Response Aid to Pakistan, Oct.
2009-Mar. 2012 ($Millions)
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As reflected in Figure 22 above, USAID assistance to Pakistan over the last few years
can be broken down into several categories. The Stabilization Program attempts to increase
the Pakistani government’s legitimacy and reach, as well as to meet the economic and social
needs of remote communities in conflict-ridden places, particularly in areas like the FATA
tribal region, according to the USAID website. Examples of USAID Stabilization projects in
Pakistan include building infrastructure, providing scholarships and training to students
and workers, building drinking water supply systems, conducting child vaccinations,
rebuilding homes hit by conflicts, and child protection programs (USAID Pakistan,
“Stabilization Program” 2011). USAID’s Energy Program seeks to increase energy access
and improve the energy sector in Pakistan by building dams that generate hydroelectric
power, modernizing thermal power stations, and replacing tube-well irrigation pumps with
more modern systems (USAID Pakistan, “Energy Program” 2011). The Education Program
implemented by USAID in Pakistan tries to improve children’s access to education across
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the country, as well as improve teaching, provide grants for research, renovate schools
impacted by natural disasters, and provide Fulbright Scholarshpis for students to come to
US universities (USAID Pakistan, “Education Program” 2011). USAID also engages in “crosscutting” Good Governance and Gender Equity efforts in Pakistan, focusing on these issues in
all its programs through supporting civil society groups, promoting female employment,
encouraging female education, and working with NGOs and local and federal governments
(USAID Pakistan, “Cross-cutting Themes: Good Governance and Gender Equity” 2011).
Finally, USAID’s Health program in Pakistan involves collaboration with the Ministry of
Health, aiming to make healthcare more affordable to the population and implementing
immunization, maternal and newborn health, birth spacing awareness, polio eradication,
and reproductive health care programs across the country (USAID Pakistan, “Health
Program” 2011). Again, many of these USAID projects are implemented by NGOs, although
USAID does not provide the figures for such outsourcing of implementation. These various
USAID programs are in line with predictions made by Hypothesis 3, that the US government
will fund (NGO) projects based on the socio-economic and political needs of a target
country.
As demonstrated earlier, and as evidenced by Figure 23, USAID has exerted a great
deal of money and effort on flood responses in Pakistan in 2010. This flood response has
included collaboration with NGOs, and in order to publicize the US government’s
involvement in such humanitarian relief, USAID requires that NGOs it funds brand its
products with the USAID handshake logo and the phrase “from the American people.”
Sometimes this requirement is waived in environments where the association of
humanitarian workers with any group of foreigners makes them vulnerable to security
threats (Ward, DipNote Blog 2010). One USAID project provided $15 million to farmers,
providing seed, fertilizer, and soil preparation after the floods to help with the recovery
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(Rodriguez, DipNote Blog 2010a). Aside from typical reconstruction and emergency relief
after the floods, the US military also transported 194 international and Pakistani journalists
in helicopters to areas affected by the flood in 2010, in order to provide them with access to
what was a major news story (Beale, DipNote Blog 2010). Such action by the US military is
an interesting example not just because it is a manifestation of combined power exhibited
by the US military, but also because it reflects a focus by the US government on issues such
as access to information. At first glance, US flood-related assistance to Pakistan may appear
irrelevant to its War on Terror, but we can think of such assistance as part of more indirect
forms of soft power. In other words, it is useful to consider this disaster and humanitarian
relief as part of broader attempts by the US to improve Pakistani public opinion towards it,
or to ensure the cooperation of the Pakistani government on matters more directly related
to terrorism. As former Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff (2008) argued, by providing
humanitarian aid the US can improve public opinion towards it and make foreign publics
less likely to see it as an enemy, as evidenced by the spike in public approval towards the US
after its extensive relief efforts in the aftermath of the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004. This
kind of logic makes US flood assistance to Pakistan of importance in an examination of the
US’s wielding of soft power in the War on Terror.
Other USAID non-flood-related projects include training for female police officers in
Pakistan, as part of the US’s collaboration with the Pakistani government to improve
women’s rights, in a program established in 2002 (Rodriguez, DipNote Blog 2010b). In
addition, USAID pledged $28 million dollars for public university education in conflictridden areas in Pakistan in 2010, funding which among other things provided tuition
waivers for 7,000 students of internally displaced families (Snelsnire, DipNote Blog 2010).
INGOs in Pakistan
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The above section catalogued USAID’s work in Pakistan over the last few years, but
in a project examining US soft power as expressed through funding of NGOs, it is important
to examine the specific work of INGOs themselves in Pakistan. InterAction, the US coalition
of international NGOs, has published member activity reports for work in Pakistan in 2009
and 2010, which is unsurprising since much of US-funded soft power in Pakistan has taken
place since 2009, after the passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Bergman Bill. In 2009, the 22
member organizations featured in the InterAction report named security as a major
problem in Pakistan, in the context of poverty, inadequate food, low literacy rates, limited
access to education and sanitation, corruption, natural disasters such as earthquakes,
inequality, and Taliban fighting in the FATA and NorthWest Province regions of Pakistan
(Aronso 2009, 5). Interestingly, many INGOs began work in Pakistan after the 2005
earthquake (6), an interesting contrast to the many INGOs who flooded into Afghanistan
after the 2001 US-led invasion.
For the purposes of this project, the INGO work of most interest involves projects
funded by the US government as part of its soft or combined power strategy in Pakistan.
The Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development, which has been in Pakistan for 15
years, responded to the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan by building emergency shelters, and
distributing food and water, with USAID funding most of that work (Aronso 2009, 14). The
Aga Khan Foundation carried out, among its other projects, a USAID-funded Child Survival
program starting in 2008 for maternal and child health (19). CARE, one of the largest INGO
recipients of US government funding, implemented a USAID-funded Pakistan Jobs Project
with a budget of $80 million (29). USAID has also extensively funded the International
Medical Corps’s projects in the NWFP tribal region of Pakistan, which include healthcare,
health education, water, and responding to gender-based violence (42). The International
Rescue Committee has implemented a four-year USAID program, starting in 2006, called
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Primary Healthcare Revitalization, Integration, and Decentralization in Earthquake-Affected
Areas (PRIDE) (48).
Mercy Crops has also worked on a number of programs in Pakistan after the 2005
earthquake, providing food, medical teams, healthcare clinics, cash-for-work programs, and
health programs for mothers and newborns, with USAID funding (Aronso 2009, 53). Relief
International began its work in Pakistan after the 2005 earthquake, working with displaced
people and farmers, also receiving funding from USAID and the State Department (59). Save
the Children, another large recipient of US government funding, has implemented a USAIDsponsored five-year literacy and community improvement program in FATA and NWFP, as
well as disaster preparation and response programs in those same tribal regions after
earthquakes and floods (62). Winrock International is another INGO recipient of USAID
funding, focusing on agricultural development, infrastructure, and healthcare (63). Finally,
World Vision’s varied projects in Pakistan include emergency relief, maternal and child
health, water and hygiene, education, and food security, with USAID as a major donor (64).
Like INGOs working in Afghanistan, these organizations operating in Pakistan often work
with Pakistani government agencies as well as local NGOs to carry out their projects.
In 2010, many of these INGOs continued projects, included those funded by USAID,
documented in the 2009 InterAction report for Pakistan. Interestingly, the 31 member
organizations expressed not just a continued concern about insecurity in the country, but a
new problem of inadequate funding. This issue was highlighted after the 2010 flood that
affected at least 18 million Pakistanis, increasing the humanitarian crisis and the Internally
Displaced Persons (IDP) problem in the FATA regions. Furthermore, the INGOs voiced
concerns about the USAID requirement of stamping its logo on any project materials in the
country, as well as new restrictions by the government of Pakistan on humanitarian
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organizations (O’Brien 2010, 5). US government-funded INGO projects not mentioned in the
2009 report include the Academy for Educational Development’s Pre-Service Teacher
Education Program, which began in 2008, to improve education policies in conjunction with
the Higher Education Commission and the Ministry of Education, as well as another project
to increase student access to higher education across Pakistan (8). Anther INGO, Concern
Worldwide, oversaw USAID’s Responding to Pakistan’s Internally Displaced project in the
country, seeking to meet the humanitarian needs of IDPs, with increased funding after the
2010 floods (31). Food for the Hungry worked on emergency response, shelter and housing,
water and sanitation, and agriculture and food security projects, with funding from USAID
(35). What emerges from these InterAction reports is a picture whereby USAID has funded
INGO projects with a major focus on emergency response, as well as other projects
primarily in the areas of healthcare and education, lending extensive support to Hypothesis
3.
INGOs and the US Government
The case studies in this project test my theory explaining variation in US hard, soft,
and combined power strategy in the US War on Terror, and one important variable
explaining US soft power strategy is the relationship between US-funded INGOs and their
government donors. Here the Pakistan case once again stands in contrast with the
Afghanistan case, as INGOs appear to have fewer areas of conflict or contention with the US
government. One issue on which INGOs have clearly expressed discontent with the US
government has been a change, under the leadership of Ambassador Holbrooke, in which US
government prefers to implement aid programs more through local NGOs and the Pakistani
government, rather than foreign NGOs. Furthermore, Holbrooke also made a decision to
publicize the US government as a source of funding. This decision resulted in the
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elimination of almost $200 million worth of USAID projects that were supposed to be
implemented by INGOs, as well as denied funding for other new projects (Wright 2011, The
Wall Street Journal). Such a shift in US aid strategy can be attributed to concerns in Congress
about corruption and insufficient transparency, as well as a preference by Pakistani officials
that US aid money go directly through them instead of foreign NGOs (Epstein and Kronstadt
2011, 27-28). Here is an example, in line with Hypotheses 5 and 6, where the US
government decided to terminate projects from its end because of concerns about how the
INGOs involved were implementing them, or because of a perception among the Pakistani
government about INGOs as encouraging corruption. Whether this concern is warranted is
not the point here, but the point is that differences between the US government and INGOs
can lead to a termination of at least project-specific partnerships, if not entire relationships
between the two actors.
From the INGO side, this same decision has fomented concern that local NGOs in
Pakistan cannot handle the extra money they would now receive, funding that had been
initially intended for INGOs. Furthermore, INGOs working in Pakistan have been displeased
with some USAID requirements attached to funding. CARE, for instance, decided to forego a
project where USAID required the organization to work in the dangerous tribal areas, and
Oxfam International decided to pass up USAID funding for a flood response project that
mandated the display of the USAID logo on the food to be distributed (Wright 2011, The
Wall Street Journal). In fact, in 2010, 11 INGOs wrote and signed a letter through InterAction
to USAID asking for an exemption from having to display the red, white, and blue USAID
logo, due to concerns about being more vulnerable to militant attacks. The branding
requirements even prompted CARE to reject US funding for a project to work in the Punjab
province in Pakistan after the 2010 floods (Abbot 2011). In line with Hypotheses 5 and 6,
then, INGOs may decide to refuse funding from the US government where they see a conflict
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between their mission and that of the US government. In this case, one of USAID’s priorities
was to publicize the US government as a source of aid in order to improve Pakistani public
opinion towards the US, and clearly several INGOs saw this as a priority that would
compromise the security and effectiveness of their programs. As in the Afghan country case,
however, foregoing particular USAID-funded projects does not necessarily mean that INGOs
will terminate the entire relationship with the US funding agency.
Another area of tension between INGOs and the US government emerged in light of
the US raid that killed Osama bin Laden. InterAction, the coalition of 200 US-based INGOs,
wrote a letter to the CIA protesting its deployment of Dr. Shakil Afridi to help find Osama
bin Laden in Pakistan. Dr. Afridi had been commissioned to start a fake vaccination drive in
Abbottabad in order to enter the house where bin Laden was suspected of residing, and to
acquire DNA evidence confirming the al Qaeda leader’s identity. This utilization of a medical
professional in the CIA’s intelligence work put in jeopardy the work of NGOs in Pakistan to
eradicate polio, particularly in an environment where rumors run rampant that vaccination
drives are Western plots to sterilize Pakistanis (Shah 2012, The Guardian). While no visible
changes in the interaction between INGOs and the US government took place in light of the
bin Laden raid, Hypothesis 5 would predict that INGOs may be more cautious about seeking
US government funding of projects that might be related to US military or intelligence work
in the country.
Mini-Case Study and Interviews
To arrive at a clearer understanding of the work of INGOs in Pakistan, particularly
their relationship with the US government agencies from which they receive funding, I was
initially able to interview employees from two INGOs operating in the country. My selection
criteria was the same as the criteria in choosing the INGOs for the Afghanistan chapter:
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choosing INGOs who operated in Pakistan and were from among the top ten recipients of
USAID funding in the War on Terror, from a list taken from McCleary (2009). It appears that
most INGOs, if not all, that operate in Afghanistan also work in Pakistan, allowing me to
select the same INGOs for the two countries as an added control in order to test variation in
the independent variables of interest here. As mentioned in the previous chapter, given the
busy schedules and security concerns of the INGOs operating in Pakistan, only one of the 10
largest INGO recipients of US government funding in 2005 (6 or 7 of whom operate in
Afghanistan and Pakistan), INGO A, initially agreed to be interviewed for this project.
Unfortunately, after I started the interview process with INGO A, my points of
contact pulled out of the project, citing the sensitive nature of my questions and a schedule
that was too busy. Despite my best efforts, I was unable to re-gain this interview access, and
thus had to eliminate INGO A from my interview pool. I was able to gain access to only one
other organization that also works in Pakistan, and receives USAID funding, but I had to
branch out of my initial selection criteria and choose a smaller organization to do so: INGO
B, which I also included in the Afghanistan chapter. In accordance with the conditions under
which I conducted these interviews, and the conditions of my Institutional Review Board
approval, I will continue using the pseudonyms for both the organization and the
individuals I interviewed. The original data from these interviews allowed for a more indepth test of Hypotheses 5 and 6, with some support for them.
INGO B, the only INGO that granted me interview access regarding its work in
Pakistan, does not meet my initial selection criteria of being one of the top ten recipients of
US government funding, but as I discovered, sometimes being given permission to conduct
interviews is enough reason for inclusion in original research of this kind. I spoke to INGO
B’s Program Officer for Asia, Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa, a region that
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includes Pakistan, over the telephone in English, and will hereafter refer to him as Officer X.
Although not one of the top recipients of US government funding, INGO B is still a sizable
organization, with a total revenue of $317,301,472 in 2010, up from $281,854,094; in 2010,
$200,438,135 (i.e., more than half its revenue) came from US government
grants/contributions, according to its 990 tax report (www.ncss.urban.org). Just as in the
case of INGO A, however, this revenue does not all go to INGO B’s work in Pakistan, as the
organization operates in 40 different countries, with an emphasis on humanitarian work
and “emergency relief, protection of human rights, post-conflict development, [and]
resettlement assistance and advocacy,” according to the mission statement included in its
990 report.
As Officer X indicated, INGO B has been working in Pakistan for over three decades,
since 1980. Originally, its work entailed only working in Afghan refugee camps, an endeavor
that has decreased in scale but continued more than ten years into the war in Afghanistan,
since “there are still many, many people in those camps.” INGO B’s activities within those
camps include providing healthcare, education, and protection, the latter a term used to
describe helping secure the legal rights of these displaced people. Such protection can entail
working with the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to help the displaced gain
access to various services, or with the Pakistani government under their status as refugees.
Aside from its work with Afghan refugees, INGO B has engaged mainly in disaster response
after the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 floods in Pakistan. Furthermore, INGO B has been
working with internally displaced people (IDPs) within the country, particularly in the
FATA and Northwest Province regions, areas particularly hit by conflict as US and Pakistani
military efforts intensified in 2008 and beyond.
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When asked about INGO B’s relationship with the Pakistani government, Officer X
responded that “it’s a little bit difficult. We haven’t had major problems with the
government, but it’s not always easy.” The primary areas of difficulty include obtaining
permission from the government for INGO B’s employees to travel within Pakistan, and
getting visas for employees to enter Pakistan from outside the country. “Sometimes [the
government] rejects people’s visas,” Officer X added, and INGO B has faced obstacles in
bringing in expats and getting them to stay in Pakistan. But at the end of the day, “I think the
relations with local authorities will vary based on the person, and based on their
understanding [of our work],” said Officer X, alluding to the power and reach of what Lipsky
(1980) called “street-level bureaucracy.” Usually when the organization cannot secure a
visa for a particular individual to enter the country, it tries to find a replacement employee,
and so far that strategy has worked for INGO B.
Unlike its work in Afghanistan, INGO B’s work in Pakistan focuses mostly on
humanitarian needs and emergency responses, with short-term projects that may span one
year instead of five years, according to Officer X. Interestingly, the only area where INGO B
implements more expansive, long-term projects in Pakistan is female education. As
indicated earlier, INGO B does receive USAID funding for many of its projects, with a huge
influx of funding after the natural disasters that have plagued Pakistan in recent years,
namely the 2005 earthquake and the 2010 floods. That funding was extensive enough that
“it took a while to digest that,” in the words of Officer X. Furthermore, donor funding
(including from US government agencies) has been generous in support of INGO B’s work
with Afghan refugees in Pakistan: “there’s a lot of donor support for those people. Some of
them probably won’t go back [to Afghanistan],” even though occasionally the Pakistani
government indicates an intention to close down the refugee camps. In any case, the work
of INGO B in Pakistan, which, like the work of most INGOs, is often dictated by the
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availability of funding, confirms the predictions of Hypothesis 3: the US government is likely
to fund INGOs whose work reflects the particular socio-economic and political needs of a
country. In the case of Pakistan, the testimony of Officer X about INGO B verifies a
propensity by the US government to fund projects related to disaster response, female
education, and working with people displaced by conflict, both from Afghanistan and within
Pakistan itself.
As discussed extensively earlier, relations between the US and the Pakistani
government have deteriorated in the last couple of years, as highlighted by the fallout from
the US assassination of Osama bin Laden and the killing of Pakistani soldiers, which led to
the closing of the NATO supply route into Afghanistan for several months. Internally,
Pakistan has been rife with political instability, ever since the assassination of Benazir
Bhutto and the resignation of President Musharraf. When asked about INGO B’s relationship
with the Pakistani government, Officer X responded that the political turmoil within the
country “increases instability generally, and makes the environment more insecure. [So] we
have to be more careful, and review our security policies, but [such problems] haven’t
impacted our work in a direct way.” However, the US-Pakistani government interaction can
affect some aspects of INGO B’s work: “as relations with the US get more difficult, that does
kind of impact things like visas, [although] it’s always hard to draw a direct line between
them. As bilateral relations get worse, we are always less sure we’ll be able to get the visas
we need.” Challenges or difficulties posed by the Pakistani government to INGO B’s work do
not, however, extend to the point of threatening to close down the INGO or curtail its
activities. Certainly Office X gave no indication that these difficulties have negatively
affected its access to US government funding; here there is mixed support for Hypothesis 4
because despite what appears to be an increasingly restrictive regulatory environment, at
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least unofficially, for INGOs within Pakistan, the US government appears to continue its
funding patterns based on the officially open regulatory environment within the country.
The variable of most interest and relevance for the interview aspect of this project
was the respective INGOs’ relationships with the US government funding agencies.
Interestingly, and somewhat contrary to my expectations, Officer X indicated that for INGO
B, “there’s less a discussion about our objectives” when it comes to applying for and
receiving funding from USAID. “We don’t see US government counterinsurgency objectives
coming through the funding stream [in Pakistan] as in Afghanistan.” Unlike the case with its
work in Afghanistan, he could not recall an incident where INGO B decided to forego or
decided not to seek USAID funding for its Pakistan projects. However, acknowledging that
one of USAID’s goals appears to be building civil society capacity within Pakistan, Officer X
indicated that INGO B is not involved in such work or projects, with one exception. The
organization does conduct projects in the areas of “women’s protection and empowerment,”
with a focus on gender-based violence, work which can get into the category of femalecentered civil society building. Officer X demonstrated no resentment or negativity towards
such goals by the US government; on the contrary, if as he understands it building female
civil society institutions in Pakistan is a goal of the US government, his reaction suggested
that INGO B supports such efforts. Thus, the experience of INGO B in Pakistan suggests
support for Hypotheses 5 and 6: the US government is likely to fund and continue its
relationship with INGOs with whom it shares similar goals and missions and with whom it
has cooperative relationships. The caveat, of course, is that in the case of Pakistan, it
appears unlikely or much less likely than in the case of Afghanistan that a conflict between
the two actors would arise in the first place, although Officer X did mention that even for
Pakistan, “I’m sure there are funds out there linked to the [US] military,” and INGO B would
never go after such funding. It would appear, at least from the contrasting experiences of
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INGO B in Afghanistan and Pakistan, that conflicts between INGOs and US government
agencies are more likely to occur, and thus more likely to negatively impact relationships or
partnerships between the two, in cases where the US is exerting more extensive hard
power. In Afghanistan, where the US has led a full-fledged war for more than ten years,
INGOs are much more resistant to what they see as counter-insurgency-related funding
goals than in Pakistan, where US hard power efforts, intensified as they may be in the last
three or four years, exist on a much smaller scale.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided an in-depth case study of Pakistan as a target country of
US hard, soft, and combined power in the War on Terror, seeking to explain variation over
time in a geographic and political context that contrasts with the Afghanistan case,
discussed in the previous chapter. Unlike Afghanistan, the US has not carried out a fullblown war and invasion of Pakistan, although certainly in the past few years US hard power
operations have intensified inside the country. At the same time, the US has directed
extensive military and economic assistance (the latter an example of soft power) at Pakistan
since the start of the War on Terror. I have used this case study of Pakistan as an
opportunity to further test the hypotheses laid out earlier in the dissertation, comparing the
results with those from the Afghanistan case study.
Like the Afghanistan case study, I began with a background on US strategy or policy
towards Pakistan before 9/11, which served as a useful benchmark from which to compare
US strategy after the onset of the War on Terror. The test of Hypothesis 1 in Pakistan
demonstrated that the US has indeed used hard power in Pakistan to counteract what it
deemed was a short-term, immediate terrorist or security threat, and that as the threat level
has grown since 2008, the US has intensified its hard power efforts. Furthermore, and here
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we see a contrast with the Afghanistan case, US hard power efforts have also changed in
kind, not just in degree: for the first few years of the US War on Terror, US hard power in
Pakistan predominantly took the form of military assistance and training to the Pakistani
government. As the US began to view the Pakistani government as less reliable or capable,
however, it began to conduct military operations on its own, even within Pakistani borders,
leading to escalating tensions between the two governments.
I also find support for Hypothesis 2: the US has used soft power in Pakistan from
the early days of the War on Terror, in what appear to be efforts to counteract what it saw
as a potential long-term terrorist or security threat. Since the early months and years of the
War on Terror, there has been an intensification of soft power efforts, which at some point
became part of combined power efforts, when Pakistan faced challenges such as natural
disasters or refugee crises. As predicted by Hypotheses 3, the socio-economic and political
country context in Pakistan has in fact shaped the kinds of US soft power programs and NGO
projects implemented in the country. It appears that as the regulatory environment in
Pakistan has become more restrictive towards INGOs, at least unofficially, INGOs have had
some difficulty implementing their work; although, as indicated by the original interview
research in this chapter, there is not much evidence to suggest that this has negatively
affected the US from funding INGO work in the country. In fact, the evidence from this
chapter suggests that US concerns about the work of INGOs in Pakistan stem not from
restrictions on the movement of their employees or the granting of visas, but from concerns
about efficiency and corruption. These changes in US funding of INGOs, instituted since the
start of the US Af-Pak strategy, include a greater willingness to fund Pakistani government
agencies and local NGOs directly than to fund INGOs, although INGO B has not had an issue
with this particular funding strategy.
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Finally, the tests of Hypotheses 5 and 6, predicting that the US government will
fund NGOs with missions in alignment with its own, and then continue that relationship
where the interaction has been positive, do not yield results nearly as interesting as they
did in the Afghanistan case study. Evidence from the experience of INGO B suggests that in a
context where the US is not conducting a full-fledged war and utilizing its entire hard power
arsenal, there is less likely to be a conflict in mission between INGOs and the US
government, and thus less of a chance that the two actors will fail to cooperate or refuse to
work together on specific projects. The situation surrounding the US raid on Osama bin
Laden, however, presents an example of INGOs declaring their disapproval with the
approach of the US government, particularly the CIA, at least on paper, although the
evidence does not extend so far as to suggest that INGOs have subsequently refused to
receive funding from the US government. Thus, the results of this case study indicate some
support for Hypotheses 5 and 6, as the US government does appear likely to fund INGOs
with a common mission and goals and to continue its relationship with them if the
experience between the two actors has been positive or cooperative. However, even when
the two appear at odds, as in the case of the INGOs after the bin Laden raid, I found no
evidence that partnerships between the two actors were terminated, even on specific
projects. Of course, more extensive testing in the Pakistani context may yield more evidence
in favor of Hypotheses 5 and 6.
It is clear that the US saw Pakistan as a front in both the short-term and long-term
counter-terrorism efforts in the War on Terror since the 9/11 attacks. The most interesting
finding from this case study, then, is that until the US government escalated its hard power
efforts in Pakistan, most of its soft power efforts in the country, at least in its funding of
NGOs and INGOs, appear to have focused on disaster and humanitarian relief after the
earthquake in 2005, and then the floods in 2010. When US hard power in Pakistan changed
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and escalated around 2008, with increasing unilateral operations by the US military in the
form of drone attacks in the tribal regions, changes that occurred around the same time that
the Pakistani military itself was increasing its operations in those same regions, US soft
power efforts grew to include supporting internally people internally displaced by the
conflict. Of course, US funding of INGOs in Pakistan also included projects dealing with
refugees from Afghanistan, as the interview data suggests. It appears, then, that US soft
power efforts appear to be more extensive in contexts where US hard power is also more
extensive; the Pakistani case confirms what the Afghanistan case suggested. The US appears
to be more likely to use more soft power, or more extensive kinds of soft power, when it is
also using more extensive hard power in a particular context in the War on Terror. When it
comes to predicting US strategy in Pakistan—and prediction is the ultimate goal of social
science research, after all—the question will be whether or not US soft power in Pakistan
will continue in the same scope whenever US hard power efforts in the country come to an
end or are significantly scaled back. It would appear that the answer is no, although only
time and further empirical tests will tell for sure.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: SOFT POWER, NGOS, AND THE US WAR ON TERROR
It is not enough to simply suggest that the use of soft power, or the “ability to get
what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments” (Nye 2004a, x), i.e.,
relying on persuasive action or rhetoric rather than hard, military power, is normatively
desirable. From a theoretical standpoint, and perhaps even a substantive one, the
suggestion that the US should simply use more soft power in its dealings with the
governments and publics of foreign nations is far from satisfying. Any reading of Nye’s work
on soft, hard, and even smart power leaves one wondering: but when does the US
government decide to use soft power, rather than hard power? Under what conditions will
the president go ahead and command the use of force against a particular target, and will
such an order be accompanied by soft power, too?
Despite the many critiques aimed at Nye’s notions of soft or even smart power (see
Chapter II), the concept of soft power remains one worth exploring, explaining, and, for
policymakers, implementing in some fashion. So while it is not enough to suggest, as Nye
(2004a) does, that wielding soft power is a desirable action on the part of the US
government, neither is it enough to simply critique Nye’s ideas as idealistic and dismiss
them as overly prescriptive. What is needed, then, is a rigorous theory explaining the
conditions under which the US government—more specifically, the US executive, the
primary actor in foreign policy—will decide to use either soft or hard power, or any
combination of the two, in a particular international context. This dissertation has sought to
craft and test exactly such a theory, positing why the US executive will use soft, hard, or
combined power against terrorist or security threats in the War on Terror. The specific
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form of soft power examined in this dissertation has been US government funding of NGOs
that carry out various humanitarian and development projects in target countries.
In this concluding chapter, I review the theory I presented earlier in the dissertation
(Chapter III), making the case for why understanding the variation in the US executive’s use
of soft, hard, and combined power in the War on Terror requires an examination of the
threat level understood to be coming from target countries, the political and economic
context of such countries, and the mission and capabilities of the relevant NGOs. I then
summarize the most important findings from the empirical portions of the dissertation by
going through the six hypotheses presented in Chapter III, discussing the research findings
that relate to each of these hypotheses. I end with a discussion of the implications of these
findings, rounding off the chapter with some thoughts on future research.
A More Rigorous Theory of Hard, Soft, and Smart Power Decision-making
Taking into account the extensive critiques of Nye’s soft and smart power
framework (Chapter II), I have theorized about the conditions under which the US is more
likely to use hard, soft, or variations of combined power in its War on Terror. I started by
revising Nye’s definition of soft power itself, although I have not really strayed from Nye’s
(2004b) definition of hard power, a term referring to traditional military power, as well as
economic power when used to punish or threaten, i.e., through sanctions. My concept of soft
power, however, is much narrower than Nye’s (2004b). I conceptualize “soft power” as a
consciously-utilized government strategy that uses non-hard power methods, aimed at
persuasion, to influence a target government or target population in a way that will enhance
US interests; soft power is a strategic means of achieving an end or a goal. In this
dissertation, I have also substituted the term “combined” power for “smart power,” arguing
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that the exact makeup of combined power, or its proportions of hard and soft power, will
vary by context.
My theory seeks to explain both temporal and geographic variation in the US
government’s strategy, accounting for its hard and soft power elements and a variety of
possible combinations of the two. I argue that the independent variables shaping US
strategy at a specific point in time and in a specific context are the preferences of the
executive, the threat level and/or type of threat posed by the target country, the target
country’s political and economic context, and the preferences, goals, and work of the
relevant NGOs. I specifically examined the US executive (i.e., the president and his advisors)
as the primary decision-maker in US foreign policy, as scholars have identified the president
as the central actor and decision-maker in this area (Wittkopf and McCormick 1998; Banks
and Straussman 1999; Rockman 2000), with Congress playing a less important role
(Rockman 2000).
Having established the importance of the executive in foreign policy decisionmaking, my theory posits that the next step in the formulation of foreign policy strategy in
the War on Terror is the US executive’s assessment of the threat level posed by a target
country. The important distinction here is between short-term, immediate terrorist threats
and long-term, potential terrorist threats. In other words, the US fights against actual,
existing terrorists who pose an immediate threat against the US, but the US also works to
prevent actual threats from developing and becoming immediate threats in the present. I
argued that the threat level determined by the US executive to be coming from a particular
country will determine what kind of power—hard, soft, or combined—the US decides to use
to fight the terrorist threat. The use of military force is seen as necessary to fight and
capture existing terrorists but in the long run, a different strategy must be adopted to
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prevent future threats from emerging and threatening US security (Gates 2009). When the
US executive determines that a specific country poses a short-term terrorist or security
threat to the US, he is more likely to decide to use hard power against such a threat.
On the other hand, when facing what it deems to be a long-term, potential terrorist
threat, the US executive is likely to use soft power in the target country. This is based on the
belief that instability, a lack of development, and/or extremist ideology are important
causes of terrorism, and therefore addressing these causes through forms of soft power can
help eliminate this long-term threat (Tujan et al. 2004, Wunderle and Brier 2007, Tayekh
and Gvosdev 2003). In other words, populations of certain poor, under-developed countries
exhibit grievances that may lead them to take up terrorism against the US (Moghdam 2006,
Wunderle and Brier 2007), and policymakers view tools of soft power as ways to help
counteract such grievances. Furthermore, tools of soft power can also help mitigate the dire
social, political, and economic conditions inherent in “failed” or “weak” states, whose
existence is often understood as an explanation for the growth of terrorism, particularly
against the West (Tayekh and Gvosdev 2003; Chenoweth 2005; Patrick 2006). Frequently,
however, short-term and long-term threats exist side-by-side in target countries, and thus
my theory posits that with the existence of both kinds of threats, US policymakers will
pursue strategies based on both hard and soft power—smart power—whose proportional
makeup will vary depending on the independent variables examined here.
Once the US executive has taken into account the threat level coming from a
particular target country, the president and his advisors also consider the target country
context. The political and economic needs of a country will influence the kinds of soft power
tools the US uses. Since this theory examines US government funding of NGOs as a specific
kind of soft power, I have argued that a target country’s regulatory environment as it relates
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to NGOs will also help shape the specifics of US soft or combined power efforts that utilize
NGOs. This is because the governments of target countries may see NGOs as threatening and
try to limit their activities (Bratton 1989; Salamon 2006; Ward 2007; Jalali 2008; Stevens
2010).
But why have I chosen US government funding of NGOs as the specific form of soft
power under examination in this dissertation? NGOs are non-state actors, although they are
often funded at least in part by governments, through agencies such as USAID in the United
States. Basically, NGOs are “private, self-governing, non-profit institutions” with goals
ranging from promoting economic development, environmental protection, human rights,
and conflict resolution to providing humanitarian aid to helping foster civil society and
democratic institutions (Aall 2000, 124). INGOs are international NGOs or NGOs based in
one (usually developed) country and operating in another; as Kerlin (2006) describes, they
operate in their various sub-fields but in international contexts, while Southern NGOs
(SNGOs), also referred to as “local NGOs,” are NGOs based in the developing world, with
whom INGOs often form partnerships.
Governments have increasingly relied on NGOs as conduits through which they
wield soft power by dispensing foreign aid to developing countries in recent years, because
of the comparative advantages these organizations are seen to possess. These advantages
include their credibility among local populations and their grassroots level connections
(Evans-Kent and Bleiker 2003, 103), as well as their flexibility and efficiency when
compared to official government agencies (Tvedt 1998; Ahmed and Potter 2006). Because
they can be more flexible, efficient, and trustworthy than government agencies, and because
they pursue a variety of activities, government-funded NGOs are important tools of soft
power that are also particularly relevant in the War on Terror.
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After clarifying why NGOs are theoretically and substantively interesting as tools of
soft power wielded by the US, I argued that the relationship between NGOs and
governments, explored extensively in the NGO literature, also impacts the US government’s
strategizing in its ongoing War on Terror. The relationship between the funding
government (in this case the US) and NGOs can vary on a spectrum from cooperative to
confrontational (Najam 2000), based on the mission, goals, and capabilities of each. A more
positive relationship between the US government and respective NGOs utilized in the War
on Terror can help explain the continued partnership between the two actors, and vice
versa. Thus the mission and capabilities of the NGOs themselves is the final piece of the
puzzle, helping to explain variation in the specifics of the US government’s implementation
of a soft or combined power strategy that relies on NGOs. In presenting my theory, I have
also pointed out that these independent variables—the threat level, the political and
economic context of the target country, and the preferences and capabilities of NGOs
themselves—not only interact with one another, but can also vary over time, accounting for
the complex outcome that has been US counter-terrorism strategy since the 9/11 attacks.
Summary of Findings
This dissertation has not been just a conceptual exercise—i.e., coming up with a
logically convincing theory—but also an empirical one, in which I tested my theory in both
an overview of the entire War on Terror, as well as more specific case studies of how the
War on Terror has played out in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Through the empirical chapters
of this dissertation, I found broad support for all six hypotheses presented in Chapter III,
although the clearest evidence was for Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Hypothesis 1: The US executive is more likely to rely on hard power tools, i.e., military
power, rather than soft power tools, in addressing short-term, immediate, existing
terrorist threats.
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As explained in Chapter IV, the chapter applying my theory to a big-picture
examination of the War on Terror, the US executive has clearly made decisions to use hard
power against what was deemed to be an immediate, short-term terrorist or security threat
against the United States. The US executive at the time, President G. W. Bush and his
advisors, chose to use hard power against the actors it held responsible for the attacks, and
those it deemed posed a short-term security or terrorist threat, i.e., the Taliban government
in Afghanistan. This explains the US military offensive in Afghanistan that began less than a
month after the 9/11 terror attacks against the United States. Furthermore, the 2003 US
war in Iraq, as controversial as it was and continues to be, also provides strong evidence in
support of Hypothesis 1. The evidence from government documents and memoirs of
President G. W. Bush and his advisors suggest that the decision to go to war there was a
response to what they determined was a short-term terrorist or security threat. Saddam
Hussein, they determined, was in possession of and planned to use weapons of mass
destruction. The fact that the intelligence leading to this conclusion was faulty at best does
not change the logic of the decision-making process of the US executive at the time, i.e., Iraq
poses a short-term security or terrorist threat against the US, and the US must counter such
a threat through the use of hard or military power.
Interestingly, the evidence catalogued in Chapter IV also suggests that the terrorist
or security threat level deemed by the US executive to be coming from a particular target
country accounts for not only initial decisions to use force against such countries, but also
variation in the degree to which the US has used hard power against those countries.
Specifically, Hypothesis 1 explains not just the start of the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, but also what has become known as the military “surges” in both warzones. In Iraq
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in 2007, and in Afghanistan first in late 2006 and then more dramatically in 2009 under
President Obama, the US dramatically increased troop levels and military offensives
because of an increase in the threat levels determined by the US executives to be emanating
from both those countries.
Chapter VI, the case study on the War on Terror in Pakistan, provides further
evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. The US has indeed used hard power in Pakistan when
facing what it deemed was a short-term, immediate terrorist or security threat, and that as
the threat level has escalated in recent years, US hard power strategy has also intensified.
Interestingly, however, in Pakistan the US was mostly working in conjunction with the
Pakistani government in its hard power efforts, until recent years, when the US began to act
alone militarily against targets within Pakistan. US hard power in Pakistan began in
partnerships with the government there, after President Musharraf pledged himself an ally
of the US in its War on Terror. By the time President Obama took office, however, the US
began to see the Pakistani government as either unable or unwilling to take adequate,
effective action against terrorists within its borders, effectively resulting in what the US saw
as an increasing terrorist or security threat coming from Pakistan. Thus, President Obama’s
AFPAK strategy, announced in early 2009, re-classified Pakistan as a target country on par
with Afghanistan itself, and since then the US has intensified military efforts, including
controversial drone attacks, often conducted without the knowledge or approval of the
Pakistani government, against targets within Pakistan’s borders. Such operations included
the assassination of Osama bin Laden in 2011.
Hypothesis 2: The US executive is more likely to rely on soft power tools, rather than
hard power tools, in addressing long-term, potential terrorist threats in an effort to
prevent them from escalating into immediate, short-term terrorist threats. In contexts
where both a short-term and long-term terrorist threat is determined to exist, the US
executive is more likely to rely on a combination of hard and soft power tools, rather
than choosing just one of these. The kind of combination that emerges, or its
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proportion of hard to soft power, will depend in part on the combination of the threat;
i.e., if the short-term threat is minimal and the long-term threat is extensive, US
strategy will rely on more soft power than hard power, and vice versa.
The empirical chapters of this dissertation also provide strong support for
Hypothesis 2. In fact, what we might think of as the ultimate expressions of US hard power
throughout the course of the War on Terror, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have actually
been cases where the US has used combined power. As Chapter IV demonstrates, the US did
not rely only on hard power strategy in Afghanistan, dispensing humanitarian aid to the
population (a form of soft power), based on the executive’s determination that along with
the immediate, short-term terrorist or security threat, Afghanistan also posed a long-term,
potential terrorist or security threat against the US. Furthermore, as discussed in the
findings pertaining to Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2 also accounts for increases in the degree
of soft power (in combination with hard power, in the case of the war in Afghanistan) used.
The role of the US military itself there changed, from an actor or institution engaged just in
hard power to one that has increasingly adopted elements of soft power to make it a force of
combined power in US strategy, through things like Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs). This increase in the use of soft power was another component of Obama’s AFPAK
strategy, based on the acknowledgement that Afghanistan presented an increasingly
combined terrorist or security threat to the US and must therefore be the target of
combined US power,
The US war in Iraq also provides support for Hypothesis 2, as demonstrated in
Chapter IV. While the US initially went to war in Iraq as a response to what it deemed was
an immediate threat from Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, the picture grew
more complicated after the initiation of military operations there. Soon after the war in Iraq
began, the US executive decided to pursue reconstruction, development, and eventually,
political reform or democratization in efforts to stabilize the country and prevent further
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security or terrorist threats from developing. In other words, US soft power in Iraq, which
was increasingly used in combination with hard power, was wielded to counteract longterm or potential security or terrorist threats from the country.
As predicted by Hypothesis 2, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (the latter in which
major US combat operations ended last year) remain primarily military operations, despite
the combined power deployed there. However, the National Security Strategies, as well as
the Strategies for Combating Terrorism, repeatedly state the White House’s intention to use
forms of soft power, including promoting economic development and working with civil
society groups and non-governmental organizations, to stabilize vulnerable countries and
try to eliminate political and economic grievances in target countries. In other words, the US
has since the early days of the War on Terror pursued a strategy of using soft power,
sometimes in combination with hard power as in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but at
other times on its own, to counteract long-term terrorist or security threats. Updated
versions of the Strategies in 2006 demonstrate a shift towards using more soft power,
particularly in the Middle East, and specifically to promote democratic reform through
Bush’s so-called Freedom Agenda. The 2010 National Security Strategy, released under
President Obama, also more clearly emphasized US diplomacy, engagement, and statecraft,
in what may be considered not a major substantive shift towards more soft power but
perhaps more nuance in the US expression of soft power around the world.
Finally, Chapter VI shows that the US has used soft power in Pakistan from the early
days of the War on Terror, in what appear to be efforts to counteract what it saw as a
potential long-term terrorist or security threat. Since the early months and years of the War
on Terror, there has been an intensification of soft power efforts, which at some point
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became part of combined power efforts, when Pakistan has been faced with things like
natural disasters or refugee crises.
Hypothesis 3: Where a long-term or combined terrorist threat is determined by the US
executive to exist, the socio-economic and political needs of that country’s population
will shape the kind of soft power tools the US uses, including the types of NGOs it funds.
For example, the US government is likely to fund economic development programs in a
country with high levels of poverty, and likely to fund literacy programs in a country
with low literacy rates, etc.

Chapters V and VI, the case studies of Afghanistan and Pakistan, provide support for
Hypothesis 3. As Chapter V indicates, Afghanistan is a very poor country plagued by a
variety of urgent socio-economic and political problems, including very high
unemployment, very limited access to healthcare among the population, very strong local or
ethnic ties but a weak national identity, corruption, the dominance of the opium trade in the
agricultural sector, and a lack of education, particularly among females. Soft power
spending by the US government agency USAID (the United States Agency for International
Development), an important measurement of US soft power spending in the country that is
also often outsourced to NGOs, provides significant support for Hypothesis 3. USAID
spending has focused on sectors such as economic development, power, healthcare,
education, and governance. Unlike what would be predicted by Hypothesis 3, though, there
is less of a focus, at least by USAID, on combating poppy or opium production, although
spending on the agriculture sector partly addresses this challenge.
More specifically and more to the point in this project examining US government
funding of NGOs as a form of soft power, the work of US government-funded INGO work in
Afghanistan has focused on the sectors of agriculture, education and training, women’s
programs, healthcare, local governance, food security, community infrastructure, water and
sanitation, emergency intervention, and working with refugees. Broadly speaking, these

266
sectors align with the most urgent socio-political and economic needs of Afghanistan,
outlined earlier in Chapter V.
Chapter VI, which provides a detailed look at how the War on Terror has played out
in Pakistan, also demonstrates general support for Hypothesis 3. Pakistan is also a poor,
developing country (although not as poor as Afghanistan), beset by problems including low
adult literacy, particularly among females, limited access to electricity and healthcare,
shortages of clean water, a corrupt and fractionalized political system with a very dominant
military, frequent natural disasters, and negative public attitudes towards the US (the latter
being a problem for the US, but not necessarily for the Pakistanis). As would be generally
predicted by these extensive needs, a breakdown of international aid to Pakistan (including
from the US) has focused on the sectors of infrastructure and social welfare services,
energy, transportation, education, health and nutrition, agriculture and livestock, rural
development,

governance,

gender

and

women’s

development,

and

crisis

prevention/disaster reduction and environment/natural resources.
More importantly, Chapter VI demonstrates that USAID spending in Pakistan has
included spending on infrastructure, education, and healthcare, as well as increasing and
improving access to energy, promoting gender equity and good governance, and providing
emergency or disaster relief.

As mentioned earlier, much of this USAID spending is

outsourced to NGOs, although the agency does not provide the relevant figures. More
significantly, then, an examination of the work of US government-funded INGOs in Pakistan
(who, like in Afghanistan, often work with local NGOs) reflects a commitment to a broad
range of socio-economic and political needs in the country, providing broad support for
Hypothesis 3. The US government has funded INGOs working in the sectors of food
security, healthcare, education, water sanitation, and emergency response in Pakistan, the
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latter particularly after the disastrous earthquake in 2005 and the extensive floods in 2010.
However, we do not see as much of a focus on INGO work in the areas of political reform or
building civil society as might be predicted by Hypothesis 3, based on the glaring political
needs in Pakistan.
Hypothesis 4: Where a long-term or combined terrorist threat is determined by the US
executive to exist, the US is likely to use more soft power, in the form of funding NGOs,
where the government of the target country places fewer limitations on NGO activity,
and vice versa.
As Chapter V suggests, the regulatory environment towards NGOs within
Afghanistan is generally open, which can help explain the extent and continuity of US
funding of NGOs in the country since the start of the War on Terror. However, it is
important to note that one trend in Afghanistan has been USAID-funded partnerships
between INGOs and government ministries in the country. These kinds of relationships
reflect the active role by the US in shaping governance in Afghanistan, which may have had
a positive impact on the regulatory environment facing INGOs in the country. Such an open
environment in turn probably positively impacted the propensity for the US government to
fund NGO projects in Afghanistan, as expected by Hypothesis 4. I did not predict, however,
what appears to be this endogenous relationship between the legal or regulatory system,
shaped in part by the US in Afghanistan, and US funding of INGOs in that country: it appears
the US helped mold the conditions favorable to a society where NGOs are allowed to operate
freely, which impacted its funding of NGOs and a reliance on them to carry out development
projects there.
Interestingly, however, the interviews with workers from INGOs operating in
Afghanistan suggest that sometimes, restrictions that are informal or not codified may
impact specific projects carried out by INGOs in the country. The deteriorating security
situation, for instance, has increasingly limited the geographic scope of INGOs operating in
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Afghanistan. Furthermore, concerns about corruption and financial ties to the Taliban have
in some cases resulted in the US government deciding not to fund specific INGO projects in
the country. Thus, the results here go beyond the predictions of Hypothesis 4: some factors
in the environment of a target country, such as the security situation or the prevalence of
corruption, may not be written into laws governing NGO activity but may still restrict the
activities of INGOs or the propensity of the US government to fund them. Furthermore, the
evidence from Chapter V indicates that the US government may forego funding particular
INGO projects, rather than eliminating an entire partnership with a particular INGO, based
on such factors.
Chapter VI on Pakistan provides less definitive evidence in support of Hypothesis 4.
This case study shows that unlike in Afghanistan, there is no possibly endogenous
relationship between the regulatory environment (which in Afghanistan was influenced by
the US itself) and the US government funding of NGOs in the country, since the US has not
shaped Pakistani public policy in the way it did in Afghanistan. Just as corruption and
nepotism may serve as unofficial restrictions on NGO activities in Afghanistan, it appears
that cultural attitudes and suspicion of foreigners may act as unofficial restrictions on NGO
activities in an otherwise NGO-friendly regulatory environment in Pakistan, as suggested by
recently proposed amendments to the NGO law there.
In the aftermath of the US raid in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden, some
INGOs have seen restrictions on the travel of their workers and on the dispensation of any
aid material they have brought into the country. Here are cases that exhibit an increasingly
restrictive environment for INGOs in Pakistan, despite the fact that officially, the NGO
regulatory environment still does not codify prohibitions on the travel of INGO employees,
or sanction the government holding of their supplies. Hypothesis 4 would predict that such
a tightening operating environment for INGOs might lead the US to limit or at least be more
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careful about funding such organizations who work in Pakistan, but there is no evidence of
that yet. However, the expansion of the USAID Inspector General’s Office in Pakistan in
order to deal with the problem of corruption in aid delivery reflects an adaptive strategy by
the US government to deal with another unofficial problem impacting the work of INGOs in
the country, lending some support to Hypothesis 4. The interview data from a US
government-funded INGO operating in Pakistan provides limited support, if any, for
Hypothesis 4. Despite what appears to be an increasingly restrictive regulatory
environment, at least unofficially, for INGOs within Pakistan, in the form of denying visas to
INGO workers and restricting their movement, the US government appears to continue its
funding patterns based on the officially open regulatory environment within the country.
Hypothesis 5: The US government (through various agencies, such as USAID) is likely
to utilize a specific NGO as part of its soft power approach to fighting a long-term
terrorist threat when the preferences of the NGO align with those of the government,
i.e., when the NGO does not find a conflict between its own mission and the projects for
which the US funds it.
Hypothesis 6: The US government (specifically the funding agency, such as USAID) is
more likely to continue to utilize a specific NGO in the fight against a long-term
terrorist threat if the relationship between them has been more cooperative and less
confrontational. The US government is less likely to continue to utilize a specific NGO
in its fight against a long-term terrorist threat (i.e. “non-engagement”) if the
relationship between them has been more confrontational and less cooperative.

Chapter V, the case study on Afghanistan, shows support for both Hypotheses 5 and
6 but not for NGOs per se; rather, the evidence suggests that the US government is more
likely to fund specific NGO/INGO projects and continue such projects when the preferences
or mission of the NGO in question do not conflict with those of the US, and when the
relationship between the two actors has been more positive (more cooperative and less
confrontational). Furthermore, the evidence from the original interviews with the two
INGOs working in Afghanistan suggests that INGOs themselves will only go after project
funding when they see a specific project as being in line with their own mission and values,
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and will neglect to pursue US government funding in cases where the project in question
does not fit in with their goals or mission. The empirical reality is more nuanced than
Hypothesis 5 and 6 predicted, although the general direction of the prediction holds: an
organization like INGO A will not go after funding for projects and may resist USAID
requirements that go against its mission or values, such as ones involving engagement with
PRTs, but this does not mean that an INGO will seek to end its overall partnership with
USAID. So while Hypotheses 5 and 6 focused on the US government’s role in choosing to
fund and/or continue funding a specific INGO, the case studies suggest that the INGOs
themselves have just as important a role in deciding to pursue or continue a partnership
with the US government, as it relates to specific projects. It appears, however, that just
because an INGO chooses not to seek funding for a particular USAID project which it sees as
compromising its mission of serving the needy regardless of their political affiliation, for
instance, it may still seek funding for different USAID projects in the future.
As pertains to Hypothesis 6, the evidence from Chapter V also suggests a more
nuanced reality than was predicted. As the data from the interviews demonstrates, the US
government may seek to end the funding of a particular INGO project without going so far
as to end the entire partnership with the INGO itself. The continuing negotiations between
USAID and INGO A reflect an eagerness on the part of both actors to continue the
partnership between INGO A and USAID, specific projects notwithstanding. Such an
empirical reality was certainly not predicted by Hypothesis 6.
Finally, the evidence from Chapter VI, the case study of Pakistan in the War on
Terror, does not generate findings nearly as interesting as in the Afghanistan case study.
Evidence from the interviews with INGO B suggests there was much less conflict between
the mission of the INGOs and the US government funding agencies even for specific projects,
perhaps because Pakistan is a context where the US is not conducting a full-fledged war and
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utilizing its entire hard power arsenal. For the most part, then, we did not see instances in
Pakistan where the two actors failed to cooperate, even just for specific projects. The
situation surrounding the US raid on Osama bin Laden, however, presents an example of
INGOs declaring their disapproval with the approach of the US government, particularly the
CIA, at least on paper. Even in that situation, the evidence does not extend so far as to
suggest that INGOs have subsequently refused to receive funding from the US government.
Thus the results from Chapter VI indicate some support for Hypotheses 5 and 6, as the US
government does appear likely to fund INGOs with a common mission and goals and to
continue its relationship with them if the experience between the two actors has been
positive or cooperative. However, even when the two appear at odds, as in the case of the
INGOs after the bin Laden raid, I found no evidence that partnerships between the two
actors were terminated, even on specific projects.
Implications of the Research Findings
This dissertation set out to do three things: 1) re-conceptualize Nye’s soft power
framework as a consciously-utilized strategy employing methods other than hard power,
aimed at target countries to enhance US interests, 2) theorize about the conditions under
which the US is likely to use hard, soft, and combined power in the specific context of the
War on Terror, and 3) test this revised theory through empirical examinations of the War
on Terror in general, but also through case studies of the US War on Terror in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Given these broad objectives, this study has important implications for
research on soft power, on counter-terrorism strategies, and on studies of US foreign policy
decision-making in general.
First, this research project has demonstrated the limitations of Nye’s notions of soft
power. While it may be tempting to simply prescribe that the US should not rely so much on
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hard power and should use more soft power in its dealings with the governments and
publics of other nations, any academic or theoretical discussions must go beyond that.
Furthermore, Nye’s concept of soft power itself is rather ambiguous and vague, and his
work does not sufficiently clarify who uses soft power, when, and how. Thus the early
portion of this dissertation made clear that in order for the concept of soft power to be
useful either theoretically or substantively, Nye’s work must be improved upon
significantly.
Second, the theoretical portion of this dissertation reflects a belief that despite the
limitations of Nye’s work, the concept of soft power remains worth exploring both
theoretically and substantively. Thus, I presented a more rigorous theory of the conditions
under which the US executive is likely to use soft, hard, or combined power in a specific
context, the War on Terror. The theory section highlighted the necessity of examining
various factors to help explain the complex, varied outcome that has been US counterterrorism strategy in the last eleven years. In order to account for temporal and geographic
variation in US strategy, we must examine the threat level seen by the US executive to come
from a particular country, the socio-economic and political context of said country, and the
mission and capabilities of the soft power actor involved, in this case the NGOs themselves.
Furthermore, the theory presented in this dissertation demonstrated both the theoretical
and substantive significance of studying NGOs as a particular form of soft power, bringing
what has generally been the domain of the public policy literature into the realm of
international relations and US foreign policy research.
Third, the empirical findings of this dissertation suggest that indeed, the US
executive is more likely to use hard power against what he and his advisors see as a shortterm, immediate terrorist threat. Alternatively, the US executive appears more likely to use

273
soft power against what is deemed a longer-term, potential terrorist threat, and combined
power, whose proportions of hard and soft power will vary, against a combined threat. Most
interestingly, perhaps, it appears that the US use of hard power in a particular context in
fact necessitates the simultaneous or future use of soft power, as evidenced by the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and even the Pakistani case. Furthermore, the empirical evidence,
particularly from the case studies on Afghanistan and Pakistan, suggests that the US
government will likely fund NGO projects based on the socio-economic and political needs
of the target country, although the record also demonstrates that the two will not match up
perfectly.
The regulatory environment surrounding NGOs in the target country can also
impact US funding of NGO projects, although perhaps not to the degree to which was
predicted by the hypotheses. Additionally, other less codified factors can restrict NGO
activities and possibly the US funding of such NGOs; these limitations include problems such
as corruption or a deteriorating security environment. Finally, the evidence from the case
studies suggests the importance of an alignment between the mission of a particular NGO
that can be potentially funded by a US government agency, although this factor appears
more relevant for particular projects rather than the entire relationship between an NGO or
INGO and the US government agencies. Furthermore, the role of NGOs themselves in the
relationship between them and the US government agencies that may fund them appears
very pronounced, and as important to acknowledge and study as the role of the US
government agency itself.
Future Research
While this dissertation has made significant inroads in the literature on US counterterrorism strategy and the use of soft power specifically, there remains a great deal of
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potential for future research in this area. First, this study has examined one specific form of
soft power, US government funding of NGOs that work in target countries. Future research
can explore the US government’s wielding of other forms of soft power, such as funding
various media outlets and programs, the rhetoric of US foreign policy leaders, foreign
exchange programs between the US and other countries, etc. Studying such alternative
forms of US soft power should not change the basic theoretical framework put in place in
this project, as it relates to the use of soft power against long-term or potential terrorist or
security threats and the socio-economic and political context of the target country, but it
will probably also require further theorizing about factors specific to different forms of soft
power.
Contexts other than the US War on Terror also present important avenues for future
research on the subject. Under what conditions will the US executive decide to use soft or
combined power in situations outside the global War on Terror (or War against al-Qaeda, as
the Obama administration has renamed it)? For instance, what explains the variation in the
use of US hard, soft, and combined power in addressing the complexities and challenges
posed by the ongoing Arab Spring? Alternatively, what explains the use of US soft power
targeted at other nations during peacetime? Does the US use soft power in targeting its
allies or friends, or is US soft power always directed at countries who may be potentially
hostile to the United States?
Methodologically speaking, a great deal of work remains to be done on the topic of
the use of soft, hard, and combined power as well. As explained in Chapter III, this
dissertation has used qualitative methods to empirically support what has essentially been
a theory-building exercise. Now that there is a theory in place that has identified the key
independent variables that account for the variation in the outcome of US counter-terrorism
strategy, attempts to test this theory with more empirical rigor can commence. The theory
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can be tested with a larger n, through more case studies from the region, as well as through
alternative methods, such as experimentation. Additionally, attempts to operationalize the
variables in ways that lend themselves to mixed-method or some sort of quantitative testing
can also be tried. For instance, more quantitative measures of the threat levels seen by the
US executives to be emanating from various countries. Furthermore, more uniform
measures of the socio-economic and political contexts of target countries can also be
examined (along with increasing the n) of the countries under study. Also, increasing the n
of INGOs studied and interviews conducted, even for the country cases of Afghanistan and
Pakistan themselves, would increase the reliability of the research findings. With regards to
the case studies, interviews with USAID officials or country program officers would be an
additional way to measure US government strategy, helping to further test my theory. Are
USAID officials consciously responding to particular threats when funding and
implementing NGO programs in particular countries, or are their decisions to carry out
particular projects more a function of budget constraints, an alternative explanation to the
kinds and degree of soft power used?
Finally, while I made what I consider a strong case in Chapter III against taking into
account domestic factors in accounting for variation in the US government’s use of soft,
hard, and combined power in the War on Terror, such factors may still be theoretically and
substantively important. Even though the president and his advisors are the primary
movers and decision-makers in US foreign policy, some members of Congress may still play
a role in outlining the specifics of hard, soft, or combined power strategies. Interview data
from Chapter V also suggests that the state of the US economy and the budget deficit may
also impact US government funding of INGOs or the USAID budget in general. Future
research can address such factors and determine the degree to which they explain US
strategy in the War on Terror.
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